THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

THESIS APPROVED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF DIVINITY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

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To

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FOREWORD

In a previous volume, *Modern Theories of Religion*, after surveying various views, I concluded by stating my preference for basing a philosophy of religion upon religious experience, in its psychological and historical aspects. After long delay, due in part to the necessities of war service, I have been able to carry the suggestion a step further.

The purpose of the present book is, first, to afford some characterization of religious experience taken collectively, in such aspects as may be held to be represented in their measure, in all forms of religion. In the second place, an attempt is made to give some account and estimate of the philosophical significance of such experience. The title is intended to imply this, rather than any philosophical scheme. What is offered is of the character of prolegomena to religious philosophy.

My indebtedness to others is wide, not least to many with whose views I am not in agreement. Most of all am I indebted to the spirit and method of William James, even more than to his writings. My philosophical sympathies are probably evident in what I have written. They arise from a conviction that the teaching of modern psychology necessitates a change in the method of philosophy. The task of philosophy is not to seek simply

a logical satisfaction in an abstract sense, but to seek a rational, unified, and systematic account of experience and its implication as a whole. In doing so, I believe it must find the clue to the meaning of experience in the process of experience, and regard those human values which make experience possible and give it meaning as indicative in some way of the nature of the reality found through experience. A genetic treatment of experience may find in its origin and development a better way of understanding its nature and anticipating its ends than centuries of mere reasoning have provided for us.

I am greatly indebted to my friend and colleague, Rev. Dr. C. Ryder Smith, for reading the proof-sheets and making many valuable criticisms and suggestions.

E. S. WATERHOUSE

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PART I

PSYCHOLOGICAL

SECTION A

RELIGION IN HUMAN LIFE

I

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

THE commonest words are seldom those most closely defined. That mankind universally possesses and expresses some form of religion is acknowledged by all; but if we ask what are the essential characteristics of religion we are met with no answer that bears the stamp of common assent. Until times that are comparatively recent, no attempt was made to give a scientific definition of religion. Modern definitions do not lack in numbers, but they are not marked by unanimity, save perhaps in the general recognition of the fact that the universality of religion through all levels of culture forbids a definition based on its higher forms alone. So wide a difference is otherwise apparent, in conception and expression alike, that it has been remarked that the definition of religion is a matter of taste.[1] It is evident, therefore, that the venture of characterizing religion is unpromising, but the need to define one's terms is uncompromising, and if unanimity cannot be attained, it is at least possible to be unambiguous, and to state at

[1] Höffding, *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., p. 109.

the outset what are here understood to be the distinctive marks of religion.

One way of approaching the question favoured to-day is that of regarding religion as a specific mode of human behaviour, a fact that is not likely to be disputed, and seeking its significance by a genetic treatment of its rites and beliefs. If we work backward, we are led in the case of religion, just as with all other forms of behaviour, to the elemental instincts which are the dynamos of life. As Schiller put it, 'while philosophers are disputing on the government of the world, hunger and love are performing the task.' With religion in view, one might emphasise the instincts which concern self-preservation, a point to which attention will be turned later. Reference to the fundamental instincts, however, does not carry us very far. Whilst some aspects of human behaviour exhibit these instincts in an almost pure form, the contribution they have made to the development of religion has been in conjunction with other factors which have widely changed their character. Hence their modification, or, if it be preferred, sublimation, becomes even more significant than the instincts themselves. Especially since religion is so exclusively human do the factors superimposed by the human consciousness count for more than the instinctive basis in which both man and beast share. It would not be an unjust comparison to liken the relation between the primitive instincts and the highly developed forms of religion to that which exists between the 'feeling-background' of consciousness and the power of abstract reasoning. Though, in each case, the line runs unbroken from lowest to highest, in neither

is there anything in the beginning, taken by itself, which can account for the end. In the same manner, it is not denied that an instinctive background is behind the whole of man's higher activities—his quest for knowledge, beauty, goodness, and God. But the significance of such activities is to be found by integrating their constituent factors, not differentiating the bare roots, as if they alone mattered. Moreover, we are learning that the process of evolution is to be viewed as the confluence of many streams from many sources rather than the slow widening of the channel of a stream that flows from a single spring. The problem is one of origins, not origin, and no single factor, however primitive and important it may be, is to be invested with the sole importance. There are more things in religion than are dreamt of in our biology.

It must not be forgotten, also, that as yet we are too near the event to recognize in true proportion the significance of the mental revolution that has followed Darwin. The notion of man as a creature apart, possessing in rationality a power that wholly separated him from the brutes, has vanished. But it is possible to over-estimate the common heritage of man and animal. If there were found upon a root of primroses one blossom as tall as a sunflower, whilst the others were normal, two considerations would be of equal importance. The one would be that all came from the same root; the other would demand some adequate explanation why this particular flower had so vastly outstripped the rest. We are not likely now to forget the common stock, but we have yet to solve the problem why man has become what he is, whilst, so far as we can tell, his nearest relatives have

remained practically stationary. In the same way, the genetic account of religion, leading us back to the common root instincts, reminds us of a factor we cannot neglect if we are to understand the place of religion in life. Yet that does not explain why from such a basis has come a development that so greatly transcends its basis. Nor does it indicate a means by which we can distinguish the religious reactions from those that have grown up side by side with them.

Similar considerations apply to those other accounts of religion in which the pre-eminent importance is given to emotion. If it be argued that religion is a special development of certain emotions, the term 'emotion' is, in the language of logic, 'undistributed,' and affords room for much that is not connected with religion. Thus we need some further criterion, by means of which to mark out religion from the whole welter of emotions. If, with Schleiermacher and others, we select one particular emotion as pre-eminently the religious emotion, we fail to do justice to the fact that almost the whole range of emotions enters into religion. If any emotional state have a religious significance, that significance will be found to belong, not to the emotion itself, but to the object which arouses it. If the old saying that fear first begat the gods were accepted, it would need to be qualified by distinguishing the fear aroused by the belief in invisible agents from that called forth by a human enemy or a wild beast. It is not all fear or any fear that could be said to create gods. Mere reference to emotion and emotions will, no more than mere reference to basic instincts, supply us with sufficient marks by

which to distinguish the characteristics of religious behaviour.

A further characterization of religion is afforded by those sociologists who broadly identify it with that which is social. By describing it as participation in the ideal values of the social consciousness, it has been maintained that the religious are those who enter into the social life of the community. Indeed, it has been said that the only non-religious persons are the mentally defective and the irresponsible classes of idle rich and improvident poor.[1] It may be granted that all religion involves participation in the values of the social consciousness, but the statement is as untrue materially as it is formally, if it be simply converted to say that all who participate in the values of the social consciousness are religious. Such a vague statement throws every attempt to define religion into confusion, and removes, without the slightest compensating advantage, a clearly recognized distinction. In the higher form of religion at least it would be more often correct to say that the religious consciousness expresses itself in criticism of, rather than by sharing in, the ideals of the social consciousness generally. Neither in point of view of history, nor of the present, can it be maintained that such a broad generalization gives us the characteristics of religion.

It will by this time be evident that every attempt to describe religion in terms of behaviour alone must fail to overcome the same initial difficulty. Psychology can start from behaviour in general, but the psychology of religion must explain why it denotes

[1] Ames, *Psychology of Religion*, p. 356 *seq.*

certain forms of behaviour as religious ; and there is no satisfactory method of separating religious from other modes of behaviour except by reference to the attitude of mind that underlies religion. It is to the attitude of which religion is expressive, rather than to its outward manifestation, that we must first turn in order to appreciate its significance.

There is better promise, therefore, in the method of another group of thinkers, who, although they would regard participation in certain social values as particularly characteristic of religion, lay stress not so much upon social behaviour as upon the attitude of valuation. More than one standpoint is represented here, but among them all there is this in common, that the essential characteristic of religion is an attitude of mind, and that it is a value-attitude. With the general position I do not disagree, but it remains still to ask exactly what is meant when religion is characterized as a value-attitude, and what purpose is fulfilled in doing so.

Höffding,[1] from a psychological standpoint, has described religion as ' a psychical state in which feeling and need, fear and hope, enthusiasm and surrender, play a greater part than do meditation and inquiry, and in which intuition and imagination have the mastery over investigation and reflection.' Philosophically considered, its core consists in ' the conviction that no value perishes out of the world.' ' The feeling which is determined by the fate of values in the struggle for existence is the religious feeling.' He does not, however, wholly ignore the object of value, understanding by God ' The principle of the

[1] *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., pp. 1–6, 186–188.

conservation of value in reality,' ' The predicate not the subject,' of religious judgements. The description seems to do less than justice to the essentially purposive character of the religious consciousness. Religion is more than faith in the conservation of value; it is a search for values, and an attempt to secure them. This element is better recognized in the not dissimilar view of Dr. Bosanquet. ' Wherever,' he says, ' man fairly and loyally throws the seat of his values outside his immediate self into something which he worships, with which he identifies his will, and which he takes as an object, solid and secure at least relatively to his private existence—as an artist in his attitude to beauty or a man of science to truth—there we have in its degree the experience of religion.' He adds, ' We are speaking of the consciousness inherent in the finite-infinite being, so far as his full nature affirms itself that he is one with something which cannot be shaken or destroyed, and the value of which is the source and standard of value.' [1] Elsewhere the same writer describes religion in terms of the love, loyalty, and community that lift man above himself. [2]

As far as the general position which broadly equates religion with the attitude of valuation is concerned, it is clear that many value-attitudes do not bear any recognized religious significance. If we understand religion to signify any attitude which relates to the highest ideal or most permanent values, the criterion is not easy to apply. It is apt to be subjectively variable, and at most indicates merely a difference in degree, but no other distinction between religious and other values. If, however,

[1] *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 270. [2] *What Religion Is*, p. 1.

no attempt is made to distinguish between them, we are unable to differentiate religion from aesthetics, ethics and, in its earlier stages, from magic. To speak of religion in terms of valuation simply is but to relate it to a *genus* without reference to any *differentia*. It offers a general description without adequate means of differentiation, like the celebrated dictum which defined religion as ' permanent and habitual admiration.'

Since, however, it is not questioned that religion involves values, and faith in, and a struggle for, their conservation, it might seem to be a matter of viewpoint rather than of fact whether this aspect were to be regarded as its most essential feature. In one respect, however, a matter of fact is involved. Religion, as it actually exhibits itself, fulfils certain definite functions, and occupies a commonly recognized sphere in life. Whatever be the theoretical view of the nature of religion, in practice that sphere is not understood as co-extensive with the attitude of valuation. Common usage may be in error in this respect, but what advantage can be gained by correcting it? It may be said that the position under discussion reveals the fact that religion is much wider than it is generally understood to be. That may be true, but if our intention be to mark out religious experience as a psychological fact, it is more important to know what the term actually stands for than what it may be held to imply. That is what this characterization fails to achieve. It does not afford us the distinctive features of actually existent religion. The artist's devotion to beauty and that of the scientist to truth afford parallels to, rather than examples of, the religious spirit, as religion is actually

understood amongst men. It may be true, as Royce has urged, that ' all the higher forms of loyalty are in their spirit religious,'[1] but whilst the true spirit of loyalty and of religion are one, loyalty is not necessarily the distinguishing characteristic of religion in an historical, or even in a psychological, sense. The last phrase used by Dr. Bosanquet comes nearest to the actual facts of the case, ' The value of which is the source and standard of values.' The history of religion shows that man, seeking values through his religion, has always sought them through an object or ground of values. The values of science and art have never possessed such an intimate and necessary relation to a ground of values. To lay stress on the element of valuation as such, apart from the particular character borne by the values of religion, may show the unity of man's quest for values, but it does not help to distinguish religion. Still further, would religion continue if its values were separated from what has been their main sustenance? Whilst the value-attitude of religion is of great philosophical significance, and loyalty to ultimate values reveals a truly religious faith, the most definite characteristic of religion in human experience is not that it is an attitude of valuation, but rather a relation to a ground of values.

We conclude, therefore, that the basis of a definition of religion should be selected from among the characteristics of its actual manifestation, and not by the exhibition of its philosophical significance. Is there, then, any common characteristic of all religions? William James' celebrated analysis suggested as a ' minimum ' a uniform

[1] *Problem of Christianity*, i. 193.

deliverance in which all religions appear to meet, 'an uneasiness and its solution.'[1] Put in this way, the statement is too indefinite to be helpful. It does not, for example, distinguish between the fear of an enemy and propitiating him with a gift and the fear of a spirit who is propitiated with a sacrifice. Now whilst it is true that amongst primitive peoples our own distinction between religious and non-religious acts does not obtain, both being mingled in the custom of the tribe, none the less there is no confusion between the manner of dealing with the physical and human and the psychical and superhuman. All savages, for example, are perfectly aware of the difference in approaching a man and a demon, an ordinary or a sacred object, an ornament or fetish. The uneasiness and its solution which assumes the character of a religious belief is distinguished from any other because it has reference to a relation with a superhuman object, a relation imperilled or broken, which must at all costs be maintained.

Before we can attempt to define religion in such terms, however, it will be necessary to notice the view which denies that religion has necessarily, or even characteristically, any reference to a deity. Mr. A. E. Crawley holds that the primary function of religion is to affirm and consecrate life, and that it may arise and subsist without any belief either in God or the soul. We may select, however, Durkheim as most definitely representative of this view. 'A religion,' he says, 'is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden, beliefs

[1] *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 508.

and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church all those who adhere to them.'[1] According to this view, the essential element is the idea of the sacred rather than any sacred object. The idea, however, is applied to the object, and results in the ascription of certain obligations, prohibitions, and commands to it, the object being thought to act favourably or unfavourably according to the response made to its behests. Religious phenomena are therefore social phenomena stamped with the idea of sacred obligation. In almost all stages of society that idea is held to be due to the fiat of a sacred being. Upon this view, however, the last step is superfluous. Religion can be treated as a social matter, alike in its origin, reference, and expression.

The question of the ultimate reference of religious experience will concern us later. At the moment our interest is in the appropriateness of such a definition as that which Durkheim has proposed. It is obvious that a very wide interpretation must be given to it if it is to include the earlier forms of religion, particularly as regards a ' unified system of belief ' and ' a single moral community called a Church.' If, on the other hand, it is applied to Christianity, it cannot be contended that what Jesus taught, or even what Christianity at its best has followed, is most aptly or correctly described as consisting of ' things set apart and forbidden.' Durkheim's definition possesses, therefore, no very obvious merits, either as regards early or late forms of religion, although it harmonizes with the sociological convictions of its

[1] *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Eng. trans., p. 47.

author. The real question, however, is why reference to sacred beings is omitted. Durkheim affords two reasons. Firstly, ' There are great religions from which the idea of gods and spirits is absent, or at least where it plays only a secondary and minor role.' The second is that even within deistic religions there are many rites which are completely independent of all idea of gods or spiritual beings, such as interdictions and cults in which the god is unnamed.

As regards the first point, not unnaturally the only examples that can be quoted are Buddhism, Jainism, and the atheistic forms of Brahmanic philosophy. The last-named, however, since they remain, however paradoxically, within Brahmanism, yield no true support to the contention. Nor, for that matter, do Buddhism or Jainism. They did not arise as spontaneous expressions of the religious spirit, but as protests against the exclusiveness of Brahmanism. The atheism of both is theoretical, and not borne out in practice. The Jains of to-day present outwardly little difference in their type os worship from the Hindus, and Brahman priests are to be met with officiating in Jain temples. Buddhism has split into a multitude of systems. Its development as a religion has been largely by the addition of extraneous elements, which supplied those religious characteristics that were lacking in the philosophical system the Buddha preached. It is questionable whether it could have grown into a religion had it not been so tolerant towards these accretions. Nor can it be disputed that modern Buddhism affords many of the normal features of religion in various

forms. It would hardly seem reasonable, therefore, to consider that such very qualified exceptions can cause any misgiving as to the general validity of defining religion after a manner which applies to all other forms, from highest to lowest.

The second point is no more conclusive than the first. In some rites, originally connected with certain gods, the rite survives the god. This is in some part because primitive peoples are not constant. New gods are readily adopted if the old gods fail to fulfil what is expected of them, or if the new gods seem more potent. But it is much less likely that amorphous rites should be established, and gain meaning, when a god was added subsequently. Durkheim holds that rites are means by which the social group periodically reaffirms itself. But when he reconstructs the origin of the totemic cult by suggesting, 'Men who feel themselves united, partially by bonds of blood, but still more by a community of interest and tradition, assemble and become conscious of their moral unity,'[1] he is surely asking far too much as data. In absence of positive evidence, we are at least entitled to apply a principle of parcimony, and account that explanation best which will explain religious rites as connected with the simplest and most elementary conditions sufficient for their establishment. The idea of supernatural beings is more primitive than the mental conditions needed on Durkheim's view for the establishment of a cult, and is accordingly a preferable explanation. In short, Durkheim's second contention does not necessarily prove anything more than that the life of

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 387

primitive society consisted of a heterogeneous conglomeration of beliefs and customs, and that various taboos and magical practices linger on from those days until times when their origin and significance is lost. It is certainly far more probable that the practices which he denotes as independent of the gods are evidence of this residue than that they are evidence of a supposed religious cult existing without gods. In face of the overwhelming mass of evidence that religion everywhere has a necessary relation to some superhuman power or order the exceptions alleged are neither sufficient nor convincing.

We are led to the conclusion, therefore, that the nature of religion is shown most conveniently and manifestly by defining it in terms of beliefs and rites which relate to a more-than-human order. In the most general sense religion is belief in a more-than-human order, and an attempt to establish harmonious relation with it. Such a definition will almost include Buddhism, for, whatever was the original teaching of Ġautama, it had reference to an attempt to transcend the ordinary conditions of human existence and to secure on earth a harmony with an extramundane order. The definition, however, need not be constrained on account of the anomaly of Gautama's philosophy which developed into a religion. It would be wide enough to cover the nature of religion if for 'a more-than-human order' we substituted 'psychic powers,' for the world's gods are psychic, not physical, and are always conceived dynamically. The definition begins with belief, but it acknowledges that religion implies more than belief; it implies an attempt to establish relationship. Those descriptions of religion which

lay stress on behaviour, Durkheim's reference to practice, or the view of religion as expressive of the life-impulse, emphasize a point which those who refer solely to an attitude of mind or to an emotion miss. Religion is essentially a matter of doing rather than thinking or even feeling. That is one reason at least why criticism never proves fatal to any religion. Religions do not collapse; they are superseded. Action is more fundamental in the psychological sense than thought, and hence Tylor's celebrated minimum definition, 'belief in spiritual beings,' is too small a minimum to express the nature of religion. We add, therefore, that religion is the attempt to establish a relationship. But not any relationship. It is one conceived as harmonious. Both magic and religion imply belief in an order or power superior to man, and seek relationship with it. It is acknowledged, however, that magic and religion are entirely different in principle, and to speak of harmonious relation recognizes this difference by implying that man seeks to make the superhuman order his ally, not his slave. The definition thus marks off religion from magic. It holds true alike of the highest and the lowest forms of relationship; of the Christian's communion with God, and of the approach of a savage to a malevolent spirit, for even such a spirit is approached on the hypothesis that it can be placated. The approach may be sheer bribery, but it none the less reveals the belief that a harmonious relation is possible.

The difficulties of the surveyor who attempts to mark out the territory of religion on the map of life are enormous. It penetrates pervasively the most closely shuttered compartments. Amongst human motives,

purposes, feelings, it is not easy to single out one that belongs exclusively to religion. That which leads towards religion in one case may in another find a directly opposite outlet, just as from one watershed streams may flow east and west. Little wonder that it has been suggested that religion cannot be defined.[1] The definition given here is not supplied as final or as excluding others, but it describes the historical and psychological character of religion in such a manner as to include both the higher and lower forms. It serves also the very necessary purpose of making clear the sense in which the word religion will be understood in the following pages.

[1] C. C. J. Webb, *Group Theories of Religion* p. 59

II

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

If it be hard to define religion, it is impossible, in the strict sense, to define experience, for experience is 'the wheel of life,' and beyond its circle we may not pass. We may imagine a reality existing beyond it, but none the less, such reality has no meaning. Nor can any explanation of experience carry us beyond experience, since explanation itself is part of experience. The *continuum* of experience is at once both that which is given to, and that which is to be explained by, every activity of our mind. Every analysis of experience must be an artificial separation within the continuous whole. As veritably τὸ πᾶν, experience is undefinable.

Thus to conceive experience is as unworkably wide as it is indisputably true. What includes all may convey nothing. Accordingly, the term experience assumes for practical purposes a more restricted sense, or senses; for considerable variation is revealed in the use of the word,[1] from the all-inclusive sense just mentioned to the narrowest conception which treats it as the mere raw material which 'reason' shapes into knowledge,—a

[1] Cf. Merrington, *Problem of Personality*, pp. 158-9. Eight meanings are here distinguished.

legacy from Hume's ' simple impression,' with compound interest added by Kant. For our present purpose, however, it will be sufficient if we consider briefly the meaning attached to experience by science, philosophy, and religion.

Science, in that narrower sense of the term which physical science best exemplifies, deals with experience in an objective and universal sense, with experience generally apart from its actual individual expressions, with the normal experience of every normal mind in general and none in particular. To say ' This is ' means, ' This is capable of being part of the experiences of all who view the matter under similar conditions.' By induction, the data afforded by this general experience can be restated as scientific knowledge. Appeal can then be made to experience to recognize such knowledge as an accurate representation of its content. The method is well suited to the purposes of physical science, which deals with the more concrete facts of experience, and can appeal largely to the senses. None the less, to understand experience in this sense is greatly to restrict it. Convenience, clarity, definiteness are gained, but they are gained by excluding certain aspects of the whole. The world of science is made smaller than the world of experience, and the moulds of science cannot contain its fullness. The prejudice occasionally met with amongst certain scientists against religious beliefs is not wholly due to dogmatism on the part of theologians. Sometimes it arises out of the reluctance of those whose knowledge is chiefly scientific to recognize the importance of facts which are not amenable to the stricter scientific conception of experience.

Most of us realize such a feeling when an otherwise complete solution of a problem is wrecked by one intractable factor. One cannot help questioning whether the disturbing element is relevant. Yet if it be so our solution must be revised; it is insufficient for the whole. The conception of experience which has hitherto served for physical science has, however, been challenged from within science itself. The purely objective experience, nature as a system apart from the minds that study it, absolute time and space, the same for all observers, no longer exist, if we accept the general principle of relativity. Each observer has his own co-ordinates; each becomes, within his own system, the centre of all. Apart from a common basis of time and space, there cannot be a common universe or an absolutely objective experience, except as convenient approximations. The revolution of thought which centres round Einstein has introduced subjectivity into the very citadel of objective knowledge. The issues raised have a greater philosophical importance than can be readily estimated. It is at least clear that an objective common universe becomes simply a useful empirical generalization, but one that has no foundation in reality.

The insufficiency of this restricted meaning of experience becomes manifest also by the widening of the conception of science. Psychology, ethics, anthropology, and other studies are now classed amongst the sciences. With the new subject-matter they introduced, a new conception of experience was needed. Animate nature and psychical facts do not lend themselves to the methods which apply to inanimate nature and physical facts. 'Experience'

for these sciences has a wider meaning than it holds for physical science; it signifies the apprehended contents of the normal *continuum* of the mind, either those of our own minds, when we speak of personal experience, or of what we assume to belong to minds generally when we speak of common experience. Such a meaning, if not precise, is practically useful. It is indeed the 'common-sense' conception of what experience represents; but its subjectivity makes it more adaptable to the 'humanistic' sciences. Without being objective in the precise sense in which experience is objective to physical science, the mass of subjective experiences taken in common can be treated generally, that is to say, in an objective manner. At the same time the individual is not the superfluity that he has been to physical science. He is the ultimate 'Real,' the centre of experience.

Philosophy, like science, is concerned with systematizing experience. Historically, both sprang from a common stock, and for many centuries no distinction existed between them. Our modern distinction is based on their respective methods and viewpoints, and not on any difference in aim. Until the rise of the new era heralded by Descartes, the groundwork of experience counted for less in the philosophic's scale than the categories which gave it philosophical form. What Descartes began Kant completed, and all subsequent philosophy has realized the fundamental character of experience. Corresponding in some measure with the objective treatment afforded by science to experience, there has not been lacking in certain types of philosophy a standpoint which would transcend individual experience by seeking a universal experience.

and even endow such universal experience with the prerogative of sole reality, the experience of an Absolute which enfolds all subjective 'appearance.' All such attempts encounter the fundamental difficulty of connecting the Absolute in an intelligible manner with the subjective 'appearances' which are its manifestation. It may not be a mere coincidence that at the same time as science, in widening its boundaries to include the humanistic sciences, was forced to realize the limitations of a strictly objective representation of experience, philosophy showed a tendency away from Absolute Idealism towards types of thought variously represented by Bergson, Pragmatism, Personal Idealism, and, even more recently by the philosophy of relativity. All forms of science and philosophy begin with 'commonsense' experience, but where physical science ignores the actual conditions under which experience is possessed, and Absolute Idealism endeavours to transcend them, the 'humanistic' type of philosophy, whilst explaining, refining, remoulding, re-interpreting, continues to deal with experience in the aggregate of its subjective expressions. In doing so it accepts experience in the sense previously described as signifying primarily 'my experience,' and generally that of mankind—experience in its subjective-objective aspect.

As far as religion is concerned, religious experience is naturally understood in the same manner. It is 'inner' experience primarily. 'Outer' experience interpreted in religious terms might be called religious experience, but only in a derivative sense. Being 'inner' experience, the methods which apply to 'outer' experience do not

lend themselves to it. The Absolute may embrace religious experience, but in the process its actual characteristics are lost, and the experient would certainly fail to recognize the original in the translation. Experience, therefore, in the sense in which we here use the term, will be understood as signifying the aggregate of subjective experiences, that is to say, it will be used objectively, without being objectified. But it need hardly be said that to accept the commonsense conception of experience does not involve accepting at its face value the commonsense interpretation of its implications.

When the first scientific studies of religious experience appeared in the work of Starbuck, Coe, and William James, it was individual experience that supplied the data from biographies, confessions, and questionnaire papers. Introspective observation was then, as James declared, 'what we have to rely on first and foremost and always.'[1] The growth of genetic and social psychology since then has caused increased reliance to be placed on objective methods—observation of the behaviour of man and animals. The prophecy Darwin uttered at the close of *The Origin of Species*—that psychology would find a new foundation—has been justified. The result of this upon the study of religion has been greatly to widen the basis used by the earlier investigators, by factors contributed from anthropology, sociology, and the comparative study of religion. Some, indeed, would limit religious psychology to the study of rites and customs, but rites and customs are religious only in so far as they express the beliefs, feelings, purposes out of which they spring.

[1] *Principles of Psychology*, i., p. 185.

Whatever has a bearing for psychology must, as Ward says, 'be regarded as having a place in, or as being a constituent of, some one's experience.'[1] The outward manifestation leads back to the inward experience, and, suggestive as rite and custom are for the psychology of religion, their interest comes ultimately from the experience behind them.

A further effect of the new method of investigation has been to reveal the importance of the study of religious experience in its social and racial aspect. This, in its turn, raises two issues that call for consideration. The first is the relation between individual and social expressions of religious experience. The second is their respective significance for religious philosophy and psychology.

As regards the former, it is indubitable that the social or tribal expression of religion precedes the individual expression. The question is whether from this we must infer that the latter is secondary and derivative, a product of the social consciousness. It has, indeed, been seriously maintained that a society has a unitary consciousness over and above that of the individuals who constitute society.[2] We may pass the theory by as wholly unproven, and assume that 'the social consciousness' is not more than a convenient collective expression. At the same time, it is a definite factor in mental evolution and assuredly more than the mere sum of its constituents, for a group will seek ends which its members as individuals would ignore.

[1] *Psychological Principles*, p. 27.

[2] The view mentioned is stated and criticized by McDougall, *Group Mind*, ch. ii.

It is necessary for the appearance of religion. Not only was primitive religion a social matter, but one cannot imagine a solitary individual creating a religion for himself. None the less, only in a metaphorical sense can anything exist ' in ' the social consciousness. Whatever actually exists, exists in the consciousness of the individuals who form the society. A sentiment like *esprit de corps*—inconceivable apart from group life—is the creation of the group and the possession of the individual. It is the similarity of reaction in various minds, the unanimity of expression, that enables us to speak of the social consciousness. Representing the majority-will, it is pressed on those who of themselves might not incline to react normally. In every state of society there are many inexpressive minds, who recognize or adopt as their own view the majority opinion. The few who are inclined to react differently are constrained by social pressure. In primitive society the group-mind is so strong that self-consciousness seems non-existent. Recollecting the native individuality of all persons, one cannot say it is non-existent, but at least it is true that inborn ' being-for-self ' has no opportunity of developing into true self-hood. The question, therefore, is whether the individual consciousness could fulfil any function other than that of reflecting the tribal mind ; whether it could contribute anything to the development of primitive religion ; in short, whether the social consciousness is not wholly and solely significant in dealing with the original character of religious experience. It is frequently assumed that the matter admits of no dispute.

In the absence of positive evidence we may consider

how far an analogy from biological evolution is suggestive. It is known that variation may arise gradually by the accumulation of 'fluctuations,' or abruptly by 'mutations.' Recent biology tends to regard the latter as far more significant than did Darwin, who was led to believe that they would be swamped by inter-crossing. Individual mutations, geniuses, certainly occur in mental evolution, and there is no reason to assume that they could not occur amongst primitive peoples. Though the chances of mental survival—the survival of an idea—may be even more precarious than those of the survival of a new species, we may presume that in the one case, as in the other, some of the sharp mutations did survive. Recollecting the conservatism of society, it seems impossible to account for mental development without the aid of the mutation. Sir James Frazer suggests that religion came into being as the 'shrewder intelligences' perceived the inefficacy of magic. Whatever be the relation between magic and religion, the statement acknowledges the influence of individual consciousness upon the mass mind. Professor McDougall expresses the same opinion: 'The ultimate causes of the differentiation of mental qualities must have been of two orders as far as I can see, differences of physical environment, and spontaneous variations in different directions of innate mental qualities of individuals, especially of the more gifted and energetic individuals of each people.'[1] Such variations as survived would graft themselves upon the existing rites and customs as modifications, ultimately becoming the rule and routine of the group, and the individual initiative would be lost

[1] *Group Mind*, p. 209.

in the custom it created. The group-mind has the function of maintaining and transmitting custom, but initiative is the function of the individual.

If certain individuals played some part, even when the tribal consciousness predominated over the individual; at later stages, when the individual was much more free and able to oppose himself to, or contrast himself with, the common mind, that part increased enormously in influence. Those who treat religious experience as entirely social regard personal religion as a mere echo, a special and late adaptation that assumes a fictitious independence. If the argument advanced here be correct, it would appear that personal religion is the development of a factor latent, but none the less implicit, even when the unanimity of the group-expression afforded the smallest scope for the individual's independence. Though the outward form were wholly confined to social rites, the feelings and beliefs that gave it strength were those of individual minds, and the initiative that brought change must be presumed to have come from individual insight.

We may now consider the other question: the significance of individual and social experience for psychology and philosophy. As far as psychology is concerned, the individual becomes important only in the more developed forms of religion. But to fail to realize the significance of the individual factor here is to be unable to see the trees for the wood. Sometimes the implications of the religion of a race are far more clearly studied in a few of its outstanding individuals than in its inarticulate masses. It may happen even that our

only data are found in the few who are expressive. Moreover, the significance of religion in life is not revealed wholly by its extent. In some part at least it is found in its subjective intensity. No psychological analysis of a sensation can reproduce its 'feltness,' and no objective representation of religion can do full justice to the actual experience. 'Religion is just that entirely subjective control of consciousness which scientific psychology thrusts aside in order to attend solely to the objective phenomena that are concomitant. Its distinguishing characteristic is to surpass those phenomena infinitely.'[1] Whilst it is impossible to present to those who have not felt it the quality or tone which yields the experient the deepest conviction of the worth and reality of his experience, psychology can at least mark its outward effects by not overlooking the individual and his experience.

Philosophy, on the other hand, is likely to find more significance in the religious experience of the race—indeed, of all races—than in that of the individual. One of the earliest results of the psychological study of religion was to bring into prominence 'the argument from experience.' Such an argument must command respect. But, naïvely stated, as if the subjective experience guaranteed the truth of the experient's own explanation of it, the argument carries no weight. Indeed, if religion were the experience of the few, its philosophical significance would not be greater than that, for example, of colour blindness. But the great collective mass

[1] Boutroux, *Science and Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, Eng. trans., p. 205.

of religious experience, spread through all ages and peoples, is a universal fact that cannot be ignored. This is the ' argument from experience ' that we have a right to present to philosophy. Philosophy has not always been ready to appreciate its importance. Yet religion has yielded to the many what philosophy has yielded to the few—an explanation of experience. Philosophical reflection may be critical of the conclusions of common sense, but it cannot ignore its evidence. In the same way, whatever be the verdict of philosophy upon the fact of religion, to overlook it would be to omit something integral in the experience of mankind, which is the starting-point of all reflection.

One way of formulating a philosophy of religious experience has been suggested by William James and F. W. H. Myers, who found in the subconscious mind a link that might be held to connect the individual with a wider reality. The personal sense of certainty in religious experience centres in subconscious processes, and although it is not easy rationally to account for it, to the experient its verdict is even more convincing than that of reason. The view in question proposes at least a semi-scientific explanation. It postulates beyond the limit of the marginal field of subconscious mind a further self, with a consciousness that transcends normal consciousness, and relates the individual to a world inaccessible to the ordinary self. Though not without its difficulties, this view is too suggestive to be summarily set aside. Yet the subconscious is the most difficult portion of the field of consciousness to investigate, and at present we are scarcely sufficiently acquainted with its characteristics

to be very confident in attaching to it the importance given to it by this hypothesis. Religious experience involves the whole of consciousness, and to treat the amorphous ' fringe ' of the mind as its especial seat must render it less significant because less intelligible. Moreover, the practice of linking the unknown with the supernatural has not had happy precedents. Like the Celts retreating westward before each wave of the Saxons, every advance of knowledge sends this type of thought further back to fresh and diminishing positions. Consciousness, whether supraliminal or infraliminal, is one field, and it is hard to see how one can justify any immanence of the divine in man in the part unless it is also in the whole. A localized immanence is not a convincing doctrine.

None the less, whilst I do not feel inclined to place reliance on such a hypothesis in the present state of our knowledge, the psychological study of subconsciousness has shown the importance of the remoter as well as the clearer aspects of mind in religion. It has guarded against the excessive claims of intellect by its reminder that intuition and instinct may be wiser, even as they are older than reason, and equally valid. Indeed, by their spontaneity and their ' smell of the soil,' the veritable clay of human nature, they are able to lead on where reason falters from the path, to feel the way when the lamp has failed. It may be that future study of that side of our mentality which slopes away toward the unexplored hinterland may reveal to us more of that which lies on the further side. But for the present it will be better to deal with religious experience as belonging

to the mind as a whole, and state 'the argument from experience,' which we shall subsequently submit as significant for philosophical consideration, from that standpoint. Our starting-point will be religious experience as a broad human fact. We postulate only that continuity which all belief in evolution must assume, the lineal thread which links the earliest and lowest to the latest and highest. This allows us to take as a basis religious experience in the collective sense, as psychology and history view it. No single period, our own or any other, is likely proportionately to exhibit the permanent elements and relative values of the whole. Nor can any period be fully understood apart from the medium that produced and surrounded it. The whole can show what no part reveals. In speaking of the religious experience of mankind we evidently assume there are common factors throughout. But if religion is definable, this assumption is justified, for any definition presumes their existence. We have seen that there are no genuine exceptions to the statement that all religion witnesses to an object—broadly speaking, gods or god—and a relation therewith Our next concern, therefore, will be with these universal ideas of religion—the idea of God and of a human-divine relationship.

III

THE RISE OF THE GODS

We have spoken of the conception of an order superior to man, which for all practical purposes we may identify with gods or a god, as characteristic of all religions. Such an idea may be justified by its results, but it can scarcely be evaluated except by inquiring as to its origin and development. Origin and early development lie far beyond the ' cultivated land ' of history, and it is impossible to undertake in a single chapter an account of all the factors that enter into a provisional reconstruction of them. We must confine ourselves to one issue, that of endeavouring to imagine what mental conditions could give rise to the idea that the world contained an order of powers neither human nor animal, and that these powers could interfere, with tremendous effect, in man's life. That mankind entertained such an idea, even at a stage of remote antiquity, is without doubt. There is little agreement as to the origin of the idea of God, but without expecting or waiting for that, it is possible for us to find some suggestiveness in the psychological conditions which may be held to have given rise to, or at least assisted in forming, the conception.

For many centuries theology postulated a primitive revelation as the source of the idea of God. When, in

times still comparatively recent, anthropologists began to take a serious interest in the question, it was also supposed that a single source sufficed. Some went back to Petronius's line, '*Primus in orbe fecit deos timor.*' Others made more adequate suggestions; but whether it was personification of natural objects (as Max Müller thought), or Spencer's ancestor-worship, or Tylor's animism, it was still one factor that was emphasized. The first modern study directed wholly to this question, Grant Allen's *Evolution of the Idea of God,* was influenced by Spencer, and amounted to a re-presentation of Euhemerism. One pathway led to deity, from ghost to God. 'The primitive mummy ghost or spirit passes gradually into a deity of unbounded glory and greatness and sanctity.' 'Normally and originally . . . all gods grew spontaneously. They evolve by degrees out of dead and deified ancestors and chieftains.'[1] The latter statement is somewhat contradictory, for an ancestor cannot be 'deified' unless there is a previous conception of a god, and yet the ancestor is said to be the origin of the god. Amongst tribes who show no indication of ancestor-worship, and yet possess gods, Allen suggested that corpse-worship served the same function. Whether of the ancestor or not, 'corpse-worship is the protoplasm of religion.'

More recently, this view has been restated by Solovyof,[2] who holds that the idea of God is derived from the parental relation, and that its character was that of 'Providence,' an idea first embodied in the mother in days when descent was matrilineal. Although Spencer's theory is not taken as completely true, Solovyof thinks that it comes nearer to

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 91, 247. [2] *Justification of the Good*, Eng. trans., pp. 80-85.

truth than any other. The argument he adduces—that young children do not heed the most important natural phenomena, but are conscious of their dependence upon their parents—is not convincing. He admits that in his own sixth year the comet of 1859 impressed him. I personally recollect clearly the terror I experienced, before the age of three, during a particularly severe thunderstorm. But children in these respects are generally influenced by the behaviour of those who are around them. Any analogies drawn from young children, however, must be employed with very considerable reserve. The conditions under which their mental powers develop are wholly different from those under which primitive man lived. Although there is certain biological evidence to support a recapitulation theory of physical development, mental development of children brought up amongst intelligent adults offers few parallels to that of early man.

We shall probably come much nearer to the actual facts if we discard the supposition that the idea of gods was fully equipped from one source, and regard these varying suggestions as factors which, in differing degrees, served to influence the conception. In one instance at least—that of animism—the influence is undeniable. Indeed, the commonest starting-point of those who give an account of the probable development of the idea of god is certain animistic beliefs. As far as the idea is concerned this may be correct, as we shall see later, but the idea has a pre-natal history in the conditions which led to its birth. How far it is possible to reconstruct them is the first consideration. Although conclusions concerning primitive mentality are hypothetical, and analogies drawn

from modern savages must be used cautiously, we may yet be reasonably sure upon some points. For example, the god-idea is not likely to have arisen out of speculative curiosity alone. Of the older ideas of man none are merely speculative, for primitive thought is prompted first and foremost by practical needs. According to some, it was social needs that created the gods ; the gods were conceived in tribal assemblies. The difficulties of the case forbid dogmatism, but we may assume it to be a not unreasonable canon which regards that explanation as preferable which can trace back the origin of the god-idea to the simplest conditions sufficient to account for it, and it seems to me possible to go further back than tribal assemblies and totemic rites. Looking to practical needs for the probable matrix of the idea, we cannot doubt that whatever arrested attention and stimulated emotion would lead to a practical reaction, involving both physical and mental activity. The chief primitive centres of attention and emotion are food and sex, but the analogy of the higher animals shows that the abnormal is also potent. The instincts that serve the end of self-preservation are continuous, and rarely inhibited. The need of food ceases to be insistent after repletion, and the sex instincts are periodic, and often dormant for long seasons. The abnormal, we may be assured, would induce in man an attitude of attention mingled with emotion in contrast with the indifference displayed towards the familiar. ' That which regularly and periodically recurs passes by unheeded, because, being expected and anticipated he (primitive man) is not obstructed in his path.' [1] The

[1] Waitz, *Introduction to Anthropology*, p. 368.

attitude adopted by man in face of the strange and portentous has been variously named.[1] We shall utilize the term 'Supernaturalism,' understanding it as 'Supernormalism,' for had not the former been established, the latter would be preferable. It does not suggest, as the other does, a differentiation between a certain order regarded as natural, and another as supernatural. That is not involved. All that is essential is that the word should convey the attitude of strained interest and awakened emotion which the abnormal evokes. Ideas as to its cause are a subsequent development. Dr. Jevons contends that man always distinguished between natural and supernatural.[2] In so far as these words indicate simply the usual and unusual, this is undoubtedly true. Animal analogies reveal the differentiation, in behaviour which ignores the familiar and is arrested by the unfamiliar. Mental activity is always primarily conditioned by the practical need of assisting behaviour, and we must understand the idea of supernaturalism as arising out of such circumstances.

The attitude (as distinct from the ideas later implied) of supernaturalism is shared by the higher animals. The abnormal impels some practical reaction. If it does not cause fear or flight it is watched with a tension that does not relax until the animal has determined the character of its response. Wherever it be that the line between zoology and anthropology is crossed, on the human side the more important differentiation was mental, not physical. In mental development came a new means of

[1] Cf. Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, ch. i., and art., *E.R.E.*, vol. xii.
[2] *Introduction to History of Religion*, p. 18.

adaptation to environment. The more urgent the need the greater the stimulus to mental as well as physical reaction. With the rudiments of conceptual thought came the real distinction between supernaturalism as a human and as an animal attitude, the possibility of some notion of the character of the abnormal power.

It has been argued that the abnormal appeared to be potent because mysterious, whilst others have insisted that it was mysterious because potent. The alternative is not necessary. The preservation instincts were aroused by the abnormal. It was necessarily mysterious because only the unfamiliar attracted notice. It was also potent, for, apart from some suggestion of potency, the unfamiliar is not likely to arouse curiosity. A dog known to me was so terrified at a moving staircase that he subsequently refused persistently to ascend a railway bridge. Another dog was terrified of gunfire, but showed no alarm at the midday darkness of an eclipse. He showed no interest in a calm sea, but was nervous of the noise of big breakers until he became used to them. We may be sure that, apart from some suggestion of possible effect upon him, the merely unfamiliar did not move man to action. It was the mysterious and potent that obtruded itself upon him.

Supernaturalism represents an attitude which fulfils the conditions requisite for the subsequent production of the idea of an more-than-human power in the world. It is based upon the ultimate instincts, is undeniably existent in animal and man, and in the latter case supplies a strong stimulus to a mental, in addition to a physical, reaction. Mental evolution would in time add to the

common form of attention and emotion which the abnormal arouses in man and animal alike, some notion which in its earliest form might be vaguely of 'that which does.' 'Recept' ideas, that is to say, notions producing activity but not implying conceptual thought, preceded concepts, and it is likely that all the earliest concepts were developed recepts. When the recept idea which accompanied the activity aroused by the abnormal became conceptual, and persisted as a free idea apart from the manifestations that suggested it, man had all the essential conditions for the possession of the idea of a superhuman power—or probably powers, for man has not been inclined to strict parcimony in populating the world with supernatural denizens.

The root-idea of religion may lay claim, therefore, to a very old lineage. Dr. Marett has spoken of 'pre-animistic religion,' suggesting that certain conditions not less primary than animism go to the making of religion, and that in some cases animistic interpretations have been superimposed on that which previously existed in a non-animistic significance. There is no obvious genetic connexion between supernaturalism and animism, and, however greatly animism assisted in framing a conception of supernatural power, it is not necessarily its starting-point. Supernaturalism has more definite affinities with the Melanesian *Mana*, 'That invisible power which is believed by the nations to cause all such effects as transcend their conception of the regular course of nature.'[1] It is described as distinct from physical power, and in a way as supernatural. It acts in manifold directions for good

[1] Codrington, *Melanesians*, p. 191; cf. pp. 118, 120.

and bad, and is highly advantageous to possess. Any kind of power or excellence, whatever is more than ordinary, is due to *mana*. *Mana* has its counterpart amongst other primitive people.[1] Dr. Marett holds that the combination of the ideas of *tabu-mana* represents more closely than animism the minimum definition of the magico-religious, the reason being that *mana* is co-extensive with the supernatural, animism far too wide.[2] Moreover, *mana*, although capable of expressing the root-idea of non-physical force, 'leaves in solution the distinction between personal and impersonal.' Dr. Jevons denies this, urging that between personal and impersonal there is no middle class, and that the mark of the animistic age was this very inability to distinguish person and thing. Persons acted; man had not yet learnt that things could act. Every agent was, therefore, a personal agent.[3] Certainly supernaturalism would not originally convey 'impersonal' power, for 'impersonality' cannot be conceived before 'personality.' But is it necessary to assume that the idea behind supernaturalism is one that could be entertained only subsequent to an idea of personality such as animism implies? Much depends on what we take to be involved by animism. The terminology of anthropologists is still somewhat fluid, but there seems to be a need to allow for a distinction between animism as implying a separable soul and 'animatism,' which has been defined as 'The attribution of life and personality to things, but not a separate and apparitional soul.'[4] Is it not rather animatism than

[1] *E.R.E.*, art. '*Mana*.' [2] *Threshold of Religion*, p. 122 *seq.*
[3] *Personality*, pp. 28-29. [4] *Notes and Queries on Anthropology*, 1912, p. 262.

animism which is involved by supernaturalism's earliest conceptions? We assume that it was the abnormal manifestation itself which first held man's attention. When he was able to conceive of some power responsible for it, 'That which does' was likely to be thought of after the analogy 'Somebody who does' rather than 'Something which does.' But, even so, is it needful to assume that man could not frame such a conception until he had reached the notion of a separable soul in himself, and projected it into the realm of inanimate things? We need not insist upon the point in any case. Our powers of reconstructing the earliest stages of mankind are not sufficiently definite to warrant dogmatism. If the idea of superhuman power can be held apart from animism, it may have arisen independently of, or even prior to it. In any case the idea of an other-than-human order is one that can have been entertained from a very primitive stage of human development.

It is not unlikely that much depended upon the character of the abnormal manifestation itself. It has been noticed that where a god is represented by a single idol there is often a tendency, even amongst relatively developed peoples, to confuse the image and the spirit. This is less evident where the representations of the god are numerous. It is likely, therefore, that where the abnormal power was associated with one or two objects, the objects and the power might long remain undistinguished. Where there was a multiplicity of objects, a distinction between the objects and similar power in them all would more readily be made. In such an instance the influence of animistic conceptions would be

both easier and earlier. In the former case the attitude of supernaturalism, at least in its first form, could exist, attaching itself to the object without demanding a separate conception of the power that thus revealed itself. In the latter, the original attitude adopted towards each object would sooner become an attitude adopted towards power in them all.

In so far as it is an *attitude* displayed by man and animal alike, supernaturalism carries us back further than we need go if the object of our search is the *idea* of God. 'Terror in the presence of the forces of nature, such as we see in animals, may exist apart from the power of speech, but this is not religion. We can only speak of religion when there is the idea of relation to higher power, and the conception of such a permanent relation is made possible by language.'[1] That the idea of God was not possible apart from language will hardly be disputed, but, even so, it is impossible to fix upon any landmark and declare that on this side of it man became religious. Preceding the stages which we may definitely call religious were stages of development that were at least 'sub-religious.' We go still backward, till, in an attitude common to man and brute, and yet one which must have possessed more significance in a mind that can be called human than in an animal's mind, we find the germ of the central religious conception implicit, and growing more explicit as the mind's power grew. The God-idea is not an invention reached at a certain stage of culture, but the gradual unfolding of the implications of an elemental emotional attitude.

[1] Galloway, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 65.

It must not be thought that the argument we have followed is a disguised return to the old conjecture that fear bred faith. The early stages of human life were strongly tinged with fears, both well and ill grounded, but primitive man did not live in perpetual terror. Fear tends to wear itself out, and especially where not associated with physical pain, to lessen gradually. The repetitions of what at first is mentally terrifying produce in such cases a familiarity which may breed contempt, and certainly will breed relative indifference. Fear is violent as a passing emotion, but much weaker as an emotional mood. The emotion that accompanies supernaturalism is not fear, but awe, a compound of fear, wonder, and negative self-feeling.[1] Awe suggests far more aptly than fear the attitude of strained attention. But even awe is not permanent, and lessens when successive repetitions of the awe-inspiring have no immediate physical consequences, or at least its element of fear lessens. Awe is never mere shivering terror. A compound of fear, it is initially less violent and disturbing than fear, because of the presence of other elements which tend to distract from the panic-producing power of fear. As fear lessens, the part played by the other elements increases in proportion. Wonder leads to interest, and even admiration. The residuum left after many instances of an awe-inspiring event tends to be rather of the nature of practical curiosity which seeks to find out how to meet the situation created by it. This presumes the notion that the event has consequences upon human fortunes. The association of the abnormal and portentous

[1] McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 131, 305.

with subsequent happenings in the life of the tribe is not unnatural. '*Post hoc propter hoc*' is more than a fallacy exposed by logic. It is an elementary process of reasoning which has led to the empirical discovery of many truths, as well as to many superstitions. Whatever may have been the way in which man was led to believe that the superhuman order affected his life, the fact that he did so believe is not disputed. When he thinks he has successfully established a friendly relationship, the original awe, though never wholly lost, finds place for trust, and even love. But, throughout, the emotion connected with the supernatural is more complex than fear. The more violent emotions are not the more mentally influential. The very intensity of fear leads to a paralysis of mental powers, a fact of which predatory animals often take advantage. Awe, less violent and more complex than fear, is far more likely to lead to mental construction.[1]

We may now summarize the points that have been discussed. Behind the idea of God lies an elemental attitude of mind, with the accompanying emotion of awe. This precedes the conception itself, and at this stage supernaturalism might more accurately be described as 'supernormalism.' The need for adjusting relationships with new objects or surroundings is primary, and may be witnessed in the behaviour of all the higher animals. In every case the animal's instinctive endeavour is to prepare itself for the possible results of the situation.

[1] Cf. Marett, *Threshold of Religion*, p. 13: 'Of all English words awe is, I think, the one that expresses the fundamental religious feeling most nearly.' He adds it is not 'pure funk,' but includes 'wonder, admiration, interest, respect, even love perhaps.' Cf. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, pp. 132-135.

Man possesses the same instinct. His would have been a short history on this planet otherwise. The normal needs no attention, since relations are already established. Both man and beast need closely to watch the abnormal, and the unusual and awe-inspiring phenomena of nature arrest the notice of both. The animal's concern is limited to its own responsive reaction. If this be man's first, it is not his sole concern. His greater mental powers were destined to serve the instincts of self-preservation, to become indeed, their chief auxiliary. As they developed they led him towards a conception of power in the awe-inspiring phenomena that was not of the order he knew, neither man nor beast, and so to the notion of those supernatural powers, to which he endeavoured to relate himself. Since his interest lay only in the abnormal that seemed actually or possibly potent towards him, man regarded it dynamically. The root of the idea of superhuman power comes, then, from the implications of the supernormal. The idea itself is overlaid with animistic conceptions, but is not necessarily connected with animism, though probably apart from animism it could not have developed. It is probable, too, that the rites paid to ancestral shades, the personification of natural objects, and the like, which we held were by themselves insufficient to explain the origin, assisted the development of the idea of God.

It is also likely that the religious reactions were not the sole fruit of supernaturalism. The abnormal and uncontrollable quickened man's intellectual activities in the interests of self-preservation, and yielded a spur

towards general mental progress. The most immediate need, however, was to discover how he stood in relation to the supernatural order, and hence it is not unlikely that magic as well as religion may have come from the same source, for 'while the logical distinction between magic and religion is as sharp as a knife-edge, there is no such acute and rigid line between them historically.' [1] Both at least have an ancient lineage in the story of humanity.

There is good reason, therefore, to hold that from an elemental attitude of mind, with its welter of emotion, which surrounded the abnormal and awesome, man drew his first crudely grasped notion of power superior to himself, and from this plasm the idea of God. Religion is not inborn in man, but it has strong, instinctive antecedents, connected specially, if our reasoning be correct, with the instincts that minister to self-preservation. It is, therefore, a phase that was inevitable as human mentality developed and the instincts prompted to thought as well as to action, not an accidental mutation which happened to get transmitted. It belongs to the main stream, and must be estimated as one of the chief factors of human evolution.

The God-idea cannot stand alone. A god in no relation to man is a conception that could not have arisen. Just as the idea of God arises out of the practical needs of man's situation, so man's attempt to adjust his relationship towards the supernormal implies the subsequent idea of a divine-human relation. The two are naturally

[1] Frazer, *Folklore in the Old Testament*, iii., p. 163. Cf. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, ch. xiii.

and indissolubly connected, and the next step, therefore, will be to trace some of the leading characteristics of the idea of a relationship between man and his gods.

IV

THE DIVINE-HUMAN RELATIONSHIP

We have said that it is possible that both magic and religion arose out of supernaturalism, as methods of dealing with the superhuman powers. Their interrelation is not easy to decide. Magic may have arisen out of the degeneration of religion, though direct evidence of such a process does not exist. On the other hand, Sir J. G. Frazer's belief that recognition of the vanity of magic led to the religious attitude is equally unproven. It is best, therefore, to regard magic and religion as efforts adopted, contemporaneously or successively, by man to secure successful commerce with the supernatural. Their distinction, as methods of coercion and conciliation, abides. If it should be that one is prior to the other it can hardly be thought to have developed into it, for a change of standpoint is involved. There is no psychological improbability in their co-existence, however. Threatening and coaxing, like tears and laughter, are opposites that often meet. Indeed, it is very likely that, under stress of emotion, and urged by the practical need of making some reaction, both means would be tried, first one then the other. But if magic and religion were at first indifferently employed, they are psychologically different. Sir J. G. Frazer, as is well known, regards

religion as belief in powers superior to man, and the attempt to propitiate or please them. Mr. Andrew Lang has objected that certain Australian tribes believe in a great god whom they do not attempt to propitiate by prayer or sacrifice, and that other peoples do the same. Propitiation, moreover, is not an essential feature in the highest forms of religion. But the idea of pleasing rather than compelling marks the difference between magic and religion. Religion seeks to establish the right human attitude towards the supernatural, magic to compel the attitude of the supernatural towards man. The importance of the distinction is not merely logical or psychological. It is traced in the effect upon man himself. The attitude which attempted to coerce superhuman power had no beneficial influence on the conception of the divine-human relationship. It tended to react unfavourably upon it, since it necessarily led towards a conception of that power as hostile. The religious attitude, on the other hand, presupposed the friendliness of the power, if man could put himself into the right relation with it, and therefore reacted much more favourably both on the idea of the relationship and on the worshipper himself. To say this does not mean that man could realize it, nor that, on this account, he deliberately put away magic for religion. None the less, it is a fact that has an important bearing upon the question of the fate of magic.

The history of religion reveals the gradual wearing down of the influence of magic. If we ask why the religious attitude prevailed against that of magic, we can only assume that it did so because it produced the

more satisfying reactions. The well-worn phrase 'Survival of the fittest,' can be applied to more than to organisms. Judging solely from what might be held to be the direct results of applying the two methods, there is no reason to think that religion would manifest any marked advantage. The religious reactions adopted as a means of attaining material ends would appear to succeed or fail in the same proportions as the magical processes directed towards obtaining the same results. Why, then, did they emerge successfully from the struggle with their rivals? It is not sufficient to reply that religion, in that it tended to be social and public, was more wholesome than magic, which tended to be individual and private. The distinction was by no means absolute, and will not account for the decay of social expressions of magic. We must connect the triumph of religion with its effect upon the worshippers themselves. It has an inward influence upon man himself. Magic, directed outwardly towards the power, did not supply this. Simply regarded as methods of obtaining material results, religion and magic might have been counted as of equal value. What magic did not give, however, was the inward effect upon the man himself, the sense of friendly communion with the supernatural, and with that sense, a source of help, strength, and comfort. Material and outward though the aspect of the earlier forms of religion was, it is impossible to disregard the gradual rise of its inward aspect. As man became capable of spiritual progress, religion rose with him, whilst magic remained stationary. Magic failed, not because it was proved false, but because it became inadequate. It was left behind amongst the

things which man outgrew. Religion remained, because it answered a need of which man became more conscious the more he developed mentally and spiritually, a need more deep and inward than that of material favour and good. We cannot account for the persistence of religion except by the fact that man felt that it answered that need. If religion, which at first could hardly have exhibited any advantage over magic, had not been fitted to afford satisfaction to man's deeper and more spiritual needs as they developed, it would have been left behind with magic. If man had remained at the stage when concrete and material benefits were all he desired, religion and magic might have remained together as joint methods of attempting to attain these ends. The survival of religion and the decay of magic witness to man's capacity for developing an inward spiritual experience, and the fitness of religion to fulfil the needs of that experience.

The more, then, religion cleared itself of the influence of magic, the more definitely it determined the conception of the human-divine relationship as one of alliance between man and superhuman powers. Increasingly it became felt that such alliance might be permanent if man could but put the gods into right relation with him by putting himself into right relation with them. The influence of the conception of such an alliance on man's ideals cannot be overstated. The decay of magic was neither constant nor uniform. It still holds a vast place in the world. But whereas it has never been more than neutral, and generally very baneful, religion, despite frequent degeneration, has in the main tended to progress. As long as magic thrives, moral and spiritual progress are impossible.

It is not strange, therefore, to find the more progressive religions most of all hostile to magic. The Hebrew prophets, whose religious ideals were the morning star on the horizon, exhibit an increasing detestation of magic. Where magic lingers, religion is weak and progress slow. The first great step in religious evolution was the determination of the nature of the divine-human relationship. Very slowly and painfully the struggle between the rival conceptions of religion and magic regarding it was settled in favour of religion. That implied the possibility of spiritual progress, and also of what cannot be separated from it—moral and intellectual progress. So did religion render service to humanity.

The character of the divine-human relationship was thus gradually determined as the religious conception of it asserted itself over that of magic. We have next to consider how the relation found expression. Whatever may have been the earliest forms of that expression, it is certain that they would be social rites, for, although, if we admit magic to have been privately exercised, we cannot absolutely deny that possibility to religion, the general trend of religion is overwhelmingly social, and nowhere is this more true than in the earliest forms. We have no means at our disposal for reconstructing the earliest forms of ritual, nor can we assert that they would even be similar in all races. But since religion was the affair of the tribe or clan, its expression was part of tribal rule and custom, and as such came into inseparable contact with primitive morality. Originally, however, the root-conception of the supernatural is unmoral. As trans-human power it is as unmoral as our own conception

of energy. If, then, the essence of religion be to establish harmonious relation with such power, it appears to have no connexion with morality. The paradox is explained when we realize that the only description we can give of primitive morality was that it consisted in following tribal custom as distinct from individual impulses. However irrational, and, from our point of view, immoral, that custom may have been, compliance was none the less of the nature of a moral act. Moral obligation, the sense that the custom ought to be followed, may or may not be argued to be the voice of the social consciousness speaking within, but moral custom meant simply the rule of the tribe. As a socially manifested thing, primitive religion was always connected with morality, in the only sense in which morality existed for early man. Later, when tribal and national religion give place to universal religion, morality widens from duty to the tribe to duty to humanity, and the spheres of ethics and religion become separable.

Thus, though the psychological origin of religion may not be connected with morality, it appears that the connexion of religion and morality is inseparable in practice, and the expression of the relationship with the god is a social, that is to say a moral, act. Interaction between religious belief and moral custom is strongly marked. The relation to a tribal god is a powerful factor in tribal discipline. Calamities are readily connected with the god's wrath, and the action of any individual which appears to have incurred that wrath is consequently punished or made taboo, whilst what seems to gain the god's goodwill is enforced. The tendency to connect

causally simultaneous or speedily sequent events creates many such commands and prohibitions, mostly irrational, but thus primitive religion influenced the content of primitive morality.

The history of religious development reveals increasingly the intimate reaction of religion and morality upon each other. Their values tend to combine. At the stage when a tribal deity is worshipped the interests of the god and the tribe coincide, and duty to the tribe and to the god is one and the same thing. The more theocratic the conception of religion, the more do moral and religious duties unite. Religion affords 'sanctions' to moral custom, basing it upon the will of the god. Moral conceptions react upon religious conceptions. Man cannot remain content to worship a deity invested with a moral standard inferior to his own. A higher moral consciousness in the worshipper necessarily implies a higher conception of the nature of his deity. The uplift given by the Hebrew prophets to the conception of Jahweh sprang from the higher moral inspiration within them. Such a deepened conception in its turn tends to make moral custom more rational, and to eliminate those prohibitions and rules which were based on arbitrary and superstitious grounds. Long before science could exhibit the baselessness of much strictly enforced custom, the growth of the religious consciousness, in realizing that the gods do not forbid without reason, relaxed much that was merely superstitious in moral custom, as may once again be witnessed in the attitude of the Hebrew prophets to the ceremonial law.

In this way, through the infiltration of a moral element

the idea of the divine-human relationship is transformed. When religion is still in the germ, its object superhuman power, its emotion awe, there is nothing moral in the relationship. Whatever can conciliate the power is right. Later, when a harmonious relationship is thought to be established, when the god is the god of the tribe, the custom of the tribe is based on the authority of the tribal god. So the relation is conceived as right or wrong according as man fulfils or fails to fulfil that custom, for any violation of the god's sanctity, as in the case of Achan, brings disaster not only to the individual and his household, but to the whole tribe, and to them first and foremost. It is later still that stress is laid on inward conditions as bearing upon the relationship, righteousness in life and motive. That implies a private as well as a social relationship, and in the earlier stages the relationship of the individual to the tribal god is as general as that of the average citizen of to-day to the King. It is the moral element in the divine-human relationship that makes individual religion possible. Where rites are social, righteousness is individual, and, more than anything else, the conscious sense of having fulfilled the rites the god demands makes possible the idea of individual rightness of character, and hence of a peculiar relation to the god not shared by all.

The influence of moral conceptions upon the expression of the divine-human relation may be illustrated by a brief reference to two means of establishing that relation which are wellnigh universal, sacrifice and prayer.

Into theories of sacrifice we cannot venture. The very simplicity of the view that the origin of sacrifice was the

idea of appeasing with a gift seems the chief stumbling-block in the way of its acceptance. Yet at least it can claim that the conception it implies is capable of being entertained by the lowliest mentalities, for to provide food is an expression of an instinct, and food is also almost the only gift of primitive peoples, and the obvious way of manifesting goodwill. In the absence of positive evidence it may be that such a view is as credible as those which suggest that sacrifice did not arise until man possessed an organized and even complicated social system. Whatever be the view adopted, however, no one suggests that sacrifice had originally a moral significance. Robertson Smith, who held that sacrifice was positively the imparting of some quality, pointed out that this negatively implies the removal of some impurity.[1] Finally the latter aspect becomes primary, and the sacrifice becomes piacular. Whether in this way or not, sacrifice ultimately obtains amongst the more developed peoples a moral significance, and so the relation it expresses to the god is transformed, until the original import of sacrifice may even be changed to the ethical conception that 'the sacrifices of God are a broken spirit,' and the material lost in the spiritual.

Just as the growth of moral conceptions transforms the idea of the relation between the god and the worshippers which sacrifice expresses, so, too, as regards prayer. Sounds and cries accompany most forms of emotion, and the germ of prayer probably lies in such impulsive expressions of wishes and feelings. Spell and prayer bear the same relation to each other as magic and religion.

[1] *Religion of the Semites*, p. 427.

When, instead of the impersonal address of the merely volitional ejaculation, or of the spell, we have what is personal address, we are dealing with what may properly be called prayer, which develops from crassly petitionary and material forms to the yearning for spiritual blessing, from begging boons to craving communion. In this, again, moral conceptions provide the motive power. Prayer is essentially a means of approach to the god. In its earliest stages actual calamity is the clearest indication that the divine-human relation is ruptured, and approach is made to the god to renew it. Subsequently, the sense of wrong, apart from any particular disaster, urges the same attempt by fear of future consequences Finally, apart from any thought of consequences, the sense of being wrong with God clamours for a restored relation ; for life, conceived as lived in and through God, can be right only when right before Him. Once again, therefore, the means of expressing the divine-human relationship can become transformed by the growth of moral consciousness.

Through all its transformations, however, the religious relationship witnesses to the same root-idea—that of some definite step on man's part to establish harmony between himself and the god. Whether it be the tribe's relation to its object of worship expressed in rites, or a personal tie between the human soul and a heavenly Father expressed in communion, the right relation is not self-existent. It must be sought, established, maintained, and, when wrong, put right. The expression of the relation has advanced with the advance of moral ideas, but every stage of human culture in its own way expresses

the sense of such a relation. Human history is unintelligible apart from this, for as the evolution of culture is the development of the sense of higher needs and higher satisfactions, the core of such development has been man's belief in an order superior to himself, and his efforts to establish and express a relation with it. Upon this all the higher values of existence have at one time or another been rooted, and the spiritualization of value, the highest achievement of consciousness, has been made possible by this alone. If only in keeping active within man the sense of incompleteness and imperfection, the idea of a divine-human relation has been the power-plant of his progress.

In whatever way the religious relationship is expressed, it is always held to be a relation between a human subject and a god or gods actually existent. The objective existence of the gods is unwaveringly believed in at all stages. When the belief wanes the religion breaks down. If religion be a form of auto-suggestion, it has existed only because of the entire ignorance of mankind of that fact. Recognition of it would instantly have been fatal to religion. Religion embraces beliefs much less coercive in character than this conviction of the reality of the gods, but such beliefs belong to mythology rather than religion. It is strange, therefore, to find such a thinker as Benedetto Croce identifying religion and mythology. A juster view of the relation between the two was long ago pointed out by Robertson Smith, who has said, 'Mythology was no essential part of ancient religion, for it had no sacred sanction and no binding force on the worshipper.'[1]

[1] *Religion of the Semites*, p. 19.

Although this statement cannot in all cases be rigidly pressed, it is illustrative of the broad difference between religion and mythology. Some myths apparently are pure flights of fancy, but even these may originally have been what the majority of myths are, aetiological. They served as a primitive science and philosophy and poetry. They were believed seriously, but are not generally expressive of deep religious feeling, nor as stringently enforced as religious rites and dogmas. The judgements which affirm myths are similar to those which affirm dogmas, yet not without certain differences. They have less intensity because they have less practical urgency. Many myths are beliefs about gods, but religious beliefs are more specially beliefs in what the gods do, or will do, to men, and contain, therefore, a stronger emotional element. Still further, religious beliefs are generally regarded as enforced from without; that is, the nature of the god necessitates the belief. Myths, on the contrary, are generally recognized as depending on a tradition which, however sacred and binding, is not of the same nature as the god's fiat. The myths of the Old Testament are not prefaced by 'Thus saith the Lord,' and if those of the Quran are regarded as divinely revealed, they have not the same sanctions as the law of Allah. Mythology and ritual alike bear closely on the religious relation. The myth helps, perhaps, to explain the nature of the god, the ritual to assist correct approach, but, broadly, there is a difference in atmosphere, in temperature of feeling, between mythology and religion. Many factors go to maintain the sense of the divine-human relation. Some are social, the belief of others, some habitual, the

embodiment of belief in cult and custom, for when worship dies belief falls sick, but, most of all, it is the sense of need that gives urgency to the attempt to maintain the divine-human relation, and that urgency is lacking in mythology.

If both moral ideas and mythology have helped to fashion the expression of the divine-human relation, another factor has also exercised a deep influence upon it. Belief in the survival of the soul or spirit is not in nature or history necessarily a religious conception, but, like moral conceptions, it has always been closely blended with religious ideas, from the earliest times till now. Its presupposition, the notion of a soul or spirit, seems to be no older than itself, for belief in the persistence of the soul appears to have as long a lineage as belief in its existence. The difficulty immortality presents does not exist for primitive minds. The influence of the conception upon religion has been both intellectual and spiritual, and also practically universal. It has afforded to the religious relation the idea of permanence and the hope of perfection. In so doing it has deepened and spiritualized it. In helping to lift man's thought above the purely sensuous world it has raised his whole nature and outlook. If religion be essentially an activity even more than a belief, the idea of the soul can scarcely be called 'The basis of all religion.'[1] But it may at least be said to be an adjunct of religion which has enabled the divine-human relationship to be conceived in a manner far more adequate and worthy than would otherwise have been possible.

[1] Crawley, *Idea of the Soul*, p. 17.

The influence of animistic conceptions upon the religious relation is traced in the tendency of belief in the existence of spirits acting through the ceremonial employed in regard to the dead, to suggest similar methods of approach to the gods, who also were conceived as spiritual beings. The natural feelings of affection and duty, mingled with certain fears, prompt the ritual towards the dead, and the attitude towards the gods was not dissimilar. At later stages the conception of immortality becomes more influential, particularly in certain races, for the Old Testament doctrine of Sheol shows that personal religious experience can flourish with a very dim sense of personal immortality. But the sense of personal, as distinct from social, relationship to the god necessitates sooner or later the corollary of personal immortality. Once established, it made possible the transformation of the conception of the religious relation, so that the outward and earthly symbols of the bond become viewed *sub specie aeternitatis*.

We may now restate the line of thought we have followed. The divine-human relationship is implied in the very nature of religion. It receives its first determination when the religious approach to the superhuman prevails over the magical approach. It develops *pari passu* with mental development, the formation of deeper powers of thought, wider interests, more adequate self-expression. Moral conceptions act upon it, and in turn are reacted upon. The story of religious development does not proceed regularly, either in itself or in its relation to mental development, to which it is sometimes disproportionate, being both in excess and in arrears at

different stages and with different peoples. Viewed as a whole, however, the process has been the refinement of crude belief and rite by the power of broader and more spiritual culture. In the earlier stages progress was stimulated by practical needs more than by intellectual effort, and in this respect religion and mythology are differentiated. The gods are actual ; the relation to them is vital. Myths are mainly aetiological, and reveal intellectual curiosity. They are less urgent, less binding, because less vital. Another conception, however, that of animism, which bears the mark of an attempt to explain experience, brings to the religious relation not merely a means of conceiving the nature of the gods, but ultimately a wider notion of the relationship with them, and affords the idea of its permanence, leading to a far more close and intimate bond when personal religion implies personal immortality. In the main the progress of the idea of a divine-human relation accompanies the process of self-realization. Personal religious experience is a late growth, when a measure of personal independence in life exists to make it possible. It implies the disintegration of the strong social bonds that made for uniformity in religious expression, but the old rule, ' Die to live,' is thereby illustrated anew, for where uniform rites and customs tend, by a kind of mental in-breeding, to sterility, the setting free of individual minds yields to religion fresh impulses, looses it from local and particular expressions, and enables it to appear as the relation between a universal God and every human soul. It is, therefore, to the more developed stages that our interest will now turn. Hitherto our principal concern

has been with more elementary forms. But such reconstruction, hypothetical as it must of necessity be, does not itself enable us to appreciate the part played by religion in human life. To attain a more adequate appreciation of that we shall need to consider what is generally characteristic of the fuller expression of religion, both in the religious consciousness and its expression in the religious life.

V

THE RELIGIOUS CONSCIOUSNESS

HITHERTO we have been dealing with what we have held to be essential to and characteristic in all religions, from the lowest to the highest forms, belief in a superhuman order, or gods, and in a relation thereto. The comparative study of religion has afforded sufficient material to justify a further step ; that is, a psychological characterization of the religious consciousness, together with certain common features of the religious life. Such general characterization as these possess will occupy us in this and the following chapter.

So far as the religious consciousness is concerned, our present purpose of dealing with religious experience in its common aspects does not allow of any consideration of the characteristics of particular periods or particular religions. Broad and general though the treatment must be, there is enough in common between all ages and creeds to allow of a description of the religious consciousness in those features which belong to it as a whole. It will be possible to indicate two main types of religious experience first of all, and subsequently to discuss briefly the function of feeling, thought, and will in the production and expression of religious experience.

The most general differentiation within the religious

consciousness is based on the predominance of what may be called active and passive characteristics. By ' active ' we understand that which is creative, original, direct, ' inspired ' ; by ' passive ' that which is transmitted and acquired by tradition, imitation, and suggestion. The distinction, of course, is neither ultimate nor exclusive, and the two classes shade off into each other by imperceptible degrees. All religious experience contains something of both elements. None the less, the preponderance of one or other characteristic is usual.

Numerically, the ' passive ' type is very much in the ascendant. In biological metaphor they are the species whilst the active type are mutations. Psychological studies of religious experience have naturally turned to the ' active ' type, which is almost exclusively represented in William James's classic work. From the standpoint we are occupying, however—that of religious experience generally—the passive type is the more significant. Amongst those who are mainly passive is the class whose beliefs remain because, once implanted, nothing has occurred to uproot them. Such belief is neither creative nor inspiring, but it may be none the less regulative in thought and conduct. Others believe upon authority. Among more backward races, where tribal custom is still dominant, this class is always numerous. Amongst Christians, Catholicism exhibits the type principally. They are found among Protestants, but here the changed estimate of the authority of the Bible has left this class to rely mainly upon the sentiments implanted by early teaching.

Passive religious experience holds its place partly by

inertia, but not entirely. It has a direct value. It serves, in the beliefs it embraces, as an explanation of those ultimate questions of life which every man faces at some time or other. More than that, it affords comfort in the pains and perplexities of life. It gives an outlet to the perennial religious impulses of mankind. Hence passive experience is living and effective, and fulfils certain necessary ends for its possessor. It is conservative rather than creative, but in this it tends to give stability to the religious community, for the very intensity of creative energy is sometimes self-destructive. It is to active experience as mother-of-pearl to pearl ; it forms a shelter within which active experience may develop. In a community where religion is moribund, revival, if it come, comes from without. Where the passive experience is maintained, an active experience may appear within it to quicken it. Christianity arose out of Judaism. It could not have sprung from unprepared ground. That is the function passive experience fulfils in spiritual evolution. It forms the material out of which arises the active experience that is destined to uplift it.

From the active type new impulses proceed. Custom is static and enduring, but the religion of rite and routine, however long it linger, will slowly disintegrate if left to itself. It collides with other interests, and wears away through friction against them. It tends to decay as social conditions change. Active experience supplies it with the necessary renewal from age to age. It affords fresh sources of energy and inspiration, revivifying an ancient or creating a new heritage. The interplay of active and passive experience in religious evolution

illustrates the balance so characteristic of living forces, the thesis and antithesis that make synthesis. The active type manifests the intensity of religion, its tendency to variation. It shows repeatedly in history how the one or the few transform the whole social inheritance. But the passive type witnesses to the naturalness and normality of religion in the race. It proves that religion is not the concern of the 'twice-born' only, of prophets and seers. Were it so, it would be far less significant. By showing the extent, influence, and permanence of religion in the social consciousness, the passive type calls attention to a fact that cannot be overlooked by any who hold that there is a meaning in experience, and that it is in some way indicated by the value-judgements of mankind.

We pass on to consider the elements of feeling, will, and thought. The threefold division is convenient, even though, in order to analyse, it rends what is woven as one in consciousness. There is no need to perpetuate the distinction we have pointed out between active and passive types in our further analysis, for, as we have said, all religious experience implies some measure of each.

Feeling appears always as the accompaniment of activity, by which it is conditioned and on which it depends, varying with the vital character and intensity of the activity. It might be possible to trace the variation of feeling according to the biological value of the activity it accompanies. In general, the most vital experiences evoke the strongest feeling accompaniments; and, conversely, the strongest feelings betoken the most vital activities. The affective element of religious consciousness may accordingly be held, not only to be an inevitable

accompaniment of the essential activity of religion, but also a sign which suggests its urgency.

It is well known that religious feeling is particularly manifest in the lower strata of culture. Amongst primitive peoples feeling is never far removed from frenzy. Mass suggestion, or even auto-suggestion, working through the emotions, can make the charm heal as surely as the balm, the spell kill as certainly as the spear. Where there is but small capacity of reflective thought, and little volitional control, there is no permanent character. The man is the plaything of his own emotions, driven by each impulse, which loses its power only when inhibited by a fresh impulse. Amongst civilized peoples greater powers of thought and will imply greater restraint; but even then the emotional impulses are little weakened. Students of group psychology are well aware of the intensity of such impulses when control relaxes. Whilst such manifestations are more frequent amongst the less educated, since education is a prime cause of emotional control, and in group expressions, none the less it is possible to find a parallel in the ecstasy of mystics, many of whom, like Plotinus, were disciplined and deep thinkers. It is evident that the current of feeling is restrained rather than lessened by the lock-gates of a navigable mind.

The function of feeling in the religious consciousness is first of all to continue and enlarge the activity it accompanies. The great movements of religious history acquire a momentum of intense feeling. In the polemics of the eighteenth century against the Methodists, the reproach is that of 'enthusiasm.' To decorous minds, whose thought is reflected in the cool logic of Butler, emotion

seemed an impertinence. None the less it is essential. Excess defeats its own ends, but controllable emotion gives a command not otherwise possible over those reserves of energy that are stored up for emergency and special opportunity. Fear, but not panic, gives speed and resource to the pursued animal; anger, but not blind fury, gives strength and skill to the fighter. Religious feeling serves a similar end in all religious movements.

What is true here socially is also true of the individual. The feelings that accompany a religious transformation or conversion are conditioned by the new activities thus awakened, and in turn assist in maintaining them. Few characters are malleable, except under the heat of feeling, and a sudden reversal of life habits and interests is seldom found where the affective nature is undeveloped. The same is true of religious leaders. Their experience is always rich in feeling qualities. Leaders of thought who have been deficient in these have never exercised more than an indirect influence over the actual progress of religion. They have been as Erasmus to Luther. There are limits both to the religious depth and effectiveness of the mind deficient in response to feeling. On the other hand, the incited feelings are apt to act blindly down the line of least resistance. Feeling cannot choose, although it can cut its own channel. The outflow from its depths is valuable, therefore, in so far as it is effectively guided, and such guidance comes from the powers of reflection, will, and habit, not from feeling itself.

A second function of feeling arises out of the first. The passage of the emotions leaves behind what may be likened to a deposit, or sediment, which is crystallized

in sentiment. Sentiment encrusts the objects to which it is attached with protective layers, and spreads, by association, towards anything connected with them. Much of the stability and permanence of rites, customs, doctrines is thus secured. The preservation, however, may be too effective, and maintain rites and beliefs out of which vital feeling has departed. While a certain conservation is essential for the permanence of religion, an excess always means traditionalism. Sentiment is healthy so long as the feelings which created it persist in it, and no longer, save in those few cases where sentiment keeps alive some rite or belief from which creative feeling has temporarily departed. In such cases it may assist its return. If, however, the original feelings have entered into other forms, the sentiment is obsolete, and, being reactionary, is a hindrance. Sooner or later it must break up before the new sentiments gathered round the new expression of feeling, but the disintegration may be very slow. No form of religion has ever died out by a pure process of exhaustion. Those that decay will be found always to have been supplanted by others which adapt themselves better to the mental environment. The place religion occupies in the life of the race is too important for it ever to have been vacant, as the witness of history proves.

A further question relating to the place of feeling within the religious consciousness was raised when Schleiermacher passionately declared that it was central in religious experience. Schleiermacher's characterization of the specifically religious feeling as that of absolute dependence found few supporters, though Tiele's description of

religion as ' That pure and reverential disposition of mind which we call piety,' [1] with its subsequent definition of piety as adoration, self-abasement, and the sense of unworthiness, is, in many respects, reminiscent of it. But since the unit of our mental processes is a synthesis of conation and cognition, it is impossible to single out ' the religious feeling.' Religion is primarily a mode of behaviour rather than a feeling-attitude. Others, following William James, contrast the affective and cognitive sides of the religious consciousness, and give primacy to the former. If this is understood to be a generalization concerning the actual predominance of the element of feeling in the bulk of religious experiences, there is no need to dispute it. Yet, so far as individuals are concerned, it would hardly be maintained that religion is not truly existent unless the feeling-attitude is more prominent in it than the intellect. In general, however, the vitality and intensity of the religious consciousness is measurable by its feeling qualities, not in themselves, but in their power of stimulating action and thought.

The part played by reflection in religious experience, though less obviously manifest than that of feeling, is influential. Professor Ladd's statement that ' religion as well as science has been found to have its sources in intellectual curiosity ' [2] cannot be accepted from the standpoint we have adopted. But curiosity is instinctive, and has certainly contributed to the growth of religious ideas as long as such ideas have been possible. If the argument offered here be correct, however, religion is

[1] *Elements of the Science of Religion*, ii. 198.
[2] *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 418.

stimulated, not merely by intellectual curiosity, but by the curiosity that is part of the instincts of preservation. As intellectual powers advanced, they accompanied and helped to regulate the expression of religion, working both constructively and critically.

Constructively, intellect works upon the beliefs of religion as it works upon the naive beliefs of childhood, not by deliberate efforts to clarify them, but by its own increase in range and depth. No one suggests now that belief in gods was the discovery of some intellectual genius of prehistoric days. The consequence of that admission is that we must regard the function of intellect in religion as having been ancillary throughout, elaborating not creating, explaining not sustaining, religion. Yet the cognitive element is as essential to religious experience as the conative. The tendency at the present time to anti-intellectualism must not blind us to the fact that concepts are as necessary to humanity as instincts. Religion is a life-movement ; behind it lies the great ' urge ' of life ; hence it is rich in feeling-tones ; but feelings that are not focused round concepts dissipate themselves in undirected energy. They may, as in the animals, serve towards preservation, but never towards progress.

Critically, intellect may work destructively as regards the forms and expressions of experience, but the unchanging sense of need forces upon it the more positive task of attempting to replace what it has destroyed. Whatever be the work of intellect in religion, however, it is always performed under pressure from the feelings and volition. Belief in God may be a necessity of thought to many philosophical interpretations of experience, but such a

God has small religious value. It is other than intellectual factors that create belief in the God of religion. The problem of religious thought has always been to discover how the values sought through religion can be attached to the conception of God provided by the intellect. But it is not the problem of religion alone. Theories of a world-principle which is beyond good and evil, or of an unconscious will as the world-ground, have failed because of their inadequacy to explain moral values more than by any purely rational defects. In one respect there can be no critique of pure reason, for there is no 'pure' reason. It is not merely psychologically false to speak of intellect as existing apart from conation ; it is unthinkable.

We speak of the volitional element in religion for convenience, though will is of the nature of a process rather than an element, and even theoretically, for analytical purposes, is less easy to regard separately than feeling or thought. Its fundamental function in religion is closely connected with the fact that religion is the attempt to satisfy a need essential to man, and therefore arouses the effort to secure and conserve its values. Moreover, the sense of conflict is inseparable from religion and involves an accompanying direction of the will toward the ends that are endangered.

Associated with the feelings and beliefs of religion, will tends to afford stability to those that serve to fulfil the ends sought by religion, and acts selectively from this point of view amongst them. Still more, the will to believe may create and maintain a belief sufficiently long at least to allow it a period of probation in which to prove its value. It cannot permanently maintain a belief that

receives no endorsement from experience, or, more correctly perhaps, is not regarded as receiving such endorsement. The cry of the man in the Gospels, ' Lord, I believe ; help Thou mine unbelief,' is sheer will to believe, but the fate of that belief would none the less be dependent upon what happened subsequently to his son. Most religious beliefs start from the will to believe, and it is significant that so many are accounted to receive such justification in experience that, despite disappointments and contradictions, they persist throughout history. It must not be forgotten that the will to believe, although it is faith, is justified by works. The idea of the working value of religious beliefs is far older than pragmatist philosophy, which emphasizes it anew. It is hard to find any other reason for the persistence of primitive belief. The Old Testament challenges the impotence of the gods compared with the potency of Jahweh. Traditional apologetics for Christianity claimed prophecies fulfilled and miracles performed. Modern apologetics point to the working value of Christianity both socially and individually. Such a criterion has at least one salutary effect. It links religion with the practical issues of life, and keeps it from becoming merely inward and mystical. But it also goes to show that the will to believe is not arbitrary. It is posited out of desire, but it works under test conditions. Throughout human history it has passed those tests whether imposed on it by primitive expectation or intellectual criticism. Each age in its own manner has tried its religion by its own method of ordeal. Form after form, belief upon belief, creed and creed, have been found lacking, but the will to believe has still put forward

fresh embodiments. If the idea of God refers to no objective reality, if man's faith is but the echo of his own heart's cry, religion has not been simply an unparalleled blunder, it has been the most piteous tragedy of humanity. It may be, however, that the will to believe carries its own justification with it. When the will to serve embodies itself in actual service, the activity often gives us the guarantee of the belief that we were called to serve. Those who will to seek the morally highest realize the justification of the moral imperative in a manner which ethical theory cannot afford. Those who will to serve their fellow men realize in such service why it is demanded of them after a fashion that is more convincing than sociology. It is in this way alone that we can explain why the religious faith of mankind has persisted. Tested intellectually, there is no creed, past or present, that can satisfy a philosophical examination on all points. Tested by results, there is no religion that does not appear to stand condemned. But unless faith brought its own justification to the faithful, religion would have perished as magic has perished amongst educated races. Neither the rational nor the pragmatic criterion after all has the last word in religion. Through all its vastly differing expressions, from lowest to highest, there is a psychological unity in the religious consciousness. It seeks human values through a superhuman ground of value. That is its most fundamentally common characteristic, and through all its long history it has always been satisfied that it has not sought wholly in vain.

VI

THE RELIGIOUS LIFE

The great differences in the moral and intellectual status of the historical religions do not alter the fact that the religious consciousness, like the social consciousness, has certain factors common throughout. The same is true of the religious life. In dealing with a generalization based on so many and such diverse phenomena as ' The religious life ' must be, one has to be content with plurative rather than universal judgements. No one, however, would feel debarred from treating, shall we say, totemism or ancestor-worship as characteristics of the life of primitive people generally, although in certain cases there is no evidence of either. Similarly, in dealing with the characteristics of the more fully developed forms of religion, it need not be maintained that all are equally apparent at every stage of society or in every individual. Yet we can consider certain features as normal predicates of the religious life generally if we characterize widely rather than particularly. Three phases or aspects are perennial within it—the mystic, the ascetic, and the altruistic. In addition to these we can take the sense of conflict, which is a broader expression than the sense of sin, as pertaining to the religious life, particularly in connexion with the sense of a wrongly adjusted relationship to the gods.

With mysticism, asceticism, and altruism in the ordinary sense of the terms, which confines them—particularly the first two—to special and intense expressions, we are not here concerned. Our interest is in those aspects of the three which enter into the religious life generally. The study of the special phases sometimes obscures the fact that what appears intensely and often pathologically in the few is, in a lower degree, found in the mass where it is normal. Nor does it follow that the difference, even, is merely of degree. The conditions which produce suggestibility, for example, in the majority, will in some cases evoke contra-suggestibility. Now suggestibility and contra-suggestibility are psychologically similar, but their reactions are opposites. The normal motive for taking food is to appease hunger, the normal result to build up the body. Pushed to an abnormal degree in gluttony, the motive changes, and the result is detrimental to the body. In like manner, if the extreme forms of mysticism and asceticism are pathological, we cannot assume that the normal forms are to be assessed merely as milder degrees of them. The mystic, ascetic, and altruistic phases are represented in the religious life of all races, and we must seek for their significance as they appear there, not in their abnormal expressions. Though individual characters, and the spirit of different ages and peoples, tend to stress sometimes one sometimes another, all are perennial in the great mass of religious experience.

The more intense mystics have usually separated the spiritual and natural life sharply, and consequently have had little contact with, and therefore little direct influence

upon, the world. Both lose. The mystic tends to become absorbed and self-sufficient. The world lacks the influence of the mystic's convictions and ardour. Life, whether of the flesh or spirit, is a unity, and to divorce flesh and spirit involves a dual control that has not infrequently resulted in inconsistencies of character and conduct. Mysticism renders better service in those more moderate forms which vindicate the worth of the experience by showing it to be productive of a life of moral and social value. In some form or other the religious life has its mystical side. It varies from ecstatic rapture to brief and passing moments of spiritual elevation, often cloaked by the reticence that many feel when they cross the bar of sense experience into the tideways of deeper seas. It is seen in the emotional accompaniments of primitive rites: it is felt in the awe that surrounds the altar and sanctuary, in the sacred syllables of the Buddhist, in the Christian Eucharist. The Vedanta and *The Imitation of Christ*, the Platonic dialogues and the Avesta, contribute to its literature. Nothing is more characteristic of the religious life of mankind than the universal sense of the mystical aspect of life. Of both ancient and modern religions Positivism alone is unrepresentative of it, and it is significant that Positivism is a synthetic, not a natural, religion.

Naturalism may write down mystics as epileptics, and mysticism as superstition, but, none the less, the mystic element in experience is not explained in that manner. Indeed, it is part of the evidence which proves the inadequacy of a naturalistic interpretation of life. Naturalism is hard put to account for the origin and persistence

of anti-naturalistic tendencies. Whilst mysticism has been joined, as it was by Plotinus, to intellectual systems, it is sustained by ultra-rational factors. It testifies, sometimes explicitly, sometimes unwittingly, sometimes rationally, sometimes intuitively, to a belief that the spiritual realm is of greater rank than the natural. This belief is the outcome of man's sense of relationship to the superhuman, and shows the effect of that relation in lifting man from sense-existence and instinctive activities towards a more spiritual plane. The mystic element in experience is more than a discharge of emotion. It is an expression of that within man which has ultimately brought him to be able to interpret life in terms of spiritual purpose. Few things are so intolerable to the human spirit, itself so essentially purposive, as a purposeless universe. To many modern minds religion and teleology are almost synonymous. Life on a naturalistic basis has no final purpose. This belongs alone to life that is spiritually based. It is this more than anything else which to-day deepens the conviction that a universe explained mechanically must also be interpreted spiritually. We may argue it on rational grounds. We believe it actually on ultra-rational grounds. It is increasingly evident to-day that the dominant issues of national and social life are spiritual, not material; that the philosophy of history must be read in spiritual terms. To-day we can say this, and separate the religious and the spiritual. But to religion we owe the key that opened the door through which the new vista of humanity is revealed. It is not, of course, implied that the heterogeneous elements

of what we denote under the common style of the mystical bear without or within an identical meaning. But the general implication of the mystical aspect of religion is none the less that of the value of the spiritual side of life. As that side itself develops in human evolution the conception of its worth develops also. Literature, art, and poetry contribute to it. But its cradle was in the rites and beliefs of religion. The history of mental evolution has been that of increasing capacity for, and tendency towards, spiritual and rational, in contrast with sensational and instinctive, interests. Historically, it is true that the largest contribution to this development has come from religion, which has thus ministered to the growth of philosophy and science. Their separation today from religion does not conceal either their original connexion or their actual unity with it as methods of explaining and interpreting experience.

The ascetic aspect of the religious life is also traceable throughout all its forms. Some recent writers incline to treat asceticism as pathological, and to connect it with those sexual perversions which the terminology of psychoanalysis has labelled Sadism and Masochism. But this is another instance of the assumption that the normal is simply a lesser degree of the abnormal, and as much or as little true as to say that, since it is not possible to make a clean cut between sanity and insanity, all men are in some respects mad. The extremer type of asceticism is probably always pathological, but a certain degree of asceticism is in accord with a natural tendency. Physical vitality, the exuberance of health and activity, is careless of comfort, and is drawn to the arduous and perilous by

sheer love of adventure. This indicates that a certain degree of asceticism is not perversion, but a special form of a normal attitude.

A more suggestive treatment of asceticism has been provided by Solovyof, who takes shame, pity, and reverence as exhaustive of the whole range of moral relations.[1] Shame is an essential sign of human consciousness, and since it is attached to the fundamental processes of animal nature, in particular to functions of reproduction, it is a witness to the inferiority of the flesh before the spirit. Its natural issue is asceticism. Solovyof holds that shame most of all distinguishes man from the animals, who show not the slightest trace of anything approaching to it. I am not certain that this is correct. Amongst wild, as distinct from domesticated, animals, a certain privacy is usually sought in sex relationships, doubtless connected with the desire to be shielded on such occasions from being taken at a disadvantage by an enemy. There is also considerable coyness amongst female animals. To such roots shame might be traced. It is not properly an instinct, though it certainly has an instinctive basis. But, in any case, shame in the true sense is a human possession, and animals do not share in it. Man is ashamed, not merely of what is morally wrong, but of what is simply carnal. Asceticism indicates a revulsion from what is fleshly, and so connects itself with the sense of shame. This is further evidence of what has already been said, that it is not to be regarded as abnormal, but rather as the special expression of what is in itself wholly normal.

Amongst the historical religions we find a heterogeneous

[1] *Justification of the Good*, Eng. trans., chs. i., ii.

mass of practices that bear more or less directly upon the subject of asceticism, ranging from savage mutilation to mild penance. In some Eastern religions asceticism and saintliness are synonymous. The *Sannyasi's* authority lies in his austerity. In Catholic discipline asceticism has been a commonly approved path of discipleship. Protestantism, whilst opposed to physical discipline, accepted fasting, and expressed its self-renunciation in an ethical severity. The question arises whether all these various facts can be included under one general term as asceticism, and whether, if so, it is possible to define asceticism in any way that will embrace them all. It is likely that some apparently ascetic customs have no original or present connexion with ascetic ideas, and must be set aside from the evidence. We may accept, however, as fairly representative of the ground to be covered the statement of Dr. T. C. Hall that ' Primarily asceticism consists in the contradiction of natural desires under the mandate of some higher, or supposed higher, ideal, set by the will before the life.'[1] That is broad enough to include the main forms, and at the same time covers such ordinary self-denial as usually represents the ascetic element in the religious life. It implies some idea of a purpose and value in asceticism, and, although we have urged that asceticism has a natural basis, yet still it is more than mere hardihood or than shame, and must involve what is more or less repugnant to physical feelings and normal desires. If we ask what asceticism seeks to obtain, we shall find that, setting aside the pathological aspects, there are at least three main motives which tend to induce it, although, of

[1] *E.R.E.*, ii., p. 63.

course, they do not necessarily exclude one another. They may be called dynamic, propitiatory, and disciplinary. The dynamic motive—the idea, that is, of gaining power by ascetic practices—leads back to a notion not uncommon amongst primitive peoples that suffering strengthens the body or some particular organ, which is mutilated accordingly. The initiation and other ceremonies of Australian tribes supply abundant evidence of this, and the rite of circumcision seems definitely connected with the notion of fertility. The principle is the same in the religious life. Voluntary endurance gives strength. In Brahmanism the dynamic motive is especially evident. In the Yoga system no limit is set to the powers thus attainable over the body, nature, and even the gods. The gods themselves gain power by *tapas*, ascetic practices. In the Upanishads, complicated directions for self-suppression are given, including regulation of breath and posture. The *sadhu* doubtless gains power with men as well as with the supernatural, but this cannot be the original motive, nor, unless we admit ascetic magic, can the idea of power over the gods be other than a later growth.

In the religious life, recollecting that self-abasement is instinctive, the propitiatory motive seems more primary. Moreover, the dynamic does not lead towards the propitiatory, but from appeasing the god to power with the god is not a great step. To please God by penitential abasement of the body was the leading idea beneath the bulk of mediaeval asceticism. It explains the self-torture of the saints in an age which measured spiritual repentance by physical suffering. There is as little in the temper of

modern times as there was much in the temper of former times, that admires it. Changed theological ideas, the advance of surgical skill and the use of anaesthetics, which have lessened the common heritage of pain, have altered our attitude towards the endurance of suffering for suffering's sake. Ascetic torture now inspires repulsion where once it inspired admiration. It is also true that undue prominence to the repression of the flesh implies the undue importance of the desires and lusts of the flesh. A spiritual mind should be less sensitive to carnal temptation, and need less extreme measures to subdue it. The idea of God delighting in the bloody spectacle of the ascetic's scourged back has gone from the higher religions, and if God demands no physical penance, the merely propitiatory motive of asceticism cannot remain. It must follow the dynamic motive into desuetude as far as educated religious thought is concerned.

The disciplinary motive is left, and therein we must find the true benefit of asceticism. It is easy to see that both mysticism and altruism may be beneficial, but asceticism is equally widespread in the religious life, and that is a certain indication that it was felt in some way to fulfil an essential end. No aspect of religious experience found '*ubique et ab omnibus*' is functionless. Whatever may be true of extreme asceticism, to trace the ordinary discipline of religion to perversion is to make the vast majority of mankind perverts, to call the abnormal normal and the normal abnormal. I do not suggest that all forms of asceticism can be said to have arisen from one source, but the ordinary self-denial of the religious life has a function. As instinct guides to

the fulfilment of physical ends not clearly foreseen, it is not unreasonable to assume that the universal religious impulses lead toward spiritual ends, also not clearly foreseen. For spiritual experience is part of the unity of human experience, and the same laws run throughout the whole. The ascetic aspect of the religious life is most naturally connected, in its main expressions, with the sense of the necessity of maintaining or restoring the relation between God and man. Just as the broken social bond implied a breach that could be healed only by blood, as the blood feud and death penalty witness, so the severed divine-human relationship could not be easily restored. Asceticism as represented by self-abnegation, self-denial, self-humiliation, indicates the price mankind has been ready to pay at its own cost for its divine-human relationship, whatever may be the psychological explanation of its morbid forms. There are practices of an ascetic nature that are more obviously connected with the stimulation of growth and plenty than with the relationship of man and gods directly. But the underlying thought is not at all dissimilar. It is the price that must be paid. Dealing with the ascetic aspect of the religious life, therefore, it is not necessary to assume that the disciplinary motive, though it survive latest, is late in development. The religious life presupposes a cost to the worshipper. Sometimes he pays in sacrifice, sometimes in vows and privations, sometimes in ascetic practices. But he has no notion of doing this for nothing. He means to gain something. It may be the hope that discipline will please the gods. It may be the negative function of cleansing the body. It may be supernatural

or spiritual power that is sought. But it is not perversion nor mere barbarity. Whatever is an object of veneration implies certain inhibitions; it is sacred, and therefore has its taboos. The ascetic aspect of the religious life is founded upon a similar basis. The divine-human relationship demands much, and the more highly it is valued the higher are the values that must be sacrificed to sustain it. It implies a separation from the profane. That which is associated with it is charged with sanctity.

The idea, therefore, of such discipline as essential to the divine-human relation comes nearest to reconstituting for us the root-idea of asceticism. We have seen that the dynamic motive may have arisen out of this, though in leading to the notion of power over the gods it reverses it. Other developments may be equally incongruous. But the conviction that self-abasement before the gods lies at the root of asceticism as a general practice is strengthened when we see that asceticism is least manifest where relationship to the gods is taken casually, as traditional, ancestral, and social rather than as vitally essential. China and Japan, so far as their native religions are concerned, are not much inclined to asceticism. Nor was it really germane to the spirit of the Greek people. But in India, where religious ideas dominate the daily life, asceticism is more highly regarded than anywhere else; and in mediæval Christianity, with its severe sense of sin and of a wrathful God, asceticism flourished, just as fasting and humiliation were laid upon every Jew and Muhammadan as a means of being well-pleasing to God. Philosophical ideas of the conflict between body and soul helped the development of the

disciplinary motive in asceticism, as well as the decay of the cruder notions of propitiation. As a form of self-discipline the ascetic aspect of the religious life is still an element of spiritual value. William James, in a hortatory mood, advocated a little needless self-denial of an unheroic character as a ' premium ' paid to ensure the power of choosing the harder path in great crises. The advice is not needless. With the decay of the value once set on asceticism comes the tendency to abandon it wholly. Self-indulgence is no expression of healthy-mindedness, however, and the undisciplined spirit is ill equipped to enter any wider selfhood, for such necessarily involves subjugation of the narrower self. The ascetic element of the religious life is, in some form or other, essential, if the values of religion are to be gained. If religion has any land of promise, it must at least require that mankind be willing to leave the fleshpots of Egypt, strike camp, and march.

Whilst asceticism and mysticism, as we now know them, have a long history, altruism may appear as a more modern growth, and very incompletely developed. Still, it remains that its roots are as old as man. As soon as we look at the primary unit of social life, the family, we see a basis of altruism in the instinct of parenthood. When altruism appears as a secondary manifestation of that primary instinct it still retains some of the latter's quality and intensity. It is also true that altruism is closely connected with one of the more primary sentiments, pity. It will be recollected that Schopenhauer found something inexplicable in the sentiment of pity, although he regarded it as the foundation of morality. Post-Darwinian

psychology, however, has shown that pity has an instinctive basis. Altruism, therefore, may be regarded as a wholly natural tendency. The idea that human nature is essentially selfish is old, as the history of egoistic hedonism shows, but it is utterly false. It is based upon the psychological fallacy that the unit is the individual, and that the community is a kind of mutual arrangement for individuals to obtain their own ends. Sympathy, in the sense of common feeling, is an essential manifestation of the herd-instinct, and whilst every man has a being-for-self, it is not less true that he is also essentially a being who belongs to, and is bound up with, the whole. The idea that altruism is something which must be grafted upon human nature by extraneous teaching may have been possible where the theological dogma of total depravity was seriously maintained. To-day it is not only false, but absurd. As Professor McDougall has put it, ' No teaching, no system of social or religious sanctions, could induce benevolence in any people if their minds were wholly lacking in this instinct.'[1] The theory that human ends are all comprised within a process that is a struggle for individual existence is based on a very partial estimate of the evidence. Altruism is the most widely diffused of all the virtues, in loyalty to family, clan, tribe, in patriotism, and in widening circles of application, until the member of the tribe is lost in the citizen of the universe, and altruistic obligation reaches to all humanity. Indeed, as William James has said, ' Psychologically and in principle the precept " Love your enemies " is not self-contradictory.' [2]

[1] *Social Psychology*, p. 276. [2] *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 283.

Altruism, which has so strong a basis in human nature, is joined with moral and religious ideas within the social consciousness. So long as religion is tribal and national, religious duty does not extend beyond the co-religionist. But, as in the Mosaic law, the stranger may enter into the bond in some measure when resident within the community. At a later stage of development, when the proselyte appears, a further extension of religious duty comes into being. It is now no longer co-terminous with the nation; a religious tie as well as a blood tie begins to bind mankind together. In Stoicism and Buddhism, however, altruistic sentiments of a universal character developed from rational and moral rather than religious grounds. In modern times an 'internationale' has been advocated, based upon the common conditions of the world's workers. It may seem, therefore, that neither psychologically nor historically is there any necessary connexion between altruism and the religious life. It may also be said that religion, not excluding Christianity, whose Founder was foremost of all in teaching universal social obligation, has not been characterized by altruism, even in the same sense as it has been characterized by mysticism and asceticism. Whilst admitting the strength of the objection, it is not final. It need not be suggested that no acts of benevolence towards those outside the tribal bond ever occurred, but it is probably true that it was the extension of religion beyond the bounds of the group that most of all helped to give a wider conception of the obligation of altruism. Still more, whilst acknowledging the limited range of the altruistic element in the religious life, it is from the

emotional qualities of religious belief that altruism can gain sufficient strength to meet the personal, class, and racial prejudices, as well as the sheer selfishness which limit it. No merely rational argument is sufficient to enforce it, however uncontradictable such an argument may be. Its presence in the religious life is a measure of the effects of religion in breaking up the closed circle of self. It is because altruism is logically, even where it is not actually, characteristic of the religious life that it is impossible to omit it here.

Passing on to the last general feature of the religious life, the sense of conflict, it is curious to notice how the physical universe appealed to man as a continual conflict. The myths of all races are full of titanic struggles and gigantic feuds; night battling with day, winter with summer, earth with sky, gods with demons. The explanation is not simply that man himself was incessantly at war. We must recollect the tendency to explain outer by inner experience. Such was the rationale of the spiritistic ideas of primitive man, We ourselves are indebted to our own experience for our conception of causation, although many centuries of reflective thought had passed before it was realized that Nature affords us regular successions or connexions, which we interpret causally because of our knowledge of ourselves as causing. It appears, therefore, that man's own sense of conflict inclined him to see conflict in the material world, and the dualism that so many religions and philosophies have found in Nature—the opposing principles of Zoroastrianism and Gnosticism, to quote two of the best-known examples—reflects the dualism found in experience.

It will not be forgotten that sometimes the opposing principles were represented in the mythologies as close kin, even as man found them in himself.

The conflict that goes on in the universe is almost invariably regarded by the religions of mankind as between beings who are allies or enemies of men, good and evil spirits, gods and djinn, angels and devils. In this way a moral tone is assumed. The enemy brings physical misfortunes, but with the development of religious and moral conceptions his function is to tempt. Zarathushtra and also Gautama fight and conquer demons who attempt to prevent them receiving their revelations. What happens to the leaders happens to the followers. Thus the sense of conflict expresses itself as a sense of sin. It is not necessary for our present purpose to do more than point out that the sense of standing in wrong relation, whether the cause seems known or unknown, ceremonial or moral, is as universal as that sense of harmonious relation which religion seeks to gain. Our interest lies in what we might call the biology rather than the pathology of religion, in the significance that must be attached by philosophy to the fact of religious experience ; and for that purpose man's consciousness of a wrongly adjusted relationship with the divine is of less importance than the fact that he believes such a relationship, even though imperfect, to exist, and seeks to maintain and further it.

We may sum up the conclusions we have reached as follows. Mysticism and asceticism in their pronounced forms do not indicate the significance of the kindred phases of normally constituted religious lives. The most

general witness of the mystical is to the existence of a spiritual order, which is regarded as of greater consequence than the physical order. Even the reverence paid to prophet, monk, *guru*, and holy man reveals this. It is not strength, nor intelligence, nor even miraculous powers that are reverenced in them primarily, but rather sanctity; that is to say, they are regarded as more intimately connected with the spiritual order than the common folk who do them honour. Asceticism is connected with shame, which testifies to the lower rank given to the fleshly. In the discipline of the religious life it also connects itself with the instinct of self-abasement before the higher order with which man seeks to ally himself. Every religion demands in the god's name some restraint on the actions of the worshipper, some thwarting of desire; that is to say, something ascetic; and it has not been asked in vain. Thus asceticism testifies to the importance man laid upon the divine-human relationship by showing what he will offer at his own cost to further it or to re-establish it. Altruism is less definitely characteristic of religion than the others, but it is a sentiment that widens with the expansion of the religious community, and needs, if not a religious motive, at least a motive of a religious character, if it is to extend to its fullest range. Finally, in the sense of conflict which man projected into the world around him, is some reflection of his inner sense of conflict. In the religious life this centres in the idea that the relationship between the gods and their worshippers is broken or endangered, or, when expressed in moral terms, in the sense of sin. All that has been said points in one direction.

It shows how the sense of a relationship to a higher order permeated human actions, just as it pervades human consciousness. What man will render and suffer, with what anxiety he attempts to establish, and, when broken, to re-establish, the tie that binds him to his gods, proves without dispute how essential that relation seemed to him. Whether he was right or wrong in his judgement, at least it is evident that the whole stream of human development would have flowed through totally different channels, and the mental world in which we live would never have come into being, had it not been for the part religion has played in its determination.

SECTION B

THE REFERENCE OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

VII

GOD AS AN INTUITION OF EXPERIENCE

HITHERTO our concern has been with the psychological and historical facts of religious experience. We have seen that the religious consciousness testifies to its acquaintance with its object, God. But in what manner is it aware of that object? Is God immediately, intuitively known, or is His existence an inference drawn from experience? To the majority of worshippers the question would appear as strange, and perhaps meaningless, as if we asked whether the existence of other selves was known by intuition or inference. But we shall find that the mystics, and the majority of those whose religious experience is creative and active, regard their knowledge as coming by the direct route of intuition. Intuitions appear self-evident to their possessors, but self-evident truths of this character cannot be conveyed to those who do not share them. Therefore many whose own personal certainty appears to them as intuitive are ready to resort to the indirect route of inference in order to present their

convictions to others. One realizes how frequently it happens that we must find reasons for what we believe intuitively. There is, therefore, in any case, no need to assume that to believe by intuition and argue by inference are incompatible. It may be held that whilst one's own assurance is not based upon any explanation of one's experience as the work of God within, but rather is immediate, still, if an explanation be required, no other is sufficient for the facts.

Our first concern will be to examine the believer's own view. It has been maintained that what is called an intuition is nothing more than a disguised inference. We must ask, therefore, whether intuitive knowledge of God is possible. Then, recollecting that the believer is also willing, for the most part, to defend the inference that his experience refers to God, we must consider that position, and subsequently the opposing hypotheses.

Turning, therefore, to the question of intuition, we must recognize that the issue cannot be made merely metaphysical. The problem of reality and the problem of consciousness are inseparable, and psychological considerations are involved in speaking of intuitive knowledge. Now psychology has gained recognition as a science. The traditional boundaries of science were laid down when, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it first won emancipation from theological control, and, taking the sphere of the 'natural,' allotted that of the 'supernatural' to theology. Just as the structure of the house can be described without reference to an architect, so the material universe raises no necessary question of an author, as far as explanation of its laws

is concerned. With regard to the physical sciences, the division was tolerable, but, imported into the humanistic sciences, it has made for an undesirable dualism of 'religious' and 'scientific' truth. The facile distinction of natural and supernatural is far from being a happy one. It is not exclusive. Yesterday's supernatural is to-day's natural, and truth is neither. More than that, it is a distinction of ignorance, not of knowledge. But its influence still exists, and helps to prejudice the very issue that we are now discussing. It is needful, therefore, to digress for a moment, to point out where the bias arises.

Modern psychology is not concerned with the soul. It must indeed acknowledge a self, or ego, as a principle of unity, for mental states imply such a self. But as the subject, this cannot be an object of knowledge. It therefore does not concern psychology, which finds its interest in behaviour, the manifestation of conscious life. It is, therefore, not unnatural to ask whether, since religious experience consists of psychical states, which are governed by the same laws as other mental states, the psychology of religion need concern itself with an alleged reference of such states to a supernatural object, any more than psychology generally need invoke a soul, which explains nothing, in dealing with its subject-matter. It is possible, however, to reply that since the self as the subject of experience must at least be assumed, the cases are not parallel. To which it can be answered that religious psychology also assumes the self, and other human selves, but it can fulfil its task and explain all that religious experience contains without invoking a God. It seems

paradoxical that the psychology of religion should find God a superfluity, but in the hands of some of its exponents such is the case. One must recognize this, not to create prejudice or to hinder complete investigation into religious experience, but because if the religious have their prepossessions, we must not assume that all psychologists are unprejudiced. Often, in such cases, the bias against the possibility of an ultra-human reference seems due to the traditional characteristics of a science to which we have referred. Religion is no longer ignored or scorned by science. It is patiently investigated. But if religion has a reference to the divine different from that which might be said to be implied by experience generally, it seems to many that a science of religion is impossible. Hence the attitude of some psychologists to the claims of religious experience, an attitude which does not always manifest the ideal of scientific impartiality.

Having entered what is not an unnecessary *caveat* against prejudging the case, we resume. It will be convenient to discuss knowledge of God as intuitive and inferred separately. Different questions are raised by each. The former concerns the credibility of testimony. The latter resolves itself into discussion whether the admitted facts are best explained by a hypothesis which acknowledges, or one which excludes, divine action.

Can God be known by intuition? Every one allows that religious experience is valid as a state of consciousness, but it is urged that to appeal to the inner experience as witness of the presence of the divine in the human is to confuse the subjective significance of a state of consciousness with the trans-subjective meaning attributed to it.

This position has been strongly expressed by Professor J. H. Leuba in his *Psychological Study of Religion.*[1] He has none of William James's respect for the mystic, nor does he hold, as James did, that the mystic is 'invulnerable.' The mystical claim, according to Professor Leuba, amounts to a disguised inference, and all belief in God rests on inductions drawn from the inner life.

It is by no means certain, however, that this does justice to the mystical claim. The mystic does not regard himself as having an experience which he interprets as union with God. He has union. For him

> The rest may reason and welcome:
> 'Tis we musicians know.

Others may infer from their own experience, or from that of the mystic, that it has God as its cause. His experience is God, and God is the experience

It is useless to retort that since immediate experience cannot yield a causal relation, it cannot possibly afford any knowledge of its cause. The mystic's reply is that his critic is still groping in the physical sphere amid time and space. He himself does not separate the experience and the cause. He does not regard the experience as caused by something 'outside' of itself. The experience belongs to another order. It is unique. Even other intuitions, though they may furnish analogies, are not parallels. He claims an experience that is God in a direct unmediated sense. It may be pressed upon him that he calls the experience God because he has learnt of God in other ways, and that, apart from this, he would not so

[1] pp. 212, 237, 239.

call it. To which the reply will probably be that such knowledge has no connexion with the experience. It belongs to the preparatory stages, but when the experience comes it is self-revelatory, and needs no interpretation by previous teaching. Indeed, often it is difficult for the experient to connect the experience with his earthly life in any intelligible manner, so entirely self-sufficient is it. The insinuation of epilepsy sometimes cast at the mystic is neither just nor generous. Pathological mystics are frequent, but the strength of mysticism lies in the thousands of quiet, intense believers whose convictions are as unshakable as their sanity. The charge that their intuition of God is a disguised inference provokes in them only a smile.

Professor Leuba's criticism of the mystical claim is not, however, daunted by such difficulties as these. He maintains that the whole content of the mystics' experience is accessible to psychology. 'The belief in the direct revelation of God in consciousness signifies necessarily, it seems, that religious experience does not belong entirely to the realm of psychology. That it includes something superhumanly determined . . . psychology on its side claims the right to submit every content of consciousness to scientific study.' He continues by referring to 'new evidence which would incorporate the entire religious life within the natural order.'[1] There are two possible ways of understanding what is meant here. If it claims that to psychology there is no forbidden ground in the religious consciousness it is correct, but if this is taken to imply the exclusion of any

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 211.

factor that is not of ' the natural order,' it appears to beg the whole question.

Psychology, we are told, claims the right to subject all experience to analysis. Without dispute, that right extends as far as psychology can exercise it. Yet how far does the objectively represented analysis reproduce the subjective experience? Professor Leuba meets the point by saying that as one need not be a soldier to understand military life, or mad to make researches into mental alienation, so ' the psychology of the religious life may be understood, and the quality of the religious life appreciated, to a certain extent, by all.'[1] It is evident that the words ' to a certain extent ' destroy the point of the reply. The essential meaning of the experience may lie outside that extent. To a certain extent I can understand the instinct that leads the homing pigeon back, the throb of a maternal passion, the feelings of the spy before the firing squad, but the most essential meaning of such experiences I cannot know. Only the actual experient is qualified to appreciate the complete content of the experience. It is true that religion assumes the same forms of consciousness as the rest of life, but there is a difference in quality in an emotion, for example, according to its object. Fear of a ghost is not the same as fear of a tiger, nor love for an ideal the same as love for a person. The mystic experience can be psychologically analysed, but the experient alone can assess its quality and intensity.

The analogies that are offered by Professor Leuba are far from helping him. If those who are not

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 275.

soldiers understand military life, at least we do not go to them for explanations of it. The illustration of sanity understanding madness seems more to the point, but even here a similar consideration is involved. In certain cases of mental alienation uncontrollable, irrational impulses occur, and yet the patient is fully aware of their character and probable consequences. But he is wholly unable to check them. The alienist understands the symptoms perfectly, but he certainly cannot comprehend the awful, compelling intensity of such impulses. Their quality cannot be objectively represented, yet it is that very quality which gives them their dreadful significance. Normal psychology can disregard these impulses, but the intensity and quality of the mystical sense in religious experience are not a pathological abnormality. Yet only the experient can comprehend them. The objective representation of religious experience by psychology is not vitiated in any way by admitting this. What is involved, however, is the recognition of the relation it bears to the experience. We may illustrate that relation in the following way. A clinical thermometer expresses the variation in bodily temperature more accurately than we subjectively feel it. But if a physician who had never in his own body experienced a temperature of more than the normal 98.4° were reading the thermometer, he would be able to use it and understand it as well as any other physician, yet the thermometer would signify to him a state with which he was both acquainted and unacquainted. It would not follow, however, that he was debarred from being as useful a physician as any other. In the same way no one need demand the institution of

a religious test for religious psychologists. They may deal with their topic effectively even if personally they do not claim a religious experience.

But supposing a being, purely and wholly rational, were to undertake the study of instinctive behaviour. It would seem entirely inexplicable. We ourselves possess in our own instincts some power to feel a sympathetic understanding of instinctive behaviour in animals, although the inner side of their instincts is closed to us. But were we limited to reason, and reason only, instinct would be interpreted by us as an inferior type of reasoning. No other explanation would be possible. Now the mystic's sense of God is to inference as instinct is to intelligence, a different way of experiencing reality. To urge that the mystical claim is really a disguised inference is a complete misunderstanding of the nature of the case.

The charge that mystical experience flourishes upon the confusion between subjective consciousness and trans-subjective meaning is, therefore, unconvincing. As Bergson insists, we grasp reality by intuition, the intuition of our own conscious existence, and our reason breaks up this immediate reality, but never clasps it as a whole. This stream of experience, of which we are continuously and immediately aware, is part of a larger reality. Does the intuition of the one involve, as the mystic finds, the intuition of the other? It is certainly a claim that cannot be rejected as impossible. It may, of course, be urged that all have the intuition of life, but not all realize the other. Yet it cannot be made a criterion of truth, whether of intuition or of thought, that it must be obvious to all,

nor can it be denied that some minds will always manifest powers that are not generally given. More than that, the universality of religion may be argued to imply more than the obvious reasons for its existence. Modern psychology realizes how many factors in our conscious experience are related to unconscious experience. In the same way many of our rational judgements are based upon grounds that are felt rather than known. It is by no means unlikely, therefore, that what appears as the mystic's intuition is but the clearer and more definite manifestation of the underlying source that gives strength and conviction to all religious experience, and is implicit in, and therefore may be possible to, all.

It seems to me, moreover, that this insistence of the inferential character of religion misses a point that ought not to be overlooked. Unless we have some experience of reality which is not inferred, in what way can we have ground for inference? The chain of inference cannot hang upon inference. Spinoza's '*scientia intuitiva*' was the third and highest kind of knowledge. It would, perhaps, be better to regard an immediate grasp of reality as the basis of knowledge. If that is to be so, it is not possible to deny that the religious consciousness may have an immediate sense which forms the basis of its knowledge, which can be apprehended as reality without inference. A more just and sympathetic statement of the issue is afforded by Professor Pratt, who says, 'While the psychology of religion must have a free hand, and while it is hopeless to look to it for a proof of anything transcendent, nothing that it can say should prevent the religious man who wishes to be perfectly loyal to logic

and loyal to truth from seeing in his own spiritual experiences the genuine influence of a living God.' [1] At least one has a right to insist, in fairness to the mystic's experience, that no psychological ban shall rule it out as evidence.

The mystic's right to claim that his experience is of the nature he thinks it to be must be admitted. It is an undemonstrable assumption to suggest that an immediate experience cannot possibly be self-revelatory. Those who would criticize the mystic will be on safer ground if they contend that a great deal too much has been claimed as intuitive, including conclusions which are manifestly inferred, even as common speech attributes to 'instinct' any conclusion of which the rational grounds are not evident. To correct common speech in this respect does not deny that there are instinctive actions, and to criticize the mystic does not imply that his fundamental intuition is a misapprehension. But how far can the mystical intuition be characterized? What can be said of the God who thus reveals Himself? When the mystic attempts to characterize his intuition, he passes from it to another sphere, and the validity of the intuition as knowledge does not endorse the rational consequences deduced from it. The question arises, therefore, whether the mystical intuition can serve any other purpose than that of affording certainty to those who experience it. Is it of significance to philosophy? Can any theoretical justification of the objective reference of religious experience be based upon it? There is no doubt of the reality and sincerity of the subjective

[1] *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 458.

experiences, nor can any *a priori* veto be placed on the possibility of such intuition, but is it in any sense a proof to offer to others?

The reply, I take it, must be that it is so only in so far as we are inclined to accept as true what is testified by many credible and sincere witnesses. The existence of such experience in others, and its marked effect on their lives, inclines us to believe that it cannot be merely a subjective delusion. To accept the mystic's testimony on this ground is to accept it without strictly scientific grounds, but we are never able, and perhaps not always inclined, to insist that all we accept must have a scientific basis. 'Overbeliefs' serve a very practical use in all lives. They have a purpose also in the growth of knowledge. Established beliefs, whether scientific or religious, are apt to become dogmatic, and incapable of extension, if not challenged by 'overbeliefs.' Many accepted beliefs of to-day were the 'overbeliefs' of yesterday, as, for example, current psychological doctrines of the powers of suggestion, hypnotism, and unconscious experience. Variety, freshness, and often progress amongst our judgements are due to 'overbeliefs.' To accept the mystic witness is an 'overbelief,' but it is not on that account illegitimate. The greater mystics are few in comparison with the vast numbers of believers who are unwavering in their recognition that their inner experience is an intuition of God. We must at least admit that the claim of religious experience thus to witness to God deserves respect.

At the same time, for the purpose of estimating the philosophical implications of religion, the mystical

testimony has serious limitations. It cannot be disproved, but it must equally follow that it cannot be proved, since it affords no ground upon which it can be made a matter for argument. There is no disputing about intuitions any more than about tastes. Mystical experience affords the real ground of certainty for the religious consciousness itself, but no ground for philosophical construction. If we share in some degree the experience, we shall understand. If we do not, whilst we may admit that perception and reason are not the only windows through which we may look on reality, we shall know nothing of that other outlook. If we are to show that religious experience has a significance for the world-view of philosophy we must be willing to present its testimony to philosophy in a manner in which it may be related to the rest of our knowledge. To rely upon a ground which means nothing to those who do not share it will yield only a vindication which convinces those who do, who are the last to need such conviction. The mystic is correct in asserting that his experience is knowledge, but it cannot be a matter of objective knowledge in the ordinary sense which can be conveyed to others through language. If we seek to interpret our experience through a philosophy which is comprehensive of our religious as well as other judgements, we cannot succeed unless spiritual knowledge can be brought into relation with the rest of our knowledge. We are impelled to seek for such a unification, for to make a permanent dualism of the two is to abandon the hope of reconstructing in thought the unity of experience. The mystical witness, therefore, lies outside the main line of our present

purpose. We have devoted some space to it, not merely because of its intrinsic importance, but because of its importance to the very arguments to which we have just said it does not directly contribute. The reason is in the weight of its indirect influence. For the purpose of philosophy we are more concerned with the contention as to what must be inferred as the only satisfactory explanation of religious experience. But it is important to realize that the witness of religious experience cannot be made dependent upon the correctness of an inference. Nor can the inference be held to be other than secondary; the rational explanation of an actual and vital force. Whatever be the explanation, the experience is a thing in itself. When we have explained religion according to whatever our theory of it may be, we are inclined to think we have made it what we say it is. It is well to remember how little the fact of religion waits upon our explanation of it.

VIII

GOD AS AN INFERENCE FROM EXPERIENCE

On asking if it is legitimate to infer from religious experience that it refers to God, we meet with a somewhat sharp division between those who agree that man can know God. Dean Rashdall asserts that such knowledge is always inferential and never immediate.[1] Others are of the opinion represented by Solovyof, who declares, 'The reality of the deity is not a *deduction* from religious experience, but the *content* of it—*that which is experienced.* If the immediate reality of the higher principle be taken away there would be nothing left of religious experience. It would no longer exist. But it does exist, and therefore that which is given and experienced in it exists also. *God is in us, therefore He is.*'[2] Dr. F. B. Jevons is equally emphatic. 'All attempts to exhibit the existence of God as an inference from experience are foredoomed to failure.'[3] We have already said that intuitive and inferential knowledge of God are supplementary, representing respectively the grounds of personal certainty and of rational argument. This is by no means an unparalleled position. Philosophy must continually face the task of putting an intellectual construction upon factors of experience whose

[1] *Philosophy and Religion*, p. 106 seq. [2] *Justification of the Good*, Eng. trans., p. 164.
[3] *Religion in Evolution*, p. 134; cf. also *Idea of God*, p. 160.

roots are non-intellectual. Without entering into further discussion of the two views we have mentioned, we may regard it possible to infer God from religious experience, not deductively, but, to use a term to which some logicians object, as an inductive inference. Dr. Jevons says that such an inference is ' a hypothesis of the same nature as the hypotheses of science, which are avowedly incapable of verification, and are announced to be purely working hypotheses, which will be cast aside as soon as they have served their turn.'[1] This seems a little severe. Most of the accepted truths of science began as hypotheses, and if, in the strictest sense, they are not capable of verification, probability is the ' guide of life,' and most of us are content to trust such hypotheses as that of the conservation of energy, which is ' incapable of verification,' but none the less meets every test to which we can put it.

But Dr. Jevons is right in saying that if the existence of God is believed, it is believed as a fact, not as an inference, if by this he means, as I suppose, it is believed not *because* of an inference. Some who have a sense of personal religious experience may be ready to argue that God must be inferred from the fact of their experience. Those who have no such sense of God regard the inference as they regard other hypotheses commonly accepted, as probably justifiable, but not certain. The believer generally views the matter in a different way. His experience of God appears to him immediate and self-evident. Those are the grounds on which he believes: not because of an inference. God is to him as self-evident as are other selves. Our own consciousness does not start with that

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 125.

of the self, and infer that there is a not-self, and proceed to divide that not-self into persons and things. We begin with a consciousness in which self and not-self are inseparable, and apart from not-self, even more, apart from the social consciousness, that is to say, from other selves, our own consciousness of self could not exist. If a child could be imagined as brought up by automata it certainly would not have the consciousness of a human being. Technically it may be argued, as Dean Rashdall does, that our knowledge of other selves is an inference; but, if this be so, it is an inference that could not be made apart from experience of the fact. It is not otherwise with the believer's sense of God. It belongs to an experience that appears to him as unitary and direct. If it be represented as an inference, it is an inference which could not be drawn apart from the previous existence of the fact. Its grounds are vital, not conceptual, and a mere rational disproof, even if it could be afforded, would never dismiss it. For the vast majority of mankind belief in God is just a fact of life. They believe in God as they believe the other articles of the creed of common sense. Whilst we argue whether to express the character of the belief as intuitive or inferred, the belief goes on, as it always has done and will do. It may be denied to be an intuition, it may be asserted to be a baseless inference, but it continues as a fact.

For our present purpose it is enough that the religious consciousness in its clearer forms believes itself to witness to the reality and immanence of God. But just as man is inclined to see the creative power in the miraculous rather than the normal, so the extraordinary rather than

the ordinary facts of religious experience are those to which appeal has been more frequently made. This is understandable, even if it is not advisable. But it scarcely justifies a critic of the calibre of Professor Leuba in saying, as he discusses the manner in which God acts on the soul, that should God act directly upon consciousness, ' Nothing ought to be easier for the psychologist than to show in the life of feeling and thought disturbances not depending on known natural causes.'[1] Incidentally one may wonder when it will be possible for the science of psychology to have such knowledge of even the ' natural causes ' of mental phenomena as to account for all its data thereby. But even if we could apply a law of the conservation of mental energy to the same extent as we apply that of physical energy, we should emphatically decline to accept the position that whatever is due to natural ' laws ' is not related to God, whose function in the universe is to disturb nature by miracles. Seriously to seek for signs of divine immanence on such lines would be to revert to a type of thought as obsolete as the Ptolemaic astronomy, and to affront both science and religion. If we are to infer that religious experience testifies to God it will not be because of any ' disturbance ' or abnormality, but as the explanation and interpretation of the very existence of that experience. We have left on one side intuitive knowledge of God in order to state the implications of religious experience in a form which gives scope for philosophical criticism and inquiry, and in that case we are certainly justified in leaving on one side also the gratuitous proposal that God can be inferred from

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 272.

religious experience only if He creates miracles therein. The question is whether the existence and persistence of the religious consciousness as a whole does not indicate the reality of its object, just as we may ask whether our experience of the universe in general does not point to a rational and creative will as its source, and it is upon such grounds that we must discuss the implications of religion Both the theistic interpretation of the universe and the believer's interpretation of religious experience can be denied; but at least they have the right to rank as possible hypotheses for a modern philosophy. To attempt to limit the issue to the alleged manifestation of phenomena of unknown origin is to make a philosophy of religion impossible and to remit religious experience to the Psychical Research Society.

Stating the issue, therefore, on these grounds, let us ask what possible explanations exist. That useful pawn in philosophical moves, the 'plain man,' commonly distinguishes three sources of experience. Some part, he holds, arises from the working of his own mind—imagination and dreams, for example. Some comes through others, inborn perhaps, or acquired by contact with society. The rest he refers to a reality which he is sure is not his own creation, nor that of his fellows, but one that exists *suo genere*, however he may, in his theory of knowledge or lack of one, conceive it.

Such a division directly opens the question in what way we are to explain the testimony of religious experience to God. The answer of all religion is unambiguous and unanimous. It never entertains the notion that it has no objective reference, and is equally

sure that such reference is to a divinely, not a humanly, existent order. This verdict does not pass unchallenged. Some maintain that religious experience is purely subjective, a process of suggestion, which corresponds to the first source mentioned. Corresponding to the second source, others hold that the community is not merely that which provides the expression of religion, but its origin, man attributing to the gods what has been wrought in him by society. The believer, we have said, refers his experience to the third source, but before we can accept his statement we must consider the opposing views.

It is not easy to separate sharply the various ways in which alternative explanations of the reference of religious experience are put forward, since there are many composite types represented. There is, I think, a broad distinction that can be drawn between those who treat religious experience as wholly subjective, a process of suggestion, and those who admit it has some objective reference, but think that society supplies it. Again, among those who adopt the latter standpoint there are at least two positions. Some draw the not unnatural conclusion that the object of religious experience should be acknowledged as society, and venerated accordingly. Others see in ' God ' the ' vital impulse ' embodying itself. The God-idea is the projection of humanity's desire, but it is not a subjective phantasy. It represents not an actually existent God, but something that is none the less actual, the nature of man. In such forms the problem of religious experience must be faced to-day. The struggle has been ceaseless ever since man tried by reflection to

bring harmony into experience. The Book of Job, the scepticism of ancient Greece, Anselm's ontology, the Schoolmen's ratiocination reveal some phases of the fight. Later the storm-centre was materialism, and later still that chasm between God and the Absolute which led William James to raise the issue on a psychological basis. It is on that basis or on that of sociology that the views now before us challenge the account the religious consciousness gives of itself.

The hypothesis of suggestion is sometimes stated with especial reference to auto-suggestion, sometimes to mass-suggestion, but both are alike in explaining religious experience as arising out of the individual's own mind, whether the stimulus be provided by himself or by the crowd. In discussing this hypothesis we must recognize clearly that suggestion of both types is a normal process, and it is not to be identified in its ordinary forms with delusions or pathological phenomena. What we call 'nerve' is largely auto-suggestion. The golfer on the putting-green knows very well that if he can persuade himself the putt is easy, it is likely to be. Most of his failures are due to the paralysing auto-suggestion that he cannot hit the ball straight. Similarly the 'spirit of the times,' the sentiments of Christmas-tide, the excitement of the crowd, are normal instances of mass-suggestion to which we are all open. In speaking of religious experience as due to suggestion, therefore, there is no necessary implication that it is not normal and useful, but there is the definite assertion that in objective reality there is no counterpart of the divine being whom the believer thinks to be immanent in the human soul. God is said to be the

shadow of our own subliminal self, which appears to us in an independent form.

It is evident that any such hypothesis cannot be limited to religious experience. If it be applied, it must be applied impartially to religious, ethical, and aesthetic experience alike. It must be asserted that none of our value-attitudes are ultimately objective. It is replied that this need not make any difference. The reality is in man himself, and the effects are the same whether attributed to human sources or to any other. Origin, it is said, does not affect validity. This dictum, however, is only partly correct. If, for example, I remind myself I have been summoned to attend an important committee, it makes no difference whether, on trying to recall how the summons came, I recollect it was by telephone, letter, or messenger. But if I recollect that I dreamt it, it makes a very obvious difference. So long as my value-judgements in morals, aesthetics, and religion can be regarded as having some ultimate reference to reality, their origin makes no difference. They may have developed from primitive crudities, but it is no matter. But if I am persuaded that they are purely subjective, they are reduced at once to the same level as my subjective tastes, whims, and fancies. The suggestion-hypothesis, therefore, abolishes as it explains. It may be replied that this is regrettable, but truth must be honoured. That is a commonplace, but one confesses to a certain suspicion as to the credibility of a 'truth,' which so easily discovers that a belief to which so many of the greatest minds of mankind, not less than the rest of humanity have subscribed, is an obvious error. The consequences of such

a contention cannot be confined to the one issue. They must deeply affect our belief in the trustworthiness of human experience generally. A hypothesis that implies such a thing must at least offer us proportionately strong reasons in support of itself.

There seems nothing to prevent the suggestion-hypothesis being carried a great deal further than those who advance it would probably desire. It is generally limited to emotional experience, but psychology does not recognize such experience as a class apart. What is to prevent it from being applied to all experience? Certainly the upholders of this position cannot regard sense-experience as any more trustworthy, since the senses are frequently the stimuli of suggestion. We are concerned at the moment with the inference of God as a hypothesis to explain certain facts of experience. Sense-experience must equally be made intelligible by postulating more than it affords. Ether, which appears to have only one property yet discovered, that of conveying undulations, is postulated as objectively existent because it seems necessary to consistent thought, but for no other reason. In what way is the hypothesis of God different from that of ether in this respect, save that the one is connected with facts of sense-experience more directly? But sense-experience is certainly not an unerring witness, nor can reason be sharply divided from affective experience.

Strictly applied therefore, the suggestion-hypothesis brings us to a position akin to solipsism with the ego as the one reality. Against solipsism there is, as Professor McDougall has said, one unanswerable argument. It is not philosophical, but ' an act of faith or will that posits

a real world ' by a man's belief ' that his perceptions are caused by some influence, some real being, other than himself.'[1] In the similar act of faith which posits the objective basis of our fundamental values, we are advancing against the suggestion-hypothesis, the same dictates of common sense that prove fatal to solipsism. The more widely the suggestion-hypothesis is applied, the broader the flank it exposes to this attack.[2]

We may carry the issue a little further by considering how far religious experience exhibits the characteristics of suggestion. No one denies that suggestion enters into religious experience, as it does into all experiences, but to explain it as wholly a matter of suggestion implies that it can be compared with those other experiences which exhibit the influence of suggestion in the purest form, namely, actions performed under hypnotic suggestion, or under the influence of mob-hysteria. Both produce results which show considerable similarity. Let us see how they compare with normal religious experience.

Hypnotism and mob-hysteria are scarcely able to induce the individual to do what is dangerous, distasteful, and humiliating. They are inhibitive, yet do not inhibit the deeper impulses and instincts. They are more effective when they tend to produce what is desired and expected. Few of the results of hypnotic suggestion are permanent, whilst those of mob-hysteria are highly evanescent, leading to outbursts of uncontrolled passion, which rapidly cools when the stimulus ceases. In all

[1] *Body and Mind*, p. 180.
[2] Cf. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 508.

these respects, normal religious experience differs markedly. We saw how in its ascetic phase it leads frequently to that which is distasteful to inclination and humbling to pride. It has power to check instinctive actions and primary impulses. Religious conversion shows repeatedly how the unexpected and undesired may happen, and the man is persuaded against himself, compelled to yield, fighting every step of the way. The results of religious experience remain, and the bitterest persecution fails repeatedly to do other than reinforce them. It is not disputed that in certain cases, and in mass movements in religion, all the characteristic qualities of suggestion may appear, but these are passing phases. Normal religious experience, especially in its higher forms, is powerful in its influence on the character of the individual and the community, and lacks the characteristics of suggestion almost entirely.

A further point which the suggestion-hypothesis fails to meet is the refinement of values. In religious experience, for example, gradually the higher, morally and intellectually, overcome the lower, fear gives place to trust, egoistic impulses soften, superstition yields to faith. There is no reason on the suggestion-hypothesis why this should be so. Indeed, since the lower forms, as a rule, lie nearer to primitive instinct and impulse, it is contrary to what might be expected, for where volitional and intellectual control is strongest, suggestion is weakest. Yet on this view, the religious life, all a matter of suggestion, works upward progressively to assume a character unfavourable to the influence of suggestion. Whatever part then, suggestion may play in the process

of experience, it is ill-fitted to account for its progress.

So far we have been considering suggestion as it applies to the process of religious experience. If we push backwards, it becomes clear that suggestion by itself is not sufficient to account for the initiation of religious experience. All suggestion implies an antecedent stimulus from some source other than itself. If a man believes in God, the suggestion-hypothesis asserts that 'God' means his own subliminal self projected as independently existing. But it is none the less true that, unless he had some antecedent stimulus, he would not react in this manner. It is frequently asserted that the stimulus is provided by certain felt needs, the desire for happiness, comfort, protection, and so forth. But that does not explain why man should have invented the idea of gods to gratify those needs. This view implies the rather strange notion that the idea of gods is due to the imagination of primitive peoples wistfully seeking comfort in an unkindly world. The fatal objection to this is that the lowliest forms of religion are those in which the gods least answer to this need. We have seen that the idea of God can be accounted for in a manner that comes much nearer to the conditions under which we must imagine early man to have been placed; from the attitude induced by the awe-inspiring and abnormal. Having obtained the idea of being able to establish a friendly relationship on certain conditions, man began to find comfort in the sense of a divine-human relationship. But there is no reason to show that in the first instance the idea of God was due to

the mere desire for comfort. The idea, therefore, determines the character of the process of suggestion. Suggestion does not create its antecedent idea. If a man believes himself inspired by God or the devil, if he auto-suggests that a muscular pain is an incipient cancer, if he persuades himself that he has a resemblance to Shakespeare, in every case the character of the suggestion is determined by his previous knowledge of that on which it depends. In the same way, whatever the idea of God be understood to represent, suggestion may extend the consequences of that conception ; it may even be argued that it is a prime factor in religious psychology, but it provides us with no key to unlock the problem of the reference of religious experience.

The second hypothesis avoids the paradox of the suggestion-hypothesis, which offers reasons for proving the illusory to have been more potent in human development than the rational. It does not base religion simply on subjective processes of the believer's mind. It holds that religion is far more firmly set, in the very nature of society. It accepts the facts to which the religious consciousness testifies, the sense of relation, obligation, and dependence. It recognizes that religion is a natural and normal phase of life. It regards it as a necessary and dynamic influence in society. In short, it comes in every respect nearer to the beliefs that the religious consciousness holds concerning itself, than does the suggestion-hypothesis. But it stipulates that society, unwittingly prompted by its own needs, made God. Where the suggestion-hypothesis, however, tends on similar grounds to regard the idea of God as merely illusory, this view, particularly in one of

its two aspects, to which we have already referred, regards it as valuable and important, if not, perhaps, wholly essential to religion.

Just as the Romans bowed before the 'genius' of the emperor, this view asks us to recognize in religion the 'genius' of humanity. We will first of all notice the suggestion that since society gave rise to religion, man, recognizing this, should disabuse his mind of supernatural notions and recognize society as the real object to which his religious experience refers.

We may begin by asking whether, so far as we can trace, the community as such has ever been able to exact from the individual the reverence and loyalty that accompanies strong religious belief. It is certainly not so at the present time. Society has to deal with many who rebel against the social consciousness of our times, and exacts obedience more by force than by sentiment. There are both social and intrinsic sanctions of religion, but many who disavow the former acknowledge the latter, which is strange if they are really but a disguised form of the same thing. To our modern thought the community and patriotism are one thing, God and religion another. If mankind could be persuaded that the two should be identified, it would certainly be impossible to transfer the values of religion, and the religious attitude to the community. It may be said that, at earlier stages of history the tribe and the tribal gods were so closely identified, as in the case of the Semitic races, for example, that duty to the god and the tribe were one and the same. Yet even so it is always the god who is represented as having made the tribe sacred and given its laws binding force, not the

tribe who has made the god sacred, giving him authority. Whilst, then, it is possible to contend that religion's object is society, it is true that in such case from first to last the religious consciousness has never been aware of its own object, and possibly, for the sake of religion, it is well that it has not.

Professor Leuba, in the work already quoted, holds, however, that recognition of this must come. The actual community is not a suitable object of worship, but a ground for man's faith and sense of duty can be found. 'There is no question but that humanity idealized and conceived as a manifestation of Creative Energy, possesses surpassing qualifications for a source of religious inspiration.'[1] 'Whom, therefore, ye ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you,' is the substance of this declaration. It is Ideal Humanity.

The position is reminiscent of Positivism, which, however, Professor Leuba disclaims. He accounts for the failure of Positivism by its anti-idealistic and unspiritual character. But anti-idealistic and unspiritual philosophies have flourished from the days of Epicurus. What was fresh and significant in Positivism was the attempt to substitute humanity for God. The attempt failed. It was not mere prejudice that destroyed it. Sooner or later the religious consciousness has to acknowledge as true any view that proves itself by appeal to the facts of experience, however repugnant it be to established opinions. History, from Copernicus to Darwin, shows that. The failure of Positivism does not prove its falsity, but it does raise the question whether its failure to meet

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 535.

facts, and not mere prejudice, caused its defeat. We ask whether Professor Leuba is in better case. 'In the religion of humanity,' he asserts, 'man's attention would be directed, not to a remote, intangible perfection, but to a concrete reality of which he is a part, and the perfection of which depends upon his own perfection.'[1] But how is 'ideal humanity' a 'concrete reality'? Surely it is 'ideal' only in that it is conceived as possessing possibilities which are not actually existent in present humanity. This theory must take its choice. The substitute for God, if it is to be 'a concrete reality,' must be actual humanity. If it is to be 'ideal humanity' then it must be a 'remote perfection,' let us hope, however, not eternally 'intangible.' Professor Leuba seems subconsciously aware of this, for he continues to speak of 'a religion centred about humanity' conceived as the manifestation of a Force tending to the creation of an ideal society.[2] Whether such force, semi-personalized by a capital letter, is blind or purposive, created or creative, in man is not clear, but from other expressions, used or approved subsequently, it appears as trans-human power or reality, 'creative energy,' a 'spirit,' and so forth. It is evident, then, that the unsatisfactoriness of a mere rehabilitation of ancestor-worship, which is what 'the religion of humanity' amounts to, is so apparent that the theory reintroduces, in abstract terms, some of the values of God. Yet if it were true that the source of religious experience were the community, it seems strange that neither in theory nor practice is it possible to induce mankind to accept the community in any form as the

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 335. [2] p. 336.

natural object of worship. The hypothesis must be held to be insufficient. It represents neither the *prima facie* nor the historical interpretation of the facts, nor yet the view of those whose knowledge of religious experience is personal. It occurred to none as the explanation of their religious experience until it was invented in the academy. Its origin seems to be in a bias against the supernatural, and not in a reading of the facts of religious experience. It virtually identifies the patriotic and the religious sentiments despite their historical differentiation, but offers no reason adequate for such a reversal of normal judgement. In short, the problem of the reference of religious experience may be dissolved in this manner, but it cannot be said to have been solved.

Although if religion refer to nothing beyond human society, the position we have just discussed is certainly the logical consequence, it is none the less seldom favoured, even by those who accept the exclusively social reference of religion. We turn, therefore, to the other position, represented in various ways by sociologists such as Durkheim, and on the psychological side by many writers of the psycho-analytic school. 'Our entire study,' says Durkheim, 'rests upon this postulate that the unanimous sentiment of the believers of all time cannot be purely illusory. . . . It does not follow that the reality which is its foundation conforms objectively to the idea which believers have of it. . . . We have seen that this reality, . . . out of which religious experience is made, is society.'[1] Durkheim, however, does not attempt to

[1] *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Eng. trans., pp. 417-8.

evolve a Neo-positivism. He is content to assert that religion is social in origin and expression, and is an embodiment of the social nature of man that involves the consequence that action, the cult, is primary therein. Out of the totemic cult, which Durkheim thinks primary, arose the gods, who are adjuncts to, but not central in, the purpose of religion, which is 'to aid us to live.' Although founded upon far too narrow a basis, a study of Australian rites and beliefs, the work of Durkheim is marked with rare insight and sympathy, and is a most valuable vindication of the vital values and permanent character of religion.

We have in some part already criticized this position in dealing with previous theories, and need not repeat what has been said. The theory encounters considerable difficulty through its close connexion with totemism. Few things are more disputed in the science of religion than the significance of totemism. Nor is it certain that it has been practised by all peoples. Its connexion with social organization is much more evident than its religious significance, and the trend of opinion seems in favour of emphasizing the former rather than the latter aspect. It cannot be said, therefore, that Durkheim's view presents the highest credentials, and it can hardly be accepted without considerably wider evidence. It, moreover, implies that the idea of a superhuman order arose comparatively late. It is difficult to think, in view of the instinctive character of the basis of religion, that no mental construction was prompted by it, and that man had to wait upon a relatively complex social order before he got any conception of his gods. The preference

we have given to supernaturalism, as supplying the inception of the god-idea, is partly on the psychological ground that the earliest exercises of thought must be held to be on the lines of the primary activities and instinctive interests, and to have been prompted by them.

The view that religion is an expression of the social nature of man, rather than a reaction towards God, is, however, independent of this particular standpoint. We may recognize that it has the merit of bringing into prominence the place of religion in life. There is much truth in the saying, 'God is my desire.' 'Projection' and idealization are inevitable exercises of the human mind, and the character attributed to the gods is inevitably fixed by the standards of their worshippers. But if we admit with Durkheim that there is something eternal in religion, if we say with a writer of the psychoanalytic school, 'We cannot deny the truth of the substance of religion, though we may criticize many of its forms. All universal and self-consistent expressions of the activity of the human spirit have a claim to the name of truth,'[1] in what way is religion 'real' or true? The writer just quoted goes on to state that religious and scientific truth are as incommensurate as mathematical and artistic truth. This is quite in accordance with the distinction made by both Jung and Freud between 'directed thinking' and 'dream or phantasy thinking,' or between the 'pleasure-pain' and 'reality' principles. But such a distinction cannot be ultimate. Subjective desires may neglect reality in phantasy thinking, but it is equally true that the wish is father to the act as well as

[1] A. G. Tansley: *The New Psychology*, p. 139.

to the thought, and under the stimulus of desire our thought proceeds, and gives rise to activity. 'The gods,' says Jung, 'are *libido*.' Supposing that we accept that statement, understanding by *libido*, as Jung does, the 'life-urge,' and not the Freudian connotation of the term? Does it follow that, if we call God our desire, or the expression of the 'life-urge,' He does or does not represent 'objective reality'? The weakness of this particular type of hypothesis is that it is psychological without being philosophical, and the question of the objective reference of religious experience cannot be settled on psychological grounds. The matter does not end by speaking of God as desire. It involves the relation of desire to reality. Modern genetic psychology has raised issues that it cannot solve. It has shown that our experience is based primarily on instinct, not upon reason. But since life is our fundamental point of contact with reality, we are driven to ask what relation is borne, not merely by our reason, but by our feelings and will, to reality. That is a question for philosophy. Psychologically it is true that every want, every desire bears some relation to reality; but what reality, and how are our human activities related to it? The objective reference of religious experience, therefore, can neither be proved nor disproved on psychological grounds; but our discussion has at least served to state the problem to be carried forward to philosophy.

PART II

PHILOSOPHICAL

SECTION C

THE RELIGIOUS POSTULATE AND ITS VERIFICATION

IX

THE ESSENTIAL POSTULATE OF RELIGION

We have seen in the foregoing chapters that the source of religion is vital rather than intellectual. On the conceptual side belief in the gods was stimulated by certain facts of experience, but it was not merely aetiological, nor prompted solely by speculative curiosity. Similarly still, the belief may be presented as an inference, but its roots are ultra-rational. We have also seen that the belief cannot be dismissed as purely subjective, nor can society be shown to be its object. We were left with the view that God is the embodiment of human desire, a statement which raises the question of the relation of such desire to reality. We do not regard 'nature' as more than a convenient general name for the physical universe and its properties. Is 'God' similarly an expression to denote the character of human ideals? Some who hold that religion is the 'Vital Impulse' revealing itself through human conative activity lead up to this view, and leave the

matter there. For science, concerned only with the properties of reality, the ultimate nature of reality is irrelevant. Idealist, Materialist, and Agnostic can share a common view of physics. Even the science of religion does not need to raise the question of ultimate meaning. The history and psychology of religion, the comparative study of rite, custom, and belief, are its concern. But the standpoint of religion cannot be that of science or even of the science of religion. Physics would be the same in an atheistic as in a theistic world, but not so religion. Those who assure us on psychological or sociological grounds that 'God is in very literal truth the Desire of the nations'[1] do not seem always to appreciate the necessity of facing the philosophical implication of that view. Yet if religion be anything more than a subjective phantasy it cannot be left as referring to the Desire of nations any more than as referring to a personal God, without involving the question of the relation of religious experience and its object to the conception of reality. Although Kant paid the tribute of his second Critique to the moral consciousness, two reasons have kept philosophy from doing justice to religious experience. One was the idea that Christianity was revelation not reason, and other religions superstition. The second was that Christianity was a separate and sacrosanct sphere to be touched by ecclesiastics only. Hence God as a rational conception merely, interested philosophy up to the modern period. Both barriers are now broken, and a juster comprehension of religion may make possible a fuller function for philosophy.

[1] Cf. Harrison : *Epilegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, p. 34.

Hitherto we have been concerned with psychological aspects of religious experience. We shall now try to indicate some philosophical consequences, and first of all to suggest how religious experience, in the form in which we have dealt with it, has significance for philosophy.

Religion cannot be brought within any proper definition of instinct, and the progressive character of the forms it assumes is unlike the general manifestation of instinct which tends to be static, but, like other great factors in mental life, its roots run down, as was said, to a complex of instincts. That such is the case, so far from being a disparagement, testifies to its importance as a regular and natural expression of the human mind. The theology of former days, with its assumption of primitive revelation, and its prepossession that the Hebrew people alone enjoyed and handed it down, obscured the importance of religion in life. If religion had belonged to one race alone, it might be held a chance ' variation.' Viewed throughout all its forms, it appears as a normal predicate of the human mind. If religion be regarded as a revelation, such revelation is manifested by the inward growth of mental process, not by outward declaration of God to man. If former days saw chiefly the divine aspect of religion, to-day we have abundant evidence of its human side, and those whose interests are expressed by the maxim ' *Nihil humanum puto mihi alienum* ' cannot ignore its place in the life of humanity. Nothing is more characteristically human than religion. Nothing in human nature is more important for estimating the character of that nature than man's persistent efforts to transcend

the objects and values of the physical universe in which he is placed. Religious ideas have helped to lift both the social and the individual consciousness above the sphere of the sensuous and material, and have fostered qualities essential alike to the development of a stable social order and a fuller personality.

What has already been said has foreshadowed a further point. Religion, we saw, arises from a vital rather than an intellectual source, out of man's struggle for existence rather than his curiosity. Had it been merely a speculative essay of thought, it would have arisen later in human evolution. Early thought was stimulated by pressingly practical needs, and the earliest religious conceptions bear the mark of being caused and conditioned by the necessity of man's finding out in what way the superhuman order affected his life. It cannot be maintained that the need was purely imaginary, or that even from what we may call the biological point of view it could have been ignored, and that man would have developed as well without it. To possess a physical power is to use it. We accept that as matter of course. We cannot imagine physical variations arising, or at least surviving, if they were not destined to be put to use in action. The *élan de la vie*, 'the life-urge,' produces for use and destroys the unused. As with physical so with mental. Possessing greater mental capacity than the brute creation, man was impelled to satisfy its demands. In one respect it led him to fashion instruments, to become 'the tool-using animal.' But mental development also took another course. It opened other than a purely material universe to man, and the satisfaction of his power in this direction was principally

connected with his religious conceptions. By the service they rendered thus they helped man to reach his intellectual destiny. In that sense religion has fulfilled what we have called a biological function. It provided an exercise for mental powers that were needed in the development of the human race.

We may further illustrate the point by reference to the function fulfilled by the idea of God or gods. Such a belief, and the practical consequences it implies, could not have survived in the universal struggle for existence unless it had been connected with certain vital ends. It demands too much from thought and conduct to persist in the earlier stages of human life as a mere speculation. Unless it served some practical need it would even now fail to maintain itself among us. At the present time it fulfils certain rational, moral, and social requirements. Rationally, the idea of God is a necessity of thought for many philosophies. Yet the God of philosophy is a very useless conception for the average man. 'The unexamined life' was thought by Plato to be unlivable by a truly human being, but only a comparatively few even of educated people think out their universe, and whilst the idea of God is useful to many as an explanation, it is not essential on that account alone. More find in the idea of God an answer to moral questioning. If the belief collapsed the moral law would remain by reason of its intrinsic value, but to many minds its unique and absolute authority would appear baseless. As the supreme embodiment of righteousness at the heart of things, God appears to them a moral necessity. 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?' But the largest class

are those who find that the idea of God fulfils for them a great social need. Apart from it they would be lonely in an empty universe. It yields comfort in sickness, hardship, sorrow, and death. Prayer to such a God is a real means of help, and thousands whose faith in prayer has been shaken by theoretical objections resort to the practice at such times. There can be no doubt that the vitality of belief in God centres in the words ' Our Father ' so far as the vast mass of believers are concerned.

Much that has been written in recent religious psychology, however, appears to me to neglect the essentially active aspect of religion. To state that comfort, calm, peace, joy, are the ends sought in the religious life is but part of the truth. Primitive forms of religion are more closely connected with active ends—success, victory, good fortune in the chase, and material benefit. Even to-day, though the more grossly material forms have decayed, man sees in God the great ally in the struggle of life just as much as the comforter in its defeats. The nightmare of our purposive minds is a purposeless universe, and the idea of God has value as promising that life has a meaning and its conflict has real issues. Against the mechanical and soulless universe that scientific thinking suggests, and against the timeless, complete conception of reality, the ' block universe ' of which William James spoke, the religious ideal passionately asserts a meaning and value in human life, an end to be gained by human purpose. It is this, and not simply comfort, that the idea of God represents to-day ; a dynamic, not an anodyne.

To say this is to state that now, as ever, the mainspring of religion is a divine-human relationship. That relation

is conceived to-day in terms of love, trust, and sympathy; but modern man, no less than his remote ancestors, shows his craving for the alliance of the superhuman in his life's purposes. Our habit of sharply separating the sacred and the secular leads us to view man's struggle for existence upon purely naturalistic lines. Religion thus comes to be regarded as an extra, a refinement, not necessarily involved in that struggle. Yet this is certainly an instance of 'the psychologist's fallacy.' Primitive peoples are fully aware of the difference between natural and supernatural, but they do not regard their religious behaviour as less necessary than any other part of social custom; generally, indeed, it is more necessary. Early man fought a tenacious struggle for survival, and it certainly would not have occurred to him that he could abandon his religion and live on as before. If the preceding argument be well founded, he could not. Even primitive peoples do not live by bread alone. Their affective needs claimed satisfaction as well as their physical needs, and religion served towards that end. Whether other means might have done so we do not know. At any rate, they did not. Both as regards thought and feeling, religion has served a vital purpose in human evolution.

It follows, therefore, that we must regard religion as having fulfilled a notable part in the stimulation of progress. The obvious difference between human and animal development is in intellectual and moral powers. Man's physical development has ceased. The Cromagnon remains indicate that. Evolution continues, but as a mental and spiritual process. It is to this that religion has rendered so much service. Superficial thinking, looking

at retrogression, superstition, and credulity, is inclined to regard religion as the brake on the wheels of progress. Historically and psychologically, however, man's sense of relation to a higher order has served to keep alive in him the sense of his imperfection, and to impel him towards a better self-realization. In this way religion has led man towards his destiny, has prepared for that phase of evolution which is now in progress. When life is viewed as a psychological development, the ultimate meaning of that development is not a matter of concern. But philosophy ought not to avoid that question, even if it should not be able to answer it. This is why we may press upon philosophy the significance of religious experience which witnesses to man's persistent refusal to regard mundane experience as sufficiently satisfying or final. For the interpretation of experience, the fact that man has thus valued his own experience is of particular interest and importance.

Why he should have done so raises a question that goes back to ultimate things. We have said that man was enabled, and it would appear impelled, to develop his religion by the possession of powers of mind vastly exceeding those of the lowly lineage out of which he sprang. But why did not an increasing heritage of sense-interests satisfy him? Why employ his superior powers upon something not directly connected with his physical existence? No doubt he imagined that his religious rites and beliefs secured him bodily well-being, but more than that is needed to explain them. Man sought physical advantages through worship—control of nature, food, health, safety, victory, and so forth. But why did he think that

such advantages could be so given? If we grant that he did think so, it is easy to see that he would attempt to turn the superhuman order to his practical advantage. But why think so? The reply is probably '*Post hoc propter hoc.*' Primitive reasoning connected abnormal events with certain happenings that chanced to be subsequent to them in the life and fortunes of the tribe. There is no reason to doubt this. Indeed, we have already acknowledged its possibility,[1] but that does not explain why man believed that it was possible to establish friendly relationship with unseen powers. We may reply further that, since he could establish relationships with mankind, it was natural for him to try to do the same with the other order he discovered in the world. Yet, when all has been said, the universality of religious reactions at all stages of human culture known to us is not explained by such a reconstruction of the possible reasonings of primitive minds. Man has followed a process of development that leads from the material towards the spiritual side of life as persistently and unquestioningly as he has followed the prompting of his instincts. Why the instincts compel obedience we cannot tell. It is scarcely easier to account adequately for the strength and extent of the tendency that has led man towards a spiritual development. This fact represents the germ of truth that has been crudely and incorrectly expressed by the positing of a religious 'faculty' or 'instinct.' The width and persistence of religious reactions certainly suggest that in some way they were essential in human evolution. We have seen

[1] Ch. iii.

how they have assisted to make the intellectual and affective capacities of the race. It may not be possible to prove, but it is certainly impossible to disprove, that they, like other characteristics of man's mind, belong to those primary conditions which have fixed for man his function and destiny on this planet. It may indeed be even as St. Augustine said, '*Fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te.*'

Whatever may be thought of the foregoing argument, we can at least claim that religion cannot be set down as an epiphenomenon, a by-product of the development of human experience. It must be recognized as one of the main factors that have made that experience what it now is. It is on this account that religion demands the attention of philosophy. The question arises as to the form in which, so to speak, philosophy is to hear the evidence of religion, in the elemental or the developed forms. The elemental forms reveal in cruder and stronger colours the fundamental characteristics of the whole. At the same time they are more difficult sympathetically to comprehend, because the interpretation of mentalities widely removed from our own must needs be somewhat problematic. The postulate of continuity enables us to regard lowest and highest as lineally connected, but unless we are prepared to contend that, since civilized man descended from brute ancestors, he is essentially a brute still, we cannot conclude that the characteristics of primitive religion are the sole characteristics of all religion. Just as an investigation of consciousness would need to consider its lowliest forms up to its highest to appreciate its significance, so is it with religion. The later forms may

include much that is essential to its understanding, which, none the less, is not discernible in the earlier expressions.

We must be prepared to find, therefore, in the developed forms of religious experience more than an elaborated expression of the earlier forms.[1] Development of any attitude may lead to a fresh orientation which amounts in the end to its entire reversal. Pessimism arises within communities which are familiar with some religious conception of the relation between value and existence. To this extent it is always a development of a religious conception, but it ends by reversing the original estimate of the relation between value and existence. It is equally possible to find within religion itself that a process of development leads at times to a position sharply opposed to that which afforded its starting-point.

In his last work, *The Science of Power*, the late Benjamin Kidd pointed out that the Japanese race had emerged in two generations from a barbaric feudalism to civilization. He contended that a new collective inheritance, particularly in its psychic elements, could bring about a complete transformation in a single generation. The fact can hardly be disputed in view of the evidence that any successful mission-field offers. The power of a new collective inheritance has been more strikingly illustrated in religion than anywhere else. The spread of Christianity and Muhammadanism and the rise of the Reformation suggest themselves at once to the mind as examples. In all forms of religion the attitude and intention are constant—to secure the right relation with the god. But

[1] In this connexion cf. Wundt: 'Principle of creative resultants.' *Introduction to Psychology*, Eng. trans., p. 164.

that does not exclude differences in motive, content, habit, outlook, which are so transforming in their influence that the dissimilarity becomes more noteworthy than the similarity. The full content of the higher forms is no more an elaboration of the lower forms than the human brain is an elaboration of original protoplasm. The thread of continuity is not broken in either instance, but there comparison ends. The religious relation of divine ally and human worshipper is changeless, but in its development historically we see the centre of gravity move from one to the other—from the desire of man to the will of God. This is not to see the self-seeking impulses of primitive religions toned down to a decently unselfish expression, but rather a complete transformation of the conditions which originally led to the attempt to establish a divine-human relation. For in the highest forms the need of a harmonious relation to God is not on account of any human advantage primarily, but as a response to the love of God that reconciles the world to Himself. The old Puritan question quoted by William James, 'Are you willing to be damned for the glory of God?' appears perhaps but a grotesque survival of fantastic piety. Yet that such an idea should be possible shows that the centre of self can be lost by identification with a higher self, for, however extraordinary the idea may be, it is sincere enough. The religious relation begins with self foremost. It finally becomes God foremost. It is not the only form of the higher loyalty, but, as far as the mass of mankind is concerned, nothing has been more influential in teaching the higher loyalty.

From what has been said, it follows that the process of

religious development as a whole, from earliest to latest forms, presents material for philosophical consideration. Religion appears as one of those forces by which man has lived ; it indicates that human existence has spiritual as well as physical needs. What is impressive in the lowliest forms of religion is that at a stage when man was so deeply marked with the clay of the ' pit from whence he was digged,' when the instinctive reactions and animal interests predominated in his life, he should have displayed any capability for, and leaning to, things psychical. There is a universality, and a kind of inevitability, in the story of the religion of mankind that yields us an unavoidable impression that whatever be the conditions under which the human race appeared and developed, amongst them was a force that works in a spiritual direction.

The higher stages of religion indicate clearly the tendency of human evolution away from a self-centred and naturalistic basis towards altruism and spirituality. That is to say that although man's earliest spiritual interests were concerned with the material well-being of the tribe and individual, in the long process of evolution they show an increasing tendency to turn from self-interest to self-renunciation. It is impossible to regard this tendency in human experience as without any philosophical significance. All we know of reality comes through our experience, and all philosophy must assume that our experience is capable of expressing to us the nature of reality. Must we not, therefore, consider the suggestion that this process within human experience may be an indication of the character of reality ?

Whether it can be thought to be such is a question which we shall face later. The starting-point for the philosophical consideration of religious experience will be found, however, not in the lower or the higher forms of religion by themselves, but rather in that which is common throughout all forms—the belief in the existence of a divine-human relationship. This is more significant even than the idea of God, since there is evidence that there are in certain cases high gods who are named, but not held to enter into relationship with man.[1] Let us see what that belief implies.

Early man, surrounded by forces which seemed to him very potent, and yet ignorant of their nature, must have realized the insecurity of his position. It has been likened, not inaptly, to that of a man planted in the midst of a huge workshop of moving machinery, surrounded by 'live' cables, not knowing what he dare and dare not touch, seeing his comrades killed or injured as they moved to and fro. He was thus impelled by very practical grounds towards some attempt to safeguard himself. The only method open to him was that of postulating, and finding out whether his postulate worked. One postulate was that by magic he could control the forces that surrounded him. Another was that he could conciliate them. Very slowly and irregularly the latter postulate gained ground, and led gradually towards a different conception of the character of superhuman power. To-day, amongst civilized peoples, the magical postulate lingers in the dark amongst superstitions; the

[1] Cf. Lang: *Making of Religion*; together with Hartland: *High Gods of Australian Folklore*, 1898, vol. ix.; *Australian Gods*, vol. x.

religious postulate has come into the light as faith in God. But behind all forms of religion, as contrasted with magic, from the lowest to the highest, there is this in common—all postulate that the superhuman order is approachable, conciliable, that it is possible to establish a harmonious relation with it. The very persistence of religion indicates that mankind has believed the postulate to be true.

In its lowlier forms the postulate was, of course, of limited application. The tribal deity was approached by the tribe, not by others. Nor did it imply a settled character of benevolence in the object of worship. The god might be wrathful and capricious, but, none the less, he could and would be gracious, if only the right method of inducing his favour could be found. In these lowly forms, the idea of all religion, which we see clearly in the higher forms, was crudely present. Gradually the local deity widens into the All-Father, his gracious mood into his settled character of goodness; but the postulate that the object of the tribal worship can be persuaded to be kind is, after all, the germ—the incomplete foreshadowing of the postulate made universal in the words 'God is love.' That is to say, under religious experience as a whole lies one great and common postulate.

We have already stated that for philosophy the developed forms of the religious consciousness, as indeed of human consciousness generally, are more important, and if from these we state the religious postulate in philosophical terms, it will be seen to amount to a predication concerning a certain harmony between existence and value, a response on the part of the universe to human search for that which is good; that is to say, it is a

postulate concerning the nature of reality. At present we are not concerned with the relation in which the object of religious experience stands towards the whole system of reality. It is enough that for all religions the gods are reality, whether God is held to be the source and centre of all reality or not. In general philosophical terms, therefore, the postulate is that there is within reality that which is sympathetic to human values. The postulate is implied by that very attempt to establish harmonious relationship which is the sign and token of religion. Such a relation must be assumed as possible in order that it may be sought. Even the worshipper who bows to a demon or hostile spirit presumes it is not implacable. It is of interest to notice that Buddhism, in theory atheistic, whose philosophy declares all existence to be misery, none the less thinks this much harmony exists between life and value, that a final attainment of Nirvana is possible. Not even the melancholy of Gautama could conceive eternal, unalterable dissonance between value and reality. Even Buddhism, exceptional though it is, joins to this extent in the testimony of all religion. What is essential to religion is not simply belief in the existence of gods, but belief in the assistance of human ends through them. That is why the value-judgement is pre-eminently the religious judgement. The religious postulate affirms the worth of the idea of God to human good.

That which is essential to the religious postulate is found, then, in all forms of religion. With the development of intellectual and spiritual outlook the postulate becomes expressed as ' We know that to them that love

God all things work together for good,' or, more briefly, 'God is love.' It is not necessary that the relation of God to reality should be settled finally before we can ask whether the religious postulate is verified. Mr. Webb has declared that 'the object of religious devotion cannot, when once the question is raised, be held to be less than the Ultimate Reality.'[1] William James contended for a finite God, and spoke of the logical possibilities of polytheism. But for each God is real, and we find Mr. Bradley ready to concede that 'whatever ideas really are required in practice by the highest religion are true. In my judgement their truth is not contradicted by metaphysics so long only as they will not offer themselves as satisfying our last intellectual demands.'[2] Whoever regards religion as truly possessing objective reference must make it refer to the nature of ultimate reality, whether it be the whole of reality or an aspect of reality. The religious consciousness itself has varied in its conception of the latter question. For the time being therefore, the general statement that reality is sympathetic to human good will suffice as the philosophical significance of the religious postulate, or, in other words, that a harmony between existence and value is founded in the nature of reality.

Moral progress brings a corresponding extension to the manner in which the postulate is conceived. In its earlier forms it was interpreted with regard to the tribal material desires and needs, and in the less spiritual forms of religious experience this attitude still remains. Later ethical development uproots the notion of arbitrary and

[1] *God and Personality*, p. 143. [2] *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 433.

capricious gods who can be coaxed into benevolence, and yields the thought of a God whose nature is love. Correspondingly, the idea of what is good for man widens, and is no longer conceived in terms of his particular desires, but of his ultimate good. Yet, throughout all, the religious postulate has never implied that the human attitude is negligible. In the earlier forms man must make the right kind of approach ; in the later forms man must seek that only which is ultimately good. He cannot presume that any end of his can be granted. It may be that the very goodness of God to him would manifest itself in thwarting the evil and unsocial ends he seeks. So in the latest it is assumed as much as in the earliest forms that the human attitude must be right. The words of St. Paul quoted above include the qualifying phrase, ' To them that love God.' That is no contradiction of the idea that God is good to all, nor does it imply favouritism, but is an acknowledgement that all things work together for good if man identifies his desires with good, and seeks it in God.

It follows that the postulate can never be separated from the divine-human relation to which it belongs. We assume that, if we think rationally, reality is comprehensible by thought. Similarly, the religious postulate assumes that if we seek for good we shall find it. It is no more asserted that we shall obtain that good if we set ourselves towards evil than it is maintained that reality will be revealed by irrational thinking. What we postulate in one case is that reality responds to our thought, for that is what is implied, or at least that reality does not shake off the clasp of thought. In the other case, we postulate that reality responds to our good, or at least

that there is no bar to prevent its realization by us. It is as much a declaration that there is no ultimate dissonance between reality and good as the other is that there is none between reality and thought.

Since the field from which we have gathered the religious postulate is that of religious experience as a whole, we are bound to that form of it which is implied in all types. We are not now concerned with belief in theism, human and divine personality, freedom, salvation, heaven, because none of these belong to all forms of religion. But every form of religion agrees upon one value, the most inclusive and objective of all values, human good or wellbeing, which is even more universal than the desire for happiness. However it be defined, crudely materialistic good, intellectual good, moral good, even such a conception as Nirvana, in every form the supreme value is a human good. If, then, the religious postulate be taken in its widest form, it is philosophically to be interpreted as the belief in the harmony between reality and the ultimate value of all human existence, the good in its utmost sense.

The question that now confronts us is that of its verification. Such verification must be in a manner similar to that afforded to our other postulates. This immediately introduces us to the initial difficulty, which is theoretical. The difference between the spheres in which the religious postulate and, for example, scientific postulates are verified is obvious. But unless we are able to afford verification in a similar manner, allowing, of course, for the difference in the character of the verification possible in each case, it cannot be claimed that the religious postulate is capable

of intelligible verification. Besides this, there are other difficulties, equally obvious, which may be summed up in the old coalition ' natural and moral evil,' which appear as an open contradiction of the postulate of religion, and have a practical as well as a theoretical aspect.

X

THE CHARACTER OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

The first step in an inquiry as to the verification possible to the religious postulate is to consider what status such a belief can claim as knowledge. The religious consciousness itself testifies unequivocally that its object is existent. This is the hypothesis 'in possession.' The question is whether philosophical inquiry can judge this evidence to be consistent with a critical conception of reality. The demand is sometimes made that religious experience offer proof of its assertion. But that is a proceeding logic text-books label '*ignoratio elenchi*.' Upon none of the established beliefs of mankind can there be any *onus probandi*. Logically and historically, belief precedes disbelief. The testimony of religion comes as near as anything can come to being world-wide witness. The burden, therefore, is one of disproof. The realism of common sense may call a spade a spade without being challenged first to produce an epistemology to justify it. Whatever be the theory of knowledge, the spade represents something that is real, and to this extent common sense has valid knowledge. Similarly, religious experience testifies to *something*. The question is whether its object, in the sense in which it conceives it, can be related to a synoptic view of reality.

It is of some importance to realize this. Philosophy has not yet answered the question, 'What is truth?' Yet, whilst philosophers are disputing, mankind lives by 'working truths,' and the 'working truths' of religion command more conviction than most theoretical truths hall-marked by philosophical approval. Moreover, no 'working truth' of humanity is, at the last resource, baseless. The witness of commonsense realism is to reality, however impossible its naïve dogmatism that 'The spade is in itself what my senses tell me it is' may be. Our primary reality is experience, and whatever is immediately experienced has reality. 'The grass *is* green,' because we see it so. 'The sun moves,' said our ancestors, on the same ground. Common sense still holds the former proposition, though it has abandoned the latter. Yet it witnessed to a truth, though mankind had not then learnt, as Relativists remind us, that it is as true to say that we push the shore from the boat as the boat from the shore. But the experience behind what is said of grass and sun is real. The error in each case is in the interpretation. No matter of general experience is without some objective basis. Whilst what is subjective merely is valid only as a state of consciousness, if the general experience of mankind does not refer to something objective, nothing can save us from universal scepticism. But inference is always less certain than immediate experience, however obvious it may appear. Religious knowledge is based on immediate experience. That is true, however one may challenge the interpretation given to it. Probably no single belief of the earlier forms of religion was true as we regard truth. Our own may,

in many instances, share the same fate some day. But the attitude, as distinct from the expression, must be accepted as valid, for the reasons just indicated, however crude be its setting forth. It may be said that on these lines ancient magic and modern occultism, both widespread, represent valid attitudes. In some measure that is so, because there is that within the nature of reality which is beyond man's mental range. This is their basis, but their expression is hopelessly contradictory. Since man's rational life is built upon instinctive reactions as its foundation, a constant function of reason is to find justification for ultra-rational action. But, because the reasons may be unsound, it does not follow that the attitudes they are meant to explain represent nothing that can be accounted real.

Philosophy, then, recognizes that religious experience is valid experience, though it has no especial regard for the dogmas which variously express the intellectual aspect of that experience. But we have seen that the postulate which is implicit in religion is of philosophical significance. In all forms of religious experience it is implied that a relation between reality—or what is conceived to be reality, or a certain aspect of it—and human values exists. In this respect religion comes into contact with philosophy ; at least, with such philosophy as recognizes human experience as a whole as providing it with material. The question is how far this partial expression of experience can be regarded as consistent with the rest. This involves some further inquiry, into the character of religious knowledge ; whether, for example, we are able to have valid knowledge of the matters to which religion refers.

Sir J. G. Frazer has suggested that the philosophy of religion must decide whether religious knowledge is derived from nature, self, or revelation. The task belongs, perhaps, rather to the psychology of religion. But it is not likely that any one source can be said to have provided religious knowledge. There is no indication that it arose or developed by any exclusive process, but many of its similarity to other beliefs. The difference between the 'sacred' and 'profane' holds everywhere. According to Durkheim, it is this, and not the conception of gods, which is the profoundest mark of religion.[1] But his characterization of the sacred by its difference from the profane is singularly like circular reasoning, and his contention that the interdiction or taboo is logically implied in the notion of sacredness appears to reverse the actual position. Certainly all sacred things are hedged about with taboos, but we probably come nearest to the original significance of taboo (if it possesses any single origin) in connexion with *mana*. If the abnormal power, the *mana*, is not to be treated lightly, because of its potent consequences of unknown extent and application, *tabu-mana* gives us the explanation of the sacred. This is more probable than Durkheim's view that sacredness, which he thinks is created by society and man's sense of dependence upon it, affords the root of taboo. But whatever be the source from which religious ideas developed, and however sharply separate the sacred and profane, religious knowledge, as knowledge, develops on the same lines as the rest. It is derived from ideas and analogies drawn from natural phenomena and from

[1] *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Eng. trans., p. 37.

animistic conceptions. It depends on revelation in the sense that our knowledge springs out of contact with reality, and implies a response on the part of reality to our attempt to express its character. But it is with the character rather than the origin of knowledge that philosophy is more directly concerned. If there is no separate source out of which religious, as distinct from any other, knowledge arises, even although religion touches certain aspects of our consciousness more closely than others, the further question presents itself, How does the character of religious knowledge compare with that of knowledge generally?

To answer this will not necessitate any excursion into epistemology to justify the assumption that we can know. The conflict with scepticism of the absolute type is always purely theoretical, for scepticism cannot doubt without assuming in some sense the possibility of the knowledge it denies, even if it be but to state that we do not know whether we can know. We assume, then, that in a veritable sense knowledge is possible. But the term knowledge is ambiguous. It may mean all that is known or what any individual or individuals know. But, more commonly, we mean by knowledge the familiarity gained by experience. Religious knowledge is primarily neither ratiocination nor scientific description, but a familiarity gained by experience. It asserts knowledge of the character of God in the same way as we assert knowledge of the character of our friends. Recollecting the social nature of religion, it follows that individual knowledge is always influenced, and often determined, by the social expression. Like the flower that shoots out from a common stock, it is

grounded upon the joint experience of the many rather than the experience of the one. Religious knowledge in this respect is the same as general knowledge ; it represents the familiarity gained through individual and social experience. It differs from certain of the other forms of knowledge not because it lacks the actual characteristics of knowledge, but rather by reason of the character of the objects to which it refers.

It is not necessary, therefore, to defend religious knowledge as a trustworthy form of knowing. All knowledge, religious and the rest, shares a common root. It seems to me that we come nearest to comprehension of the character of the earliest forms of knowledge if we refer to the knowledge we possess in the course of dreams. The Freudian psychology has the merit of serving to emphasize some of the significance of dream-life, whether or not such significance is correctly interpreted by it. But there are other ways in which dream-life is significant. Every one is aware of the strange paradox of many dreams, that, whilst actually perceiving objects in one form, we none the less recognize them as being other than they seem. I dream, for example, that I am at home, or talking to my friend X. All the while I am aware that the room in which I am is not in the least like any in my own house, yet the conviction that I am none the less at my home is complete. Or X, it may be, is like Y, and yet I am aware it is X. Such knowledge seems direct, and not dependent on inferences, and I imagine that the knowledge possessed by the higher animals in many respects resembles our dream-knowledge. In dreaming the higher brain-centres are quiescent, but dream-life

has its knowledge, and although in dreams we can draw simple inferences, our general state is a kind of immediate awareness. Any one who has sympathetically studied the behaviour of a dog must have noticed this same kind of awareness in him. Our dream-knowledge, while it lasts, bears the character of familiarity gained by experience, and we do not nowadays limit experience to the individual's own consciousness without reference to such factors as inborn or unconscious experience. But in dreams our reasoning powers are very limited. We seem to know without reasons. Indeed, in waking life, recollecting our dream, we are wholly unable to supply reasons for the very conviction so indubitable in the dream. We must imagine that, in the process of development, reasoning powers were very gradually superimposed upon that basis of working familiarity with experience which instinct affords, and in time were able to take over certain functions previously guided by non-rational powers, as well as vastly to enlarge the range of mind. That is why it appears that the characteristics of dream-consciousness reproduce most nearly the primitive conditions of knowledge. Whilst I am unconvinced by Freud's theory of the dream as the fulfilment of a wish, it is certain that the conative aspect—conation 'fromwards' and 'towards'—is dominant in dreams, with that strong emotional accompaniment which makes the dream-consciousness so much more intense than normal consciousness. Further, there is the absence of the element of surprise in dreams. Curiosity is instinctive, but surprise represents comparison between expectation and realization, and comparison is a late development

which the animal mind shows small sign of possessing, and primitive minds possess imperfectly. None the less, our dream-knowledge serves as knowledge and stimulates its own activity, for in our dream we find ourselves acting upon it.

It seems, therefore, that our dreams supply us with the best analogy for comprehending the root-form of knowledge. Scientific knowledge is furthest removed from it. It is based on a system of judgements concerning facts abstracted from the *continuum* of experience, and deals with them apart. Religious knowledge, specially concerned with values, sometimes asserts their existence, as if it did not need to be harmonized with other aspects of experience. Yet, on the whole, fact implies value, for a fact that has no value in any sense is unthinkable, and we cannot imagine a scale of values, on the other hand, unrelated to any fact. The difference between the two forms of knowledge is in emphasis or aspect, rather than in character. The criticism that universal and objective knowledge cannot be based on the data of 'inner' experience simply means that religious knowledge is not scientific knowledge. It is universal in the sense that it is possible to all; at least, there is no evident reason why it should not be. It is objective in the sense that it has a reference beyond self-consciousness. But one cannot include God in the major premise of a syllogism, and deduce Him as its conclusion, nor can one assert Him to be an object of knowledge in the same manner as sense phenomena are. To assume, however, that such knowledge alone is knowledge is to beg the issue offhand. I may be equally certain of the grandeur of a sunset and

of the properties of glass. If anyone contended that glass was less brittle than iron a practical test is open, but there is no such test to convince the man who sees in the sunset nothing more than a disc the size of a guinea, as Blake put it. But unless knowledge is to be limited to what can be mathematically or experimentally demonstrated, there is no point in objecting that universal and objective knowledge cannot be obtained from judgements of value and inner experience.

A further way of contrasting religious and scientific knowledge is that often made between faith and knowledge, which is made the more easily because the different terms suggest two attitudes wholly unconnected. But the connexion is at least as evident as the contrast. Both are the expression of purposive activity ; both are directed towards what is desired as truth. Still further, all knowledge has a basis in faith. In a practical sense knowledge comes as the result of experiment. Every advance may be from knowledge to more knowledge, but, none the less, it also implies an anticipation or postulation of what is not yet known. 'When we regard the development of living forms as a continuous whole we are forced to recognize as immanent and operative throughout it a sort of scientific trustfulness that from the very first seems to have been engrained in all living things.'[1] An example of this is supplied by any biological variation. It is put forward in 'trustfulness,' without any guarantee that it is not born out of due time. No pre-established harmony exists between it and its environment. It survives or is swamped. The

[1] Ward : *Realm of Ends*, p. 416.

life-impulse goes on, unchecked by its failures, producing fresh variations ; some come through, and by them the process goes forward another step. The analogy between this and human conation seeking knowledge is close. We try in faith ; to some of our faith reality responds, and the result is knowledge ; some fails. But each onward step of knowledge is by a venture advanced in faith.

Equally does any theory of knowledge build on a basis which is of the character of faith. For one thing, faith that we can know at all : for another, we must accept the axioms of thought, its connecting principles of identity, difference, continuity, and so forth, without proof. They are not inductions from experience, for they must be possessed before experience can confirm them. In other words, they can be read into, but not from, experience. To call them ' self-evident ' is merely to avoid the issue. Kant, it is well known, regarded them as *a priori*, and though the insight into the manner in which mind developed, which Darwin made possible, finally shattered Kant's categories, ' necessary truths ' are still regarded by many modern thinkers as presuppositions of knowledge which are axiomatic, and are referred to the mind which knows rather than to that which is known. The voluntaristic type of thought regards them as in their nature postulates, which have been uniformly verified, and paradoxically calls on Kant for evidence.[1] For Kant, who employed postulates in *The Critique of Practical Reason* in order to base moral and religious judgements, forgot that the unitary character of experience makes it impossible to create a dualism of pure and practical reason, and

[1] Cf. Schiller, Axioms as Postulates : *Personal Idealism*, pp. 47, seq.

employ postulations as valid in one sphere only. Whichever view be accepted, the result is the same. Voluntaristic epistemology acknowledges axioms as postulates. Others merely state that, as self-evident, they are incapable of proof. But in each case it follows that knowledge is based on faith. The fact that experience never calls necessary truths into question conceals the character of the grounds upon which we accept them. To ordinary thought there can be no more 'faith' in acceptance of principles which are self-evident than there is in the expectation that the sun will rise to-morrow. But it is not merely a technicality to insist that both imply something which cannot strictly be knowledge, however different in degree such 'faith' may be from other ventures we also call faith.

That scientific knowledge is based upon postulates is also evident. In theory and practice we rely on the regularity of the laws of Nature. That is to say, in practice man, and, indeed, every animal that learns by experience, postulates that what has occurred will re-occur, and uses past experience to anticipate future. In theory, we embody this in our belief in the uniformity or unity of nature. This cannot have been originally a fact of observation. Indeed, even now to a superficial gaze there is as much chaos as regularity in Nature. But we find, on fuller acquaintance, that Nature never disappoints our postulate. We anticipate, relying on it, and find our anticipation verified, until our postulate appears to us a certainty. Similarly, the 'law' of the conservation of energy. We cannot measure the energy of the universe, nor show that it is constantly the same. That is to say

we do not know whether it is to be regarded as finite or infinite. But the ' law ' is never found wrong in experience, and on such grounds we accept it. Indeed, none of these laws of science are, in the strict sense, capable of proof. They are uniformly verified postulates. Yet their verification is never absolute or complete. So long as experience continues we have no doubt that their verification will continue, but its character is like that of a mathematical series to infinity—always approaching and never reaching its goal.

Philosophy is in the same case as science in this respect, and even more evidently so. That the universe is not a multiverse, that it is rationally intelligible, and so forth, are clearly postulates, however necessary they may seem. We follow the same course in metaphysics as in physics, postulating and finding confirmation. Yet the further we go beyond sense-experience the more clearly do we realize, both in philosophy and science, the postulatory character of our principles. The existence of ether, for example, is plainly a postulate rather than a fact, especially since the Michelson-Morley experiment failed to verify its existence in the manner intended. Hence Einstein limits its function to one property, and some have repudiated it altogether. Still, in all such matters, we can do no other than postulate, and rely on our postulates the more with each fresh verification. On the other hand, we hesitate to accept a postulate, however likely it may seem *a priori*, without verification from the facts of experience. *A priori*, it is certainly likely that the conservation of energy should apply throughout the universe and hold good in regard to mind. But although

psychology postulates determinism as confidently as does physical science, the lack of the possibility of verification, or of anticipating actions by means of it, together with the sense of personal freedom, limits the postulate to theoretical use.

It is not necessary to carry the point further. It is recognized—though it is of use to our present argument to re-emphasize it—that all knowledge implies faith, and religious and scientific knowledge do not differ as dealing with faith and fact respectively. Both express aspects of life-experience, yet, if we grant the unitary character of knowledge, it still remains that some aspects of it, even if technically sharing in a basis of faith, are uniformly recognized, and others are not. Whilst this is undoubted it is not easy to show that one kind of knowledge would appear to us more certain than another were it not for the social consciousness. If I dislike, for example, any bitter taste, I maintain that it is unpleasant. If I found everyone did so I should be as confident in asserting it had that character as I am in asserting that the extraction of teeth is painful. But whilst all my fellows share my experience as regards teeth, I learn some find a bitter taste pleasant. I accordingly regard the two as not of equal certainty generally, though equally certain to myself. If every one had identical dreams, dream experience would be ' real ' experience. Since, presumably, it would be still not manifestly connected with waking experience, it would be regarded as another type of reality, but unquestionably real. Even mathematical reasoning would have no certainty if we could not assume that others can get the same results as ourselves. If, upon

the principle of relativity, each individual, using his own reference system, obtained results palpably instead of inappreciably different, any objectivity which knowledge of the material world might possess would be similar to, or even less than, the objectivity we regard common opinions or emotions to possess. Thus social consciousness is a court of appeal as to what constitutes fact. It is true that ' fact ' approved in this manner fails often to stand the test of criticism, but the criticism itself must pass the same test. Even when it is not the general consciousness which endorses a fact, it is the consensus of those capable of understanding it.

It may be replied that, granted this is so, yet it still is true that certain judgements are universally held or demonstrable and must, therefore, be deemed to possess a greater degree of reality. The answer, it appears to me, is that it is not a question of any ' degree ' of reality, but rather is it true that the judgements which appear most universally valid are those connected with whatever is essential to existence. We may omit mathematical certainty in this connexion, because it has a reference which is purely abstract and does not necessarily hold in physical existence. It is obvious, for example, that no circle or triangle can be constructed to fulfil their geometrical definition with absolute preciseness. But commonsense realism assures us that there is in the well-known properties of sense-experience an indisputable ground of certainty. This seems to indicate that herein we have a class of judgements of superior validity. But whilst accepting the broad fact upon which common sense insists, is it not rather that the utmost certainty attaches

to biologically necessary knowledge? Just as in the organism the fundamental reflex actions come first and go last, hold on longer than consciousness, and even continue an appreciable time after death, because they are vitally indispensable to the organism, so the lowliest type of knowledge is the firmest because it is most necessary to the wellbeing of the organism. The greater certainty of that sense-experience to which the common consciousness unanimously witnesses, indicates, that is to say, not a greater degree of reality, but a greater degree of biological necessity. Tastes proverbially differ, but there is practically no difference in individual reactions towards what is vitally useful, or towards what is vitally harmful, because the greater the similarity where the greater the necessity.

If this be so, we find the first criterion of certainty in the social consciousness, and the unanimity of the social consciousness is more manifest in those aspects of experience which are of the greater importance to the physical existence of the organism. If it be said that many indisputable truths are not manifestly connected therewith, it will still be found, I think, that they have a basis which bears that character, and just as reactions based on fundamental instinct display the greatest similarity, so is it with knowledge also. If not, they will be found to have a purely abstract reference. Now ' scientific knowledge,' because it can assume a common experience, can omit individual aspects and present truth in an impersonal form independent of its meaning and value to the individual. In ethics, aesthetics, and religion the values and ultimate meaning of experience are concerned ; and it is

here that the individual differences are most manifest. For just as the physically necessary functions are common to all organisms of the same species, but the powers of mind variable, so does human experience exhibit its most common and its most variable aspects, and the most uniform are those connected with the aspects of experience fundamental to existence. Where there is variability in experience it is impossible to omit the individual. The barrenness of Kant's categorical imperative lies in the fact that it is purely formal. But, none the less, in ethics, aesthetics, and religion there is common ground, and in each case the greatest degree of uniformity is to be traced where there is the greatest necessity to life. With all the varying moral codes, no community allows practices which are subversive of communal life, and in religion we have traced certain broad uniformities in all types, facts which are additional evidence that knowledge is one process throughout all its forms, and that the difference between religious and other knowledge is relative and not absolute.

We conclude, therefore, that religious knowledge is rightly to be called knowledge, in the sense that it possesses a character similar to the rest. Yet the postulates which underlie certain forms of knowledge are so regularly and uniformly verified, that to speak of them as having an aspect of faith seems the veriest technicality. These were seen to be especially those connected with the necessities of existence. Since we have called religion a vital necessity, we should, on analogy, expect to find a certain common form throughout it, as in all knowledge relating to the essentials of existence, and also

ground upon which to verify it. The common form we traced in the religious postulate. No one can assert, however, that this receives such regular and patent verification as scientific laws. Yet if verification were wholly lacking it is incredible that the postulate should persist. In some sense, therefore, whether critically regarded as sufficient or not, it must receive verification. The question is whether this kind of knowledge can be said to possess what may justly be called verification.

The answer has in some part been already given. Verification in the case of religious and scientific beliefs differs, but it is in degree more than in kind, for a unitary experience holds them both. To imagine that religious beliefs are based on individual intuitions and those of science upon ' the nature of the facts ' is untenable. The truths of science are the result of insight and intuition. Experience presents a mass of apparently heterogeneous elements. Without insight, the chaos would remain chaos. If the ' nature of the facts ' yielded scientific knowledge such knowledge should be obvious. It is just those flashes of insight and intuition that grasp the relation of phenomena, and give new truth. It is not otherwise with religious truth.

Science and religion deal, manifestly, with different aspects of reality, and physical science has a basis in sense-experience. We are apt to regard such experience as yielding the maximum of certainty : ' Seeing's believing, but touch is the real thing.' Such certainty is, however, a matter of similarity or uniformity. But certainty is not necessarily the same as reality. The utmost certainty is afforded by mathematics, but its certainty is theoretical

and means its intrinsic consistency. The mathematically valid may be the materially ridiculous, as when at school we solemnly gained correct answers to our sums by assuming that if one man papered a room in a day a hundred would do so in one-hundredth of a day, and a thousand in a thousandth. Mathematical certainty is conditional. The certainty of Euclidean geometry for example is undeniable, *if* space has the character Euclid assumed it to have. That of uniform sequences of sense-experience is practical, but never absolute, as it depends on the unanimity of individual perceptions.

The position may be summarized as follows. Religious experience is real as all immediate experience is. Certain aspects of immediate experience are more uniform than others, so we are apt to regard them as more indubitably and objectively true. Yet this may mean nothing more than the consensus of experients. What I regard as purely subjective is as real and as certain to me as what I regard as universally valid. But where I find my meat another man's poison I regard my opinion of its being meat as merely subjective. Were it all men's meat my experience would at once appear objective. Verification here is wholly a matter of numbers. But no theory of what is real or true could accept this as the sole criterion. Some facts are accepted as true on these grounds, but truth would be in a poor way had it to obtain a universal licence to exist. The work of art is beautiful despite the inappreciation of the Philistine, and the pursuit of truth is noble despite the sneer of the plutocrat who asks what is its cash-value. Religious truth, by reason of being what it is, must lack the verification that endorses the

ordinary sequences of sense-experience as true; but it may none the less be true, and it may none the less receive sufficient verification for us to accept at least its main testimony, just as we accept as valid other judgements that have not the stamp of universal consent.

When scientific theory raises issues that lie beyond the field of sense-experience—for example, the ultimate nature of matter or energy—verification of its hypotheses becomes much less certain. Philosophical hypotheses are generally more difficult to verify than those of science, and despite the alleged objectivity of reasoning, philosophy has a very small number of doctrines which can be regarded as indubitable. In aesthetics, notwithstanding the basis of sense perception, theory is difficult to establish, because it involves necessarily the values physical science can omit. In this respect it is linked more closely with religion. In ethics we approach even more nearly. In practice, moral judgements may appear more certain than religious judgements, but this is because social needs enforce them, and social demands are complied with by conduct alone, without raising issues of belief. But in its theory the difficulties that beset ethics are serious, and no hypothesis concerning the ultimate nature of morality or of the moral standard has found a general acceptance. The religious postulate is not alone, therefore, amongst our beliefs in finding verification difficult, but its kinship with the rest shows that no purely theoretical consideration can debar it from asserting itself as valid, and that there is no intrinsic impossibility of verifying it. Moreover there is no difficulty more serious to it than those which are attached to other of our beliefs.

Finally it must be recognized that verification of all knowledge is found in its capacity of being instrumental in the adjustment between man and his environment, the situation, whatever it may be, to which he must adapt himself, or which he must adapt to himself. Its value and its validity alike are found in its success in doing this. Works, not faith, justify all our postulates. Whatever may be thought of the pragmatist doctrine of truth, it affords a criterion where the 'correspondence' and 'coherence' theories merely afford difficulties which seem insuperable.[1] For it, as for science, the hypothesis that works is true. Nor is it, at last resort, a question of the hypothesis which accounts for the facts; it is the hypothesis which enables us to meet the situation. It is precisely that which the religious postulate does. It is a hypothesis by means of which mankind has met life and lived it. It is scarcely possible to believe human existence could dispense with it. Judged from the purely intellectual standpoint it encounters serious difficulties. Yet, however necessary intellectual satisfaction may be, it is secondary in comparison. Judged from the standpoint of adjustment to the conditions of life the religious postulate is capable of genuine verification.

[1] Cf. Mr. Joachim's *Nature of Truth*, which dismisses both theories, and suggests that ideal truth cannot belong to a finite being.

XI

THE CHALLENGE OF EVIL

The writer who introduces the problem of evil seems to owe an apology for retreading such familiar ground, where there is so little chance of saying anything fresh or finding any new clue to an inscrutable mystery. But the challenge of pain and sin, to take the two most urgent forms of the problem, is so menacing to the religious postulate that it cannot be passed by in silence. We will confine the discussion to a single issue, omitting other aspects which a full treatment of the problem of evil involves, for example, whether in some sense the uses of adversity are not sweet. That issue will be whether pain and sin present an obstacle which forbids us to regard the religious postulate as being verified in actual experience.

There are times when the whole of nature seems to foster man's good. Then, without warning, man finds the desire of his eyes cut off at a stroke. Physically the order of nature embraces danger, disease, and death, represents a ceaseless battlefield, exhibits the loathsomeness of parasitism. Spiritually, temptation and bitterness of soul await man. Sorrow and pain blot the pages of his life's diary. The natural order seems irreconcilable with the spiritual, and the spiritual for ever waging indecisive conflict with evil. We have said that the problem is

practical, because it implies a conflict in experience as well as an obstacle to thought. But in its practical aspect the problem is less acute than in its intellectual aspect. The actual endurance of pain and conflict with evil seldom destroy religious convictions. More often do they increase faith. It is not those who suffer themselves who are foremost in asserting the problem of pain. They seem to find those ' reasons of the heart ' of which Pascal spoke to help towards a practical solution. While the intellect still seeks a theory to reconcile the contradiction, experience solves the rationally insoluble.

In such matters we must not think merely in particulars. The problem of pain, which we will consider first, is too often stated by challenging universal goodness in the name of particular happenings. The average man reasons from particulars ; philosophically one must think more widely, and it is certainly easier to argue for a general harmony between existence and value than to reconcile detailed instances. It may, however, be asserted that an order which permits such intensity of suffering to sentient beings thereby reveals itself as blind impetus, or unconscious will. Or it may be urged that pain shows that our values are just human preferences, unheeded by, and giving no indication of, the ultimate ground of existence. At present, however, we are not concerned with the nature of reality as a whole, but simply with the question whether the postulate of religion can be maintained in the face of open and acknowledged facts which apparently deny it. In view of such facts can it be presented at all as admissible evidence regarding the nature of reality ?

There are two reasons, however, why the formidable difficulty of pain is not an insuperable objection to the religious postulate, even in theory. The first is that we cannot prove that pain is an ultimate evil. We regard it as such unquestioningly, but our only ground for doing so is because our physical nature shrinks from it. Yet we can neither assume nor demonstrate that physical values are ultimate standards. Even now, when we look back upon certain pain we have suffered, and see it in the past instead of feeling it at the moment, it often appears to have been by no means the unqualified evil it appeared to be when we were enduring it. The religious postulate must be held to refer to value in an ultimate and spiritual sense, not to passing physical values. It is by no means certain that our bodily preference is an absolute standard of what ought to be, or what is best for us. Many things physically pleasant are physically harmful, and much that is arduous and irksome to the body proves beneficial to it. Still more is this true of the relation between physical and spiritual values. Yet the ' problem of pain ' implies the assumption that physical values are an indication of what is good or bad in an ultimate sense, if it is to be urged as an insuperable objection. Such an assumption is not provable, nor even probable. Possibly the fact already noticed that pain often intensifies religious belief is accounted for by the creation through pain of new spiritual values, of greater intrinsic worth than the physical values which are lost.

The second reason is found in the fact that the problem of pain can exist only when the religious postulate has been intelligently conceived and established. The fact

of pain exists from the beginning, but does not prevent the establishment of belief in goodness at the heart of reality. Apart from that belief, pain would belong to the order of what is, without any question of what ought to be. It would have to be borne as animals bear it, groaning but not wondering, or as we ourselves endure the vicissitudes of climate, without raising a moral issue concerning the rainfall. The problem does not exist for primitive religion, because there is not such a conception of God as can raise it. To primitive people the gods are variable, like men, and if the problem of pain arises at all, it is limited to the practical issue how to placate a deity who inflicts it. For a consistent unbeliever to-day there can be no problem. If he holds that religious belief is illusory, he must take things as they are. He may urge the problem against those who do believe, but he cannot find it a problem for himself unless in some degree he also believes. Primarily, then, the problem exists for the believer, and yet *ex hypothesi* he believes despite it. It cannot therefore be insuperable. It arises only as subsequent to belief. If, then, despite the fact of pain, religious belief arises and is maintained, the grounds upon which that belief arose remain to provide a basis for that belief, despite the subsequent challenge to them by reflection upon the fact of pain.

The problem, then, exists only when belief in the goodness of God exists. That belief causes the difficulty, and yet it is an asset as well as a difficulty in dealing with the question. Abandon the belief and the difficulty disappears. The problem of pain continues as a problem, only so long as the belief is maintained. We

are entitled, therefore, to claim the help such belief affords toward a solution, as well as obliged to recognize it as involving a difficulty. The help it gives is that, for those who hold it, that is to say for those for whom alone the problem really exists, the belief indicates that the problem is not insoluble. It may at least be lived out, if not thought out, to solution. When we discuss the nature of reality we place ourselves in thought ' outside ' of it, as if we were subject and reality object. Yet this is obviously an artificial separation. The same order of reality which allows us to suffer allows us to question why we suffer. We are inclined to rebel, and yet the very nature that inclines us is part of the reality against which we rebel. Does this, then, imply that within reality a dualism exists such as Gnosticism imagined, or else that we live in order that we may learn to ' curse God and die ' ? The former alternative is as unsatisfactory to reason as it is to feeling. The latter implies not a neutral, but an actually malevolent reality. If, then, neither alternative can commend itself, we must hold that our capacity of raising the problem indicates that it can be harmonized in some way within the nature of reality.

An intellectually comprehensible solution of the problem of pain seems to involve our possessing knowledge of the reason why the universe exists, and that we cannot hope to know. But pain, which in some ways contributes to physical development, leads also towards spiritual development. Its very challenge and contradiction stimulate thought concerning the deeper issues of life. If belief in the goodness of God is maintained, it implies,

as we have said, that a solution exists, even if we do not discover it. For if God knows the whole extent of human suffering, when we know but a small part, it cannot be that pain is seen from the divine standpoint in the same way as from the human. We are inclined to think that a universe ordained by us would not include pain. The fact that the universe, as ordered by God, does include pain implies, for the religious consciousness, not the old dilemma that God is either not all powerful or all good, but rather that He must see pain from another standpoint which solves the antinomy presented from our standpoint.

It is this which in practice solves, or if that word be too confident, eases the problem of pain. It does not explain why pain exists, but it explains why it can co-exist with belief in the goodness of God. Life is more than reason, and whatever enables man to meet experience should be as significant for philosophy as that which enables man to explain experience. That pain and sorrow, which often drive us to hide from our fellows like a wounded animal, may impel us to cry for God is wholly contrary to what one would expect if pain meant only a problem. Why should what is in theory so serious an obstacle to religious beliefs actually urge men more passionately to affirm them? Why should any man, having suffered, be found, as often he is found, more convinced of the goodness of God? It is evident that experience supplies what reason cannot find here, and affirms, from actual contact with pain, what theory, abstractly regarding pain, is apt to deny.

If then the religious postulate can not only survive, but be strengthened by, experience of pain, it cannot be

destroyed by theoretical objections raised thereby. To imagine that it is, is to make theory dictate to, rather than explain, experience. That cannot be a valid procedure. It is not claimed that the discussion which has been undertaken has provided any explanation of the problem of pain, either by dissolving it as ' appearance,' or attempting to justify it as a disguised good. But it has afforded some indication why the problem of pain is incapable of presenting a veto to the religious postulate, or of providing an obstacle to forbid our regarding that postulate as capable of verification.

Passing to the question of moral evil or sin, an issue that is urgent for a philosophical theology is raised, since not only divine goodness, but divine omnipotence also, is challenged. Pain may be argued to be a means to good, but the moral sense of mankind has never accepted the possibility of sin being so. Hence the age-long question why the power of God does not thwart or destroy evil. Despite some modern thinkers, the philosophy of religion as a whole has found omnipotence, or at least potential omnipotence, almost an inevitable belief. But it lies outside the scope of the argument here. Religious experience does not necessarily imply it. It is possible to hold the essential postulate of religion without it. Indeed the actual religious consciousness seems to relate more often to a God who is treated as finite even if called infinite. A finite God may be distasteful to speculative thought, but the negative notion of the infinite does not truly harmonize with the religious conception of the divine-human relation. Since a finite God may be regarded as concerned with human welfare, despite the

existence of sin, our present purpose does not involve the question of the relation of moral wrong to divine omnipotence. The issue is limited for us to that of inquiring whether the fact of sin, any more than pain, can discredit the religious postulate of harmony between reality and human good.

The line of inquiry is similar to that taken in regard to pain. Does sin indicate that the character of reality cannot sustain moral predicates? Can ethical and spiritual values find a home in reality which reveals the existence of sin? Does not the fact that conditions which allow even its possibility to arise, prove that the nature of reality is responsible for its existence? The question of the freedom of the human will inevitably arises here, but even that is not final. For deterministic theory must ultimately make reality or God responsible for evil. That implies either a non-moral source of the universe, or else the attempt to show that sin is a means to the production of a higher good. Even if the latter could be demonstrated it does not explain why goodness should require so hideous an instrument, nor lessen the sense we have of the unfitness of complicity between good and evil. The religious consciousness itself, except in so far as speculative ideas, both in the East and the West, have influenced it, generally inclines towards regarding man as the author of evil by reason of his own choice, or imagines a devil to account for it. But these expedients do not succeed in solving all the difficulty. It still remains that a devil is permitted to exist, or that man is placed under such conditions that he can bring about moral evil. The notion of a devil,

however, has practical value in easing the moral difficulty. It is the intellectual difficulty that it fails to solve.

The problem seems insoluble. If free will is accepted, all that can be said of the benefits it affords to character and manhood still falls short of showing what good is fulfilled by the creation of self-determinating beings. We are once more facing the ultimate question why humanity exists. Upon it depends every other question. If there were to be revealed to us the key of knowledge, it might indeed be enough that we should have this question answered. All the rest, one imagines, might be deduced from it.

The only approach to this question that, as far as I can see, is suggestive, is this. The result of every human life is to express the character of a human will. The acts, words, thoughts of each of us embody the nature of our will, and will, so Kant held, is the one thing that can be called good in an unqualified sense. If we assume that the universe is an expression of the will of a God perfectly good, the full expression of that will may require that goodness should prevail, not only over the possibility, but over the actuality of evil. Actual evil cannot co-exist with perfect goodness. Even omnipotence cannot contradict itself, and be both good and bad. A perfectly good being expressing His will, the will not merely to defeat the possibility of evil, but to redeem its actuality, might conceivably be held to call into existence a subordinate order of beings that through them this aspect of His will might be fulfilled; that is to say, that through them He might express the power of good to redeem evil. This, of course, is not a solution.

It is but to change the character of the question from that of asking why God permits sin to asking why goodness needs to express itself in not merely restraining the possibility of evil, but in restoring from its actuality. But the suggestion is not offered for the purpose of trying to solve the motive of creation. It is offered as a possible ground of explanation of the frequent conviction of the religious consciousness that God is vitally concerned in man's struggle with sin, and that if man triumph it is through God, and God triumphs with him. It is not possible to comprehend the problem of sin justly if that conviction is omitted from view.

As bearing directly upon the religious postulate, the problem of evil must be admitted, as was that of pain, neither to prevent the postulate from arising, nor to be sufficient to destroy it when it has arisen. Why this is so is clear if we remind ourselves that the problem of sin also is constituted a problem because of the existence of the religious point of view, and those who regard it as a problem must to some extent at least adopt that point of view. That is to say, they must declare that evil should have no place in the scheme of reality, and that human good should triumph over it, which is to admit that the religious postulate should be right, even when it is denied that it is right. The problem of evil is intellectual rather than moral. Morality has no doubt as to the character of evil. Intellectually, however, it is parallel to, and even more enigmatic than, the problem of error. If philosophy attempts to unite evil and good in a super-moral principle, it must also logically unite truth and error in a super-rational principle, and so

make unintelligible our moral and intellectual conflicts. If evil and good are regarded as separate, a dualism is introduced, and good seems to be made relative to evil. Yet if we cannot regard good as positive and self-existent, and real in a sense in which evil is not real, how can it be shown that good is final and eternal? The problem is intellectual, as is the problem of error. But, just as to be intelligible negation must imply the possibility of affirmation, and some truth must be presupposed as the necessary condition of error, so it is that the problem of evil assumes the actuality and right of the good, however insoluble the relation between good and evil may seem. In one sense, therefore, evil which challenges the religious postulate also serves to show its necessity.

Those who argue that sin contradicts the religious postulate are apt to assume it as a self-evident truth which needs neither demonstration nor explanation that sin is an evil. It is certainly in accord with human belief to regard it as such, but an explanation why it is evil is not so obvious. The indecision of ethics regarding the nature of moral judgement indicates this. We have the celebrated historical doctrine that evil is irrational, and contrary to 'the fitness of things.' Herbert Spencer declared that the essence of conduct was the continuous adjustment of internal to external relations, and the moral end was to further an increasingly complete adjustment. Other writers, from a similar standpoint, regard moral life as a process of natural selection, in which the most efficient and perfectly equilibrated type of conduct survives. But the question why this should be right and its opposite wrong still remains. To say that we are

so constituted that we are bound to regard it as such is to imply the justification of the assumption of the religious consciousness that human good is grounded in the nature of reality. It is on this account that the problem of sin fails, both in theory and practice, to present an insuperable obstacle to the religious postulate. The problem arises because the very conditions of our existence arouse in us, in some way or other, moral sentiments. By these sentiments we account sin to be evil, and yet, if we ground sin in the nature of reality, to that same reality we must refer that in us which condemns it. For if the nature of reality were unmoral, we have a moral nature, and to introduce another contradiction will not solve this contradiction between sin and goodness. To abandon the religious postulate, therefore, does not remove the problem sin raises. Primarily that postulate excites it, but when it is once raised, even the abandonment of the postulate would leave us to wonder whether we are able to entertain a point of view which has no relation to the character of that from which we spring. It is possible to meet the problem of sin by believing in a dualistic character in reality, or it is possible to recognize the problem as not fully soluble by us. But it is not possible from any standpoint to efface it altogether. Nor is it possible to charge it against the religious interpretation of the universe alone. Upon this ground, therefore, we can leave it. Serious though it is, both for life and thought, it does not present a reason why we should not be able to postulate a harmony between reality and human wellbeing, nor does it forbid us to regard such a postulate as receiving endorsement from experience.

XII

THE PROCESS OF VERIFICATION

We have seen that, theoretically, verification is not impossible, and also that the actual presence of pain and sin in life fails to inhibit the religious postulate. This leaves us free to inquire in what way positive confirmation of it may be secured. Our first concern will be to examine those views which regard the religious attitude as based upon insufficient or imaginary grounds. It is not practicable that it can be curtly dismissed as a gigantic superstition, but it is possible to argue that it reads the evidence in a very partial and one-sided manner.

It is not a question of whether any form or creed is true, but of the direction of a universal expression of the mind of man. The forms in which the postulate have been embodied have declined and been left behind by generation upon generation; but always, and without exception, new expressions, gradually becoming purer and more adequate, have arisen. The religious postulate witnesses to the spiritual nature of man and his continuous spiritual development. It may be asked whether this persistent direction of desire upward must not be thought to represent a movement of reality within man which expresses its character to him.

The reply may be that though, apparently, the postulate

finds some justification, yet, notwithstanding, the scheme of things is indifferent to man. That does not, however, mean hostile. In many ways man's good is furthered; in other ways frustrated. But since memory is generally prone to hold to the brighter side, and since, too, psychology has suggested an active tendency towards forgetting the harmful, there is no difficulty in seeing that the postulate can receive confirmation in a sense, and yet not be a valid predication concerning reality.

This position has been variously represented. From one standpoint, Positivism suggested that mankind had no need to concern itself with such inconclusive issues as those relating to reality and value; but the attempt to provide a more proximate object of worship in humanity concedes the inevitability of the religious sentiments. Secularism reproduced the Positivist limitation of interest without the Positivist religion.[1] Both these movements, however, were rather attempts to set aside the religious postulate than to disprove it. The main strength of this attitude belongs to the various types of Agnosticism, which unite in refusing to regard the ultimate implication of value in experience as a matter of which there can be any knowledge. The existence of values is not disputed, but the verification of those values which lie beyond a certain range, which must be somewhat arbitrarily defined, is held to be impossible. Agnosticism is, therefore, neither a philosophy nor a theory of knowledge. It is a policy of despair. Its origin lies in what seems likely to have been a passing temper of science. It

[1] I have dealt with Pessimism and Positivism in *Modern Theories of Religion*, p. 423 seq., and with Secularism in the *E.R.E.*, vol. ix.

attempted to limit philosophy to the sphere of physical science, overlooking the difference in aim and attitude between the two. Agnosticism is the renunciation, not the acceptance, of the task of philosophy, the denial of its primary aim. All that can be offered by Agnosticism's view of experience is a torso or a skeleton philosophy. Yet it cannot provide a reason to prevent the exercise of reason. Its very spirit would have proved fatal to a large part even of the discoveries of science. No considerations that Agnosticism can adduce are sufficient to restrain the human mind from seeking the nature of ultimate reality, or to prove beforehand that the attempt is incapable of achievement. Similarly Agnosticism can never debar the religious consciousness from seeking to relate its values to a ground of value. The actual negative to the religious postulate is provided by Pessimism, which asserts dissonance between reality and human value. To refuse to consider the relation can never be a final attitude for our purposive human minds.

In opposition to the religious postulate, Pessimism declares that the facts reveal dissonance, not harmony. The attempt of Agnosticism to close the discussion because the postulate is unprovable leads to a false position, for the nature of a postulate is to anticipate first and verify afterwards. No postulate can be banned, therefore, on *a priori* grounds. But it is entirely open to any one to deny that the postulate has succeeded. Pessimism is a valid alternative to religious faith, and the most consistent alternative, though seldom recognized as such. Theoretically, Pessimism has a strong basis of facts which lend it support. Yet the failure of Pessimism as a philosophy is

complete. The cause is not wholly, or even mainly, rational, but volitional. It is impossible for the mind of mankind to accept Pessimism, despite the melancholy which often tinges thought, particularly in the East. This is further proof that life decides rather than reason between our postulates. But it shows more than this. The failure of the postulate which is most directly contrary to that of religion goes to indicate that the character of experience as a whole responds to the one postulate much more definitely than to the other. If experience gave as consistent support to the one postulate as to the other, there would be no reason for the overwhelming preponderance of the religious postulate.

It seems, then, that the assertion of the religious postulate cannot be prohibited on any of these grounds. But that does not involve its acceptance. Without resorting to the dogmatic Agnosticism which refuses to regard such knowledge as possible, it may still be held that the case for the religious postulate is neither proved nor disproved, that there is not sufficient evidence to warrant acceptance or rejection. It is admittedly unsatisfactory to suspend judgement, but there are instances where definite conclusions cannot be reached, and caution is preferable to hastiness in either direction. This standpoint is that of a number of thinkers, who decline to regard the religious postulate as receiving verification. It is honest, and must be respected. But need it be adopted?

Let us try to forget for a moment rites and dogmas, and the particular forms in which the religious postulate finds embodiment, some of which do it little justice, and

recognize that the meaning of religion is that the character of reality affords a ground for those human values which relate to our ultimate wellbeing. Is this a position for which there is no sufficient evidence?

We must recollect, in the first place, that although we have connected this belief particularly with religion, it is even more widespread. Humanity as a whole holds it and lives by it. Our contention has been that in religion it is most consistently and universally asserted, and religious experience affords a reason why the belief should be considered well based; in its conception of God and its witness to touch with Him. But, none the less, whether connected or not with religious ideas, the belief is accepted overwhelmingly, and life would be intolerable apart from it. That may not be a logical reason for its validity, but it is an empirical reason, and that by which man lives has right to be respected. It is not a case of confusing moral confidence with logical certainty, but of holding that moral confidence indicates, as much as logical certainty, the nature of the real. Nor does the religious postulate give a final and unquestionable guarantee of good. It expresses meliorism rather than optimism, but to believe in the better leads on towards the best, and to hold that the good may be is the first step to holding that it must be.

The issue amounts to this,—can our experience afford reliable grounds for holding that the values, so deeply interwoven throughout it, indicate in some way the nature of reality? Religious expression arises out of the mind in relation to its environment in a normal and regular manner. It is part of experience generally, and

similar to it. We must regard our experience as capable of expressing the nature of reality to us, and whilst we need not accept particular views and beliefs belonging to religious experience as necessarily valid, there is good reason why we should regard its broad testimony to the relation between reality and human good as reliable.

Still further, we cannot, except as a methodological device, separate what is known from the process of knowing. The conditions under which knowledge arises have been seen to require more than the power to relate facts. Apart from primary interests, our mind could not be stirred to seek knowledge at all. Apart from belief that our quest for truth could be satisfied, we should not continue to seek any ultimate knowledge. The place occupied by our value-judgements in the essential conditions of acquaintance with reality may justly be held to be an indication that what brings us into touch with reality also brings us an indication of its nature. If it were not for our false and frequent habit of thinking of reality abstracted from the conditions under which we become acquainted with it, I imagine this would appear evident to us. At least it may be urged that if our value-judgements give no such indication, it is difficult to say by what right we claim to have any other.

To ask whether they can be held to do so is to ask whether there is any meaning in life, whether we can interpret as well as explain what experience signifies. We have seen that Pessimism fails. Agnosticism is philosophically unsatisfactory, and equally so morally, for

our whole attitude to life is determined by our answer to this question. A meaningless reality can demand no moral effort from us. The practical issues of the question also demand that no final suspension of judgement prevail. Indecision may be wisdom or cowardice according to the issues involved, and since the character of our whole attitude to existence is involved here, we are compelled to seek an answer, whether we find or not. If we take the view that existence has merely hedonistic values, it is equally meaningless, for pleasure is not an end in itself, nor does it consistently minister to any known end, nor even to physical survival in all cases. Those who are content to say that the survival of the species is the meaning of existence, leave moral and aesthetic ends hanging upon nothing, inexplicable epiphenomena produced by the stream of life; whilst to acknowledge, with Nietzsche, an aesthetic meaning only, must involve reasons which serve equally to vindicate a moral end.

It appears, therefore, that all attempts to limit the meaning of life to partial expressions of the good fail to justify their limitation. It is good as a whole, or not at all. Is reality hostile, neutral, or sympathetic towards such good? We may omit the first suggestion. A reality hostile to man cannot be conceived as sustaining, and continuing to sustain, his existence. But it may be asked as between the other two, What evidence is there for deciding? As a cynic has said, to praise the Lord for His goodness is as if one praised the postman who leaves good news at one house, bad at the next. There are facts to show that Nature is cruel and kind, fosters human good and destroys it. Is it, then, a matter of

impossibility to decide whether the religious postulate has sufficient reason or not?

In replying we must recollect that for the answer we must go to experience. It is not to be found in debate. The religious postulate works better in experience than the postulate of a neutral reality. It explains more. It helps mankind to face pain and sorrow. It gives meaning to life and tonic to moral effort. Two recent Gifford lecturers have found in the ontological argument evidence that mankind believes the highest value to have necessary existence. If our highest good is based on the nature of reality we can understand why we are impelled to seek it. A neutral reality cannot explain that, nor explain how the ground of our existence produces in us what itself is not; nor yet explain man's persistent longing for a communion and sympathy with it. Whatever be the difficulties of the postulate, the denial of it certainly does not make the position clear. Still further, the greatest spiritual lives have not only witnessed it, but been lived through it. A belief that inspired the life of Jesus has at least proved its value to mankind.

In saying this we are not suggesting that the postulate is proved thereby; but it is evident that its verification must come, like that of any other hypothesis, by provisionally accepting it, and finding whether experience confirms it. These considerations at least afford evidence why the hypothesis should be regarded as a well-supported working hypothesis. If it be accepted as such, then we may also see its worth in enabling us to interpret life, and so assist in what we have here

contended should be the task of philosophy, a comprehensive and not a barely intellectual systematization of experience.

So far we have been concerned mainly in meeting the various theories which deny or doubt that confirmation can be attained. It remains to ask what kind of confirmation may be held to be possible. We have seen that postulation is common to all forms of knowledge, and the frequency and regularity with which the universe responds to the postulate is the measure of its verification and our confidence. A scientific hypothesis is postulated by an act of insight. Undeniable contradiction involves its modification or abandonment. But, in the meanwhile, every fresh evidence that it meets the facts adds to its probability. No verification is absolute. Even the existence of universal laws of Nature must, technically, continue being verified as long as experience lasts, although we regard such laws as facts upon which we can not only reason, but live.

Verification, then, is empirical. It is not established by the strength of any arguments which support the hypothesis, but by the confirmation given through experience. The most notable indication of verification is the ability of a hypothesis to form a basis for anticipating the future. The laws of the physical universe provide such a means. But the laws of psychology, for example, are less satisfactory in this respect, and therefore are not so fully verified, though few would make that a ground for disputing their validity. It follows, then, that postulates are verified by their ability to account for, and to anticipate, the facts of experience

consistently. Life rather than reasoning is the criterion. Such a hypothesis as that of the Fitzgerald-Lorenz contraction, for example, was not set forth because of its intrinsic rational probability, nor by analogy, but as a method of accounting for certain ascertained facts. We must regard the religious postulate, in its measure, as like the rest. More than most it meets apparent exceptions; it works in a sphere in which consistent verification is of necessity difficult; and it cannot receive final verification. But man anticipates by means of it, and his anticipation helps him to live. That he holds it so persistently shows that, whether a reasoned justification can or cannot be afforded to it, the facts confirm it to those who make it. That is to say, it receives verification for them in the one way in which verification can come to any postulate. Otherwise it could not persist. If, for example, the postulate of a rationally intelligible reality were so scantily and irregularly confirmed that our attempts so to conceive it served more to perplex than to enlighten us, as those cynical regarding philosophy say, would not attempts to reason out matters gradually disappear? Psychology certainly suggests that conation which does not find some measure of satisfaction tends to exhaustion, or sublimates itself in seeking other ends. Our postulate of a rational universe is often baffled, but it could not continue if the universe were fundamentally irrational. In the same way would not the needs which create the religious postulate tend to sublimation if there was felt to be no response? The needs and the belief are inseparable. When the need dies down the belief decays.

The need for protection against the caprice of goblins begets belief in the charm. When clearer thinking abolishes the need, the charm is no longer taken seriously. The belief persists as long as the need is felt, but a never-satisfied need cannot continue for ever. There is a transitoriness even in instinct where the instinctive reactions get no satisfaction. The permanence of religious belief witnesses to the permanence of need, and implies a need which at least gains some satisfaction through the belief.

The religious postulate has always had to face the weight of opposing facts. Every age has had its problems, yet while there have been ages of intense belief, there never has been truly an age of unbelief. Few postulates have received more apparent contradiction, and yet none have been held with more intense feeling accompaniment, or more unanimity, by the mass of mankind. Whatever be the hindrances to a justification which can be set forth on grounds of argument, those who have held it must certainly have found sufficient verification in experience, for the continuity of religion is explicable on no other supposition.

In the case of opposing hypotheses that are together exhaustive of the possibilities, a 'crucial experiment' may decide. If the alternatives, reality is indifferent to, and reality is harmonious with, human wellbeing, are exhaustive—and unless we regard it as hostile or capricious they are—a crucial experiment is afforded, unwittingly, by prayer. I do not mean definitely petitionary prayer, but prayer as it exists for the higher forms of the religious consciousness. 'If it be possible let . . .

Nevertheless, not what I will, but what Thou wilt, be done.' In such prayer communion is more than petition. Its results are undeniable. It produces endurance, patience, fortitude, self-sacrifice. Such results are real, for no sense of the word real is more just than this. Through prayer there comes into being that which does not otherwise arise. Prayer does not demonstrate, but it does indicate that the religious postulate is more than a subjective desire that finds no response in reality.

The very character of the postulate itself is not less significant. It is not the survival of superstition, or the outcrop of untutored imagination. It has evolved in the process of that mental development in which it is integral and potent, and has arisen out of man's apprehension of reality. Refined in the form in which we have regarded it, it represents the growth of man's spiritual insight throughout the ages, and it still commands well-nigh universal assent, even from those who own no creed and reverence no rite. If it is unverified, it follows that mankind can entertain the true and the false alike, and cannot distinguish between postulates to which reality responds and those to which there is no response. That does not merely mean that man is fallible, or that errors may hold a long life. It must involve a profound mistrust of all the deeper thought of humanity and reflect upon all moral and aesthetic judgement, and all belief in ideals. It must tend to destroy faith in our intellect in any capacity. We are not at the moment concerned with the philosophical issues raised by the relation of value to reality. To those we shall turn presently. But we must hold, if

we would avoid the temper of Pyrrhonism, that the religious postulate has received such empirical confirmation in human experience that mankind is justified in its belief in its truth.

If the argument we have set forth be correct, it follows that religious experience, taken as a whole, represents the witness of the human consciousness that its final values belong to the very nature of reality, which is what is meant by attributing them to God. We have seen the character of the confirmation which can be given to the conviction. The persistence of the religious point of view is the best evidence of the verification of its postulate. It is confirmed, not by a process of argument, but by consistency with the facts. The existence of an ultimate Good can be logically demonstrated no more than can that of the self, of other selves, or even of an external world. It can be set forth only as a postulate, but it is verified by the character of experience. It is not proved, as a geometrical proposition is proved, by intrinsic consistency with the premises, but by the test of life. Such verification is never final nor absolute, but it gives that probability which is ' the guide of life.' It is not needful that it should solve every anomaly. Factors necessary to a complete solution lie outside the range of our knowledge. But at least it is evident that there is nothing that can veto the possibility of the religious postulate being regarded as a valid hypothesis explaining the facts, and no other hypothesis, it may be claimed, is better fitted to do so, nor is any other free from difficulties even more serious than those which are attached to this.

We may regard the religious postulate, therefore, as receiving such confirmation from experience as justifies us in employing it to interpret the nature of reality. To do so is not to deny the rights of other hypotheses. The interpretation they yield, and that which one affords, must be tested by life, by the fires that ' try every man's work of what sort it is.' But we hold that the religious consciousness need not take a timid, apologetic attitude, and plead for some by-product of a rational argument on which to exist and justify its belief. The real question, I believe, is not whether ultimate value is indicative of the nature of reality, but rather why our apprehension and realization of good is so partial and incomplete, why our postulate meets so many hindrances to verification. Into that question it is hardly possible to venture far. It involves too clearly knowledge we do not possess. But one consideration at least is evident, and bears in some way upon it. Let us try to imagine the consequences to human development if the attitude of Pessimism or Fatalism, instead of religion, had been characteristic of the human race. The one implies the temper of sullenness, the other that of indifference, towards existence. If progress is a good, it is a good made possible by that belief which is the core of religion—that reality is responsive to human endeavour seeking for human wellbeing. But progress would be impossible to a really pessimistic or fatalistic humanity, and the ' life-urge,' or what Bergson calls ' the ascending wave,' would be checked in human evolution, not only by the ' descending wave ' of matter, but by a mental attitude at variance with the essential conditions of development. It appears

that the religious postulate is a precondition of human evolution in its higher stages. Instinct can be left to provide direction up to a certain point, but when mental power is strong enough to inhibit instinctive reactions, human evolution demands more than instinct can supply. But conation satisfied is conation ended. An end attained is the suspension of the process that sought it. A truth once acknowledged arouses no further effort. If human endeavour reached its end, if all its postulates were verified, what then? If the conditions under which humanity is framed demand that our life shall ever be to be up and on the march, it can be understood why values are never attained, and our most urgent postulates never verified, so long as human evolution is to continue. The real reason for the sense of imperfection and incompleteness lies, not as some ancient philosophy or theology thought, behind, by reason of a flaw in the making, but ahead, by reason of what humanity shall be.

SECTION D

RELIGION AND REALITY

XIII

THE CONCEPT OF VALUE AND THE NATURE OF REALITY

THAT experience is expressive of a system of values as well as a system of facts was implied when Plato gave supremacy to the Idea of the Good. It was not less implied when Kant set practical reason above pure reason; but the philosophical significance of value remained unrealized until Beneke, Lotze, and, more particularly, the Ritschlians, definitely raised the question. Since then the importance of valuation has been increasingly, if somewhat slowly, recognized in philosophy. Interest at first centred in discussion upon the relation of fact to value. It has since tended to gather round the relation of value to reality.[1]

Approaching the question, first of all, from a psychological standpoint, it is manifest that whatever is known proceeds from our attempt and desire to know.

[1] For the conception of value cf. Urban: *Valuation, its Nature and Laws*, art. 'Value,' *E.R.E.* For Lotze and Ritschl in connexion with the value-judgement cf. *Modern Theories of Religion*, chs. iii., iv.

We have long since left behind the notion of external reality imprinting knowledge on passive minds. Knowledge, then, is preconditioned by our purposive activity. The unsought remains unknown. That which impels our search cannot be other than some interest, that is to say, some good or value. As Professor Ward has expressed it, 'Knowledge is obtained only as fast and as far as this paramount interest prompts us to new efforts, and is valued primarily as a means to that end. What is learnt takes at first the form not of theoretical propositions, but of practical maxims, which are thought of, not as true, but as useful.'[1] This, it is pointed out, implies that knowledge primarily takes the form of subjectively imposed imperatives rather than objectively necessary affirmations; that it involves a concept of value, and is maintained or rejected according to its practical consequences. Conative activity seeks, and, by seeking, knows: that is to say, knows by trusting it can know.

Psychologically, then, facts are established as facts because they are sought as values; values create facts. Every concept has its value, just as it has its feeling tone. For animal consciousness, whatever exists as a fact is constituted solely by reference to the meaning or value that fact has for the animal's ends. Whatever has no possible bearing upon them is to that animal virtually non-existent. What is an object for one animal is nothing for another. We are able to entertain the idea of facts as apart from values, but this is an artificial separation made for a special purpose. Even thus the very purpose of separation is, in its own sense, a value.

[1] *Realm of Ends*, p. 414.

In experience fact and value are inseparable, and the value makes both the percept and concept facts of consciousness. It would appear, therefore, that whatever problem may remain in the relation of fact and value, it is not primarily of a psychological character.

It should not be necessary to deny that, because knowing is always stimulated by a purpose, it is dictated by preconceived personal ends. Sometimes this may be so, but the result is always something less than knowledge. If knowledge is not an end in itself, none the less, it can never be made subservient to any one end, or group of ends, for the obvious reason that any such attempt, by its very limitation of interest, falls short of being complete knowledge. We separate cause and effect, but in a purely arbitrary way; for like the poet's 'flower in the crannied wall,' every effect has the whole universe for its cause. When the pragmatist speaks of truth as a satisfaction, it means satisfaction to the whole process of systematizing experience, and exactly in the same way the fact, and the values connected with it, alike carry us back to the universe of experience as a systematic whole. That is why every value raises the question of the relation of value as a whole to fact. Psychologically, it is sufficient to notice the parallelism of fact and value, like the parallelism of psychical and physical in the brain-process. But the problem for philosophy is not the relation of particular facts to concomitant values. It is that of fact and value in the totality of experience.

The character of the problem becomes manifest when we proceed a step farther. Hitherto we have been

referring to the proximate or concomitant values; that is, the interests which inspire our efforts to know. These may appear to be subjective and variable. But we do not regard all our value-judgements as subjective. To say that pleasure is better than pain, right than wrong, truth than falsity, is to assert a relation as objective as any relation can possibly be. Similarly if we are to think of any human assertions as being objectively valid, we must include the assertions of the normative sciences of logic, ethics, aesthetics. All values are set forth as claims to truth, just as judgements made as to matters of fact are asserted as true. In neither case is every claim validated, but there is no ground for regarding description as objectively, and appreciation as only subjectively true. If, then, there are independent values—ultimate, absolute, or eternal values, as they are sometimes called—as well as concomitant values, what relation do they bear to fact? Psychologically, fact may be determined by value, but what is the connexion between fact and ultimate values? The problem here is metaphysical, and is constituted by the necessity of seeking a synthesis in which both can be united.

That it is a necessity is evident from what has already been said. No account of experience in terms of fact alone can be final or complete. For this reason the world of physical science must always be less than the world as given in experience, for experience is permeated with the values science overlooks. Philosophy, however, holds that reality is knowable through human experience. Mr. Bradley's epigram, to the effect that Herbert Spencer

told us more about the Unknowable than the rashest of theologians has told us about God, is a pungent reminder of the impossibility of an unknowable real. But, since our human experience is directed throughout by its ends or values, it is incumbent upon philosophy to seek some synthesis of value and fact.

An interesting attempt at such synthesis has been afforded by Dr. Bosanquet.[1] He grants that value exists primarily for the subject who experiences it, but holds that its conditions cannot be found in the individual, but only in conscious experience as a whole, since the nature of conscious states is never found within the states themselves. Value, therefore, and the experience in which it is expressed, must alike be understood as belonging to the whole, of which both are part. For, it is contended, individuality in the complete sense belongs to the whole, not to the finite self. From this he contends that a logical or rational standard of value is afforded. It is found in the completion or perfection of the whole. Values, therefore, are explained as dependent upon their relation to this, and so it comes to pass that an object is valuable in the same sense as it is real or true. Thus value is ultimately identified with rationality or reality, and the relation of value and fact explained.

This solution might be satisfactory if the type of idealism which Dr. Bosanquet represents were accepted, but it stands or falls, so it seems to me, with it. If this view of the nature of individuality be correct, it may be that the unitary value of the universe is, as Dr.

[1] *Principle of Individuality and Value*, Lect. viii.

Bosanquet holds, the completion of such individuality, or perfection. But is there sufficient reason for connecting the actual and psychological values of consciousness with the metaphysical value of completeness or perfection? Most of them appear to us to be found, as pleasure is so often found, in attaining rather than attainment. Value continually opens the way to fresh value, and prompts us forward to it. That is the most essential characteristic of value. It is impossible for us even to imagine a finality to value and a static perfection. Whoever is led to regard such perfection as the completion of value has of course, a valid ground of argument, but it must be recognized that the assumption is not supported by the character of the values of which we have experience, and cannot therefore be thought in any way to be self-evident. Nor does it appear in what manner and to what extent value, which exists for and centres in finite individuals themselves, and not in the objects they value, can be transferred to an 'individuality' of the whole, such as Dr. Bosanquet expounds, without such transvaluation as would entirely alter their character and significance. Despite the need for unity, it cannot be said that to subsume value under rationality is a satisfactory solution. If, with Dr. Bosanquet, we take the ultimate meaning of value to be metaphysical completeness or perfection, it may be a solution, but the solution is reached by absorbing, not explaining, value; and the ultimate value bears no evident relation to actual value. Psychologically, value creates fact. Here fact appropriates value.

Others regard the problem as insoluble. Höffding

points out that neither the concept of value nor that of reality is complete, or can be completed. The former is empirical, the latter ideal. Hence we cannot deduce reality from value or value from reality. He suggests that ' Our thought is here thrown back on the possibility of a principle from which the origin and preservation of the world, and with this the interconnexion of reality, might spring.' But ' This thought could never be cast into scientific form.'[1] The conclusion is that ' the problem of psychical life, and more especially the problem of value, remain unsolved.'[2]

The difficulty is evident, but, in some part, it seems due to the defects of the method employed in dealing with experience. The tradition of philosophy has been to state the problems raised by experience in purely intellectual terms, neglecting the value-aspects of experience. That an incomplete statement of the conditions should result in an incomplete solution is not surprising, for the values left aside are not easily re-introduced. As Professor Sorley has put it, ' From is to ought there is no way that logic has not blocked.'[3] The impasse suggests that we must return to the data of experience when value and fact are found together, to see in what other way it is possible to state the issue.

The position from which we view the question in the light of the present argument is as follows. The religions of mankind, implicitly or explicitly, are based on a common postulate, which has been said to have the philosophical significance of an assertion regarding the nature of

[1] *Philosophy of Religion*, Eng. trans., pp. 259-60. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 262.
[3] *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 183.

reality. This is the testimony of a universal aspect of experience, and from experience philosophy quarries its foundation-stones. In what light, therefore, is philosophy to regard this postulate ; what place has it in the system of reality as philosophy sees it ?

The influence of religious experience upon philosophy, as the history of philosophy reveals it, has been mainly indirect. Because philosophy has generally named the supreme reality God the religious consciousness has seldom realized the difference between God in the philosophical sense and the God who is worshipped. Philosophers themselves have sometimes taken the identification for granted. The common name, however, does not hide the difference in standpoint and function. The one conception is metaphysically attained, and its function is rational. God is the Absolute, the Creative Principle, the Ground of Interaction, and so forth. The other conception has roots in man's affective and volitional nature. God is Creator, perhaps, but more especially Father, Helper, Friend. As reflection is brought to bear upon the two conceptions there appears to be little in common, and the breach between judgements of fact and value opens out once more. Yet value-judgements are valid judgements, and are predicated of reality. Is there any way, then, in which empirical and philosophical knowledge of God can be brought together ?

It will be of some assistance to the answer to notice first of all how the value-judgement has gained recognition in present-day philosophy. Traditionally, philosophy is limited to logical consistency, ' The attainment of truth by way of reason.' Ancient and mediaeval philosophy

aimed at a rational explanation of reality as a whole, and the last and most complete attempt of that kind found embodiment in the system of Spinoza. The advance of science altered the aspect of the matter. The problem of reality was approached inductively and piecemeal, various aspects being separately investigated by the various branches of science. It seemed to some, therefore, that the rôle of philosophy was to co-ordinate the findings of science. G. H. Lewes, for example, expressly defined philosophy in such terms. But modern philosophy has realized that even a synoptic explanation of reality would be less than a full account of it. Reality is a realm of values as well as of facts. Experience has a meaning for us which is expressed in our value-judgements. If we are to interpret that meaning it must be done by asking what relation our value-judgements bear to the nature of reality as a whole. Whatever be the answer given, at least no modern philosophy ignores the issue altogether, if only for psychological reasons.

It has been said that psychology has shown us that value is a presupposition of knowledge. This implies that it is a presupposition of acquaintance with reality. The existence of value for us is our datum in that respect. We are not obliged to assume even that the laws of thought belong to the nature of the mind *a priori*. But we are compelled to assume conation, the instinctive interests, as a presupposition to any acquaintance with reality; not innate ideas, but innate tendency to seek ends. It is the inseparable connexion between value in this sense and fact which has roused philosophy to an appreciation of the importance of value, in a manner that could not

have been possible unless psychology had made the connexion evident. Now ultimate values, however they may differ from the interests that lead towards knowledge, are of the same psychological character at root. The question is, therefore, inevitably raised as to what indication they can give regarding the nature of the system of reality in which they are expressed. We assume that our thought, itself an aspect of reality, can yield an expression that is valid of the nature of the whole. We shall ask, therefore, whether the grounds upon which that assumption is based do not also allow that our value-judgements may, in their own way, indicate the nature of reality. It will be of interest, before attempting to answer, to see how some leading types of thought regard such a suggestion.

Naturalism and Agnosticism omit moral and religious postulates. Both theories are challenged widely on intellectual grounds, but it is not simply upon these grounds that they are unsatisfactory. Rather is it because of their inability to comprehend within them the principle of value that they have declined in favour. Absolute Idealism, a name which includes many different expressions is, however, more inclined to the consideration of the witness of religion. Mr. F. H. Bradley[1] has acknowledged religion as ' a necessity,' ' something more and therefore something higher, than philosophy.' Religion, however, and the God of the religious consciousness, are ' appearance ' and therefore self-contradictory. The basis of religion is faith, which ' is, in short, a making believe,' and ' is not ultimate and final.' Like morality,

[1] *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 438-454 *passim*.

goodness, truth, and even philosophy itself, religion is a one-sided and inconsistent appearance of the Absolute and 'short of the Absolute God cannot rest, and, having reached that goal, He is lost, and religion with Him.' Side by side with this we may place Dr. McTaggart's declaration that 'The Absolute is not God, and in consequence there is no God.'[1]

Dr. Bosanquet's statement of the position comes somewhere between the former two. 'The God of religion, inherent in the completest experience, is an appearance of reality, as distinct from being the whole and ultimate reality, a rank which religion cannot consistently claim for the Supreme Being as it must conceive Him. But the conception, which finds Him in the greater self recognized by us as present within the Finite Spirit, and as one with it in love and will, assigns Him a higher reality than any view which stakes everything on finding Him to exist as a separate Being after the model of a man. Religion establishes the Infinite Spirit because it is continuous with, and present in, the finite in love, and in the will for perfection. It does not need to appeal to the facts of separate being or to endeavour to demonstrate them. It is an experience of God, not a proof of Him.'[2]

These writers represent different viewpoints, but all have in common the sharp distinction between the Absolute and the God of religion. The God of religion is finite and contradictory, and so the Absolute cannot be God in this sense. If this basis of reasoning be

[1] *Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 94.
[2] *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, pp. 255-256.

accepted, the conclusion is inevitable. But is it necessary to accept the basis? If the Absolute is not God, it may be that there is no Absolute. The assumption underlying is the same in each case—that reality must be comprehended as a rational system, and whatever presents an obstacle to such comprehension must be rejected. It is recognized that the ideal of rationality is never realized, but we must pursue it, under penalty of what Mr. Bradley calls 'self-stultification.' For the criterion under which rational thought alone can proceed is that the self-contradictory cannot be the real.

From another standpoint, in a book of much interest, Professor Wildon Carr is brought to the same antithesis between the God of metaphysics and of religion. The idea of God is 'a necessity of thought' for philosophy, but philosophy moves on a higher plane and ordinary religious experience on a lower. The God of religion is 'an idol of our imagination. We construct it, and then lean on it for support.' It is true that for Professor Carr 'the mind expresses its inner impulses and latent force by creating images.' But philosophy seeks to comprehend the principle of existence which will interpret the reality of experience itself. To this the religious idea of God cannot contribute, for philosophy is not religious in the ordinary meaning; it seeks not aesthetic but logical satisfaction.[1]

The vigour and brilliance of Professor Carr's exposition are undeniable, but if we are to accept the conclusion we must hold that philosophy has a function as limited as that of science. It is part of the purpose of the present

[1] *Theory of Monads*, pp. 100, 242.

book to urge that philosophy is called to the most comprehensive of all tasks, the attempt to express the unity of experience in relation to reality. Is such a task to be regarded as beyond its reasonable scope?

The gist of the whole matter is what we are to accept as our criterion of reality. In one point we must all agree. Whatever be our conception of reality, and whether we regard our minds as self-existing monads, or as modes of an Absolute—that is, as having 'substantival' or 'adjectival' existence—none the less, those minds supply the criterion. What part of our mind's functioning we take to afford the criterion is open to question. It is customary in philosophy to accept the logical principle of non-contradiction as absolute. That we cannot deliberately accept the contradictory is undeniable, but is the *logically* contradictory to be the *sole* criterion?

In the first place, we notice that the results of its application are very diverse. In the hands of some of its exponents it yields an attenuated, barely characterizable, Absolute as the sole Real, and leaves our moral and religious convictions amongst the 'appearance' that is not indicative of the ultimate nature of reality. The rejection of this by thinkers who accept the identical criterion shows that what it implies can be agreed upon only up to a certain point. Its inevitability is abstract rather than concrete, like the truths of mathematics. Put as it is expressed in text-books of logic, A cannot both be B and not be B, we all accept it. Yet we can and do argue, almost in the same breath, that the Government is both competent and incompetent, that public schools are both improving and deteriorating. The

complexity and richness of reality make it impracticable for us to agree how far the application of the principle of non-contradiction extends. We all accept the principle, but the range of its implication is more or less open. Moreover, even the principle itself depends upon our purpose. No serious issue can be furthered if it is violated, but if our purpose be to construct a nonsense rhyme or a fantasy of romance we are not bound by it.

Beside the principle of non-contradiction our mind supplies a further criterion, the scale of moral value, which exists, not in anything external, but for mind alone. Its application may be less evident than that of the rational principle, but the predicates 'better' and 'worse' are as essential to our minds as those of 'true' and 'false.' Nor can we regard the worse as being finally characteristic of reality any more than we can regard error as ultimately belonging thereto. Neither criterion finds full verification in experience, but both are fundamental to its nature. That the better is to be preferred to the worse is as undeniable as that the whole is greater than the part. We have spoken of the problem of evil. There is no problem of good. It was perhaps to the deepest conviction of human nature that Plato witnessed when he made the Idea of the Good constitutive of ultimate reality.

If, then, we apply a criterion which reduces our moral and affective experience to insignificance as regards the ultimate character of reality, we seem to be in danger of what may be very truly called self-stultification. Yet this is done on the assumption that reality must be exhibited as intellectually harmonious, whatever be

jettisoned in the process. Realizing the constant errors of our reasoning, the variance of standpoint and conclusion between those competent to reason, the rejection of the reasoning of one age by the next, we may hesitate before accepting the demand that all must be sacrificed to whatever is advanced in the name of logic. The verification of the postulate that reality is rationally comprehensible has not been so signal and complete as to justify us in subordinating moral and religious postulates to it simply because we cannot find a satisfactory harmony. It may be better to leave the problem unsolved than to distort experience to force a solution.

It is not that the criterion of non-contradiction should not be accepted. It is undeniable that our view of reality must be a reasonable view. The question is whether the clash between rational and other postulates does not in itself demand, by the principle of non-contradiction in a wider sense, that a more comprehensive criterion should be sought. The weight of moral and religious factors is felt even where discussion is ostensibly limited to grounds of intellectual consistency. Leslie Stephen's jesting dictum that the concern of a philosopher is to find ' how conclusions which are agreeable to his emotions can be connected with postulates which are congenial to his intellect ' owes its point to the illustration afforded to it by the history of philosophy. It is difficult, therefore, to disallow the contention that the considerations which go to make our judgements should be avowed factors in the discussion. If debate be on professedly logical grounds, its conclusions are indirectly influenced by ultra-rational motives, and such motives frequently

supply the inspiration of the rational objections urged by criticism. Full satisfaction is more than logical satisfaction, and short of full satisfaction our conative nature cannot rest. We seek not only to identify reality with reason, but with our ultimate good. Is it not as impossible for us to accept as final the morally contradictory as the logically contradictory, and must we not hold that our logical principle of non-contradiction is part of a wider harmony?

Can we, then, justly maintain this? Professor Pringle-Pattison, in a sympathetic treatment of the question, reminds us that after all 'Philosophy is not an effort to help the good cause in a cosmic duel.'[1] But is this really what the identification of reality with the ultimate good amounts to? I think not. It is this fear of taking sides which obsesses philosophical thinking and hinders the acknowledgement of the point we are pressing now. Philosophy is 'an attempt to find out the truth about the universe'—so the sentence continues. But, in doing so, has philosophy not already taken its side? It has assumed a knowable reality, a harmony between intellectual values and reality. We are thus brought back to the main question whether such a proceeding must not allow the wider assumption that our ultimate good is also grounded in the nature of reality.

In the quest for knowledge we must believe satisfaction to be possible. So long as our view of reality, whatever it be, is unsatisfactory, we cannot accept it as final. We are driven to fresh attempts to solve the antinomy and harmonize the contradiction. Yet, even so, this indicates

[1] *Idea of God*, p. 242.

that in some degree our efforts yield us both a measure of present satisfaction and a belief that fuller satisfaction is attainable. If we thought that our efforts led to no more progress than that of the squirrel in his wheel-cage would the pursuit of knowledge still lure us? The ideal of reality, as philosophy conceives it, has continually been represented as perfect, just as much as the heaven of religion has been. In Plato and Aristotle, in the Stoics' perfect universe, in the Neoplatonic 'One Beyond Intelligence,' in Spinoza, and Hegel, we find this same conviction. However thwarted our search may be, the presupposition of any search is the possibility of finding, and we continue to seek. We may not hope fully to attain the ideal, but it can be an ideal for us only in so far as it is believed to be attainable. Definite knowledge that it was impossible would stop our quest.

It follows, then, that we regard a harmony between reality and the intellectual value of truth as attainable and progressively being attained. Nor unless we are sceptics—and scepticism produces small philosophy—do we doubt that a valid representation of the nature of reality is capable of being expressed in the truth we seek. In that case, what is to forbid the further extension of the same attitude which the religious postulate makes? The difference between the two is less than it may seem to be. We tacitly assume harmony between truth and reality, and, since even to discuss the possibility of the religious postulate being valid both sides must hold that truth can be attained, we seldom notice what we have assumed. Religion introduces the idea of God as a ground of values, but for the time being we may

leave that aside, and see in religion simply the assertion that reality is harmonious with ultimate value in its widest sense. It is not a matter of attributing existence to an object of value just because it is a value, nor primarily of any particular value-idea, not even of the existence of a personal God. It is impossible to argue that all valuation, any more than all reasoning, rightly indicates the nature of reality. Values conflict and decay. They are liable to transvaluation or revaluation. But ultimate value is a legitimate conception, and the grounds upon which we all must assume a partial harmony seem to imply more than this.

There are obstacles on both sides—error on one, evil on the other. Error may seem the less serious problem. From the intellectual standpoint it is the more serious. It is the vital and practical aspect that makes evil appear the worse. It may be said that the more correctly we are able to reason, the more rational does the universe appear, and that this justifies a rational criterion, whilst much less patent harmony obtains between existence and other values. I do not deny this. Yet we cannot expect the religious postulate to be proved by a response being made to all we seek in the name of good. That would be destructive to ultimate good. Few of us but are thankful that our desires have at times been frustrated. The crux of the dissonance between value and existence, and the real problem, is why we have such an imperfect apprehension of our ultimate good, and not so much lack of harmony between life and value. The lack of harmony lies rather in ourselves, desiring what is detrimental for us, and complaining that we are players

in a tragedy of life. If we were able to recognize our good even as readily as we can recognize what is true, I believe we should agree that reality responded to that good just as readily as we hold that it can be discovered by the effort of our intellect.

It appears, then, not a question of taking sides with a good cause, but of extending the principle of logical non-contradiction into a principle of general non-contradiction ; in other words, of an ultimate harmony between existence and value. If we deny that, we deny at the same time any final ground for believing that even the logical satisfaction which philosophy seeks is possible. A universe in any sense ultimately out of harmony is bound to imply that scepticism cannot be silenced, and that we have no guarantee whatsoever that what we believe to be truth is anything but a human delusion. A universe that mocked our moral judgements must certainly be a universe capable of mocking our intellectual judgements.

If we take, for example, the brilliant and depressing essay of Mr. Bertrand Russell entitled ' The Free Man's Worship ' we are told ' that Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving ; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms ; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought or feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave ; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noon-day brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system and that the whole

temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the débris of a universe in ruins,—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand.'[1]

We might answer such philosophy by psychology, and predict that no philosophy which asserts these things will stand accepted of our purposive minds. Volition and feeling count for too much to allow such reasoning to survive. Yet Mr. Russell is convinced that this blind and purposeless universe is sufficiently well disposed towards us, its offspring, to allow us to know the truth concerning its nature. If any one suggests that such a universe out of its purposelessness produced beings destined to ascertain error and always think it truth, what answer can be given? Mr. Russell calls it a 'strange mystery' that man can judge 'the works of his unthinking mother.' But it is perhaps no less strange a mystery why, upon such a view of reality, any one should hold that he can.

Philosophy, therefore, takes sides, and of necessity, the postulate that truth is possible can be fully justified only if we also allow that man's ultimate good, his moral and aesthetic as well as his intellectual values, represent the character of reality. To accept the wider is to include the lesser. To deny the wider is to leave the lesser entirely uncertain. A hostile or neutral ground of reality affords no guarantee for any human value, nor even for believing that any truth concerning it can be ascertained. A reality beyond good and evil, or capable of finally embracing

[1] *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 60.

both, may also be beyond truth and falsehood, or inclusive of both. A morally neutral universe may also be logically neutral.

It appears, therefore, that the criterion of logical non-contradiction must be widened to that of non-contradiction to human values as a whole. This does not mean that all our individual desires, or even those of mankind generally, must represent the nature of reality, any more than did the view, which seemed for so many centuries entirely rational, that the universe was geocentric. But it does imply that just as we believe that a proper understanding of what is logically consistent will, as we attain it, yield wider and more adequate truth, so the growth of our understanding of the final nature of what is good will increasingly show that it lies at the heart of reality.

Within the present century a number of lines of thought, diverse in many ways, have yet tended to modify the traditional rationalistic methods of philosophy. Variously expressed, in some part by Pragmatism and Humanism ; in another way by certain forms of Personal Idealism and of Pluralism, and again by Vitalism, there has none the less been a certain unity throughout all. No one has been more convincing than Bergson in showing the limitation of intellect to represent the actual nature of living experience, in saying what a ' logic of solids ' fails to grasp. Still more recently, the philosophical implication of Einstein's principles has borne in the direction of emphasizing the human factor. But perhaps the greatest pressure is coming from psychological and biological conceptions of experience. The work of such writers as McDougall, Rivers, Freud, and Jung has

brought home the immense significance of instinctive reaction and unconscious experience upon mental life. Modern psychology has given us a wholly new idea of the origin and process of experience, and the full meaning of this for philosophy has yet to be realized.

Philosophy once boasted that it arose from a nobler source than utilitarian interests, the pure quest for truth. That can be no longer maintained. Social and practical needs have prompted philosophy as much as have intellectual needs. We do not make validity a question of origins, for all is fashioned from the same clay. But origin illuminates function. The idea of reason as a superior human prerogative is true in one sense, but not in the sense in which philosophy used to think. To-day we recognize that knowledge is essentially instrumental, not an end in itself ; instrumental to the purposes of life, to that adaptation of which but the half is told when we call it adaptation to environment. For the other half is man's adaptation of environment to himself, of the situation to his purposive activities. Reason has an instrumental value for this, and as such man pursued and developed it.

The general effect of all this has been to send philosophical reflection back to its groundwork in experience. That is likely to be all to its gain. Philosophy is most fruitful when, like science, it turns continually to observe and re-observe fact, and tests theory consistently by appeal to fact. Science, with its harvest of practical results, has been often contrasted favourably with philosophy, which is said to be sterile. The contrast is not wholly just, but science at least merits the praise because

of her passion for the concrete. Rationality can too readily grow abstract. For just as the materially false syllogism can be validly manipulated in formal logic, so is it possible to be rationally non-contradictory and hopelessly untrue to life. Only by constant touch with the empirical realities of experience can philosophy truly translate their implications into logical expression.

It appears, therefore, that we cannot hope to determine the nature of reality solely by rational consistency. It remains, accordingly, to ask in what way values, and especially religious values, may be held to enter into a philosophical conception of reality. The question does not concern particular values so much as value in the ultimate sense, or to employ a common distinction, not instrumental but intrinsic value. The distinction has it use, but it also has certain limits. It appears that, as the last resource, all that we regard as having intrinsic value is instrumental in the sense that it is really a means to the one value that is ultimately intrinsic ; that is, human good in its completest sense, the harmony of all values. Although commonly we speak of goodness, beauty, and truth as intrinsic values, no one of them can be pursued separately without the peril of fanaticism. 'Be not righteous overmuch' is not a cynicism. It was from a sect founded with high religious and patriotic motives that the Pharisee sprang. The pursuit of health alone, produces the valetudinarian; that of truth alone, the pedant; that of justice alone, the legalist. Thus fanaticism waits on all ends that do not merge with life as a whole. When the Greeks gave primacy to justice, or Christian moralists to love, it was not so much

to one intrinsic value of itself as to what was thought to be the virtue most inclusive of all. The ultimate value is the ultimate good in its widest sense. Such good is in process of development. 'It doth not yet appear what it shall be,' but no end is clear before it is attained, and we may believe in such a good as the supreme value, however little we can now envisage or realize it. It is this which forbids that hard and fast teleology which Bergson calls simply the other side of mechanism; that is to say, looking at a process from beginning towards its end appears teleological, but, looking over the same process from the end towards the beginning, it appears mechanically determined. A good, complete and perfect from all eternity, seems to make strangely superfluous the process of attaining it. Teleology implies, not a predetermined and fixed end, but a consistently directed purpose amongst ends leading the good to the better. Such an idea seemed to Spinoza the denial of the perfection of God. It may be that it is the only way in which we can express that perfection.

We have already urged that the deepest implication of what we have called the religious postulate is the ultimate, comprehensive good in this sense. It is not necessary to ask if 'good for each' is 'good for all,' or to fear logical vetoes against proceeding from the distributive to the collective. The antithesis of 'individual' and 'society' is convenient, and seems obvious, but in any final sense it is annulled by the fact that there can be no individuality without society any more than society without individuals. This interaction renders the idea of a final lack of harmony between individual and social

good impotent, however the good of the moment may seem to conflict. We might as well imagine the health of an organ as unconnected with that of the body, or that of the body with the organ. Though partial expressions embodied in particular religious beliefs may fall far short of this full significance, I take this meaning to be the only defensible interpretation of the ultimate nature of collective religious experience. The further question remains as to its embodiment in the synoptic view of philosophy.

XIV

THE PHILOSOPHICAL EXPRESSION OF RELIGION

THE last paragraph of Lotze's metaphysic refers to his having previously stated that 'The true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics.' He adds, 'I admit the expression is not exact, but I still feel certain of being in the right when I seek in that which *should* be the ground of that which *is*.'[1] Lotze, unhappily, did not live to carry the suggestion further, but it has not fallen unnoticed, and is destined to far wider effect.[2] Yet to many the notion that 'should be' can influence 'is' seems an utter paradox, an entire reversal of the true method of seeking knowledge.

It may, however, appear more explicable if we consider the position in which modern knowledge finds itself. Within the space of two or three generations scientific progress has revolutionized, not only our habits, but our conception of man and the universe. It is inevitable, therefore, that the methodological influence of science upon our thinking should be profound. Indeed, to call any branch of knowledge a science seems to invest

[1] *Metaphysic*, Eng. trans. (Clarendon Press), p. 536.

[2] Cf. especially 'The Ethical Basis of Metaphysics,' by F. C. S. Schiller in *Humanism*, and W. R. Sorley, *Moral Values and the Idea of God*.

it with authority and security. Science has afforded what the Western mind immensely respects, material progress. But the method of science, admirably adapted to its own particular ends, has not been wholly helpful in its influence on philosophy. It has tended to diminish the human factor, and the importance of values. Indirectly, it has promoted mechanistic views of the universe, and militated against teleological interpretation. It has led to undue weight being placed on analogies drawn from the material world and applied to mental life. The strength of determinism lies notably in this rather than in any support from our actual experience of choice. Professor McDougall has told us that 'the acceptance of the libertarian doctrine would be incompatible with any hope that a science of society, in any proper sense of the word "Science," may be achieved'; and that 'psychology must not allow its investigation and theories to be biased by moral needs, and it must not easily accept, as evidence in favour of free will, the difficulty of finding in our mental constitution the source of that influx of energy which seems to play the decisive rôle in volition.'[1] Undeniably bias, whatever its source, is unjustifiable, but the former statement suggests that scientific needs not less than moral needs may be productive of it. With regard to the second statement, if we are to limit our interest to psychology as a science we shall not incline to dispute it. But surely a wider question is opened—not whether moral needs must stand aside for those of science, nor scientific needs for those of morality, but how a synoptic

[1] *Social Psychology*, pp. 231, 235.

view, a knowledge that can embrace both, is to be attained.

Further illustration might be supplied of the same tendency in its influence on ethics and sociology. Natural selection has been treated as if it were the sole explanation of social and moral life, and the spiritual side of human nature a mere by-product. Ethics and Christian ethics are still taken as wholly separate subjects, despite the enormous influence of Christianity on subsequent moral thought and life. The reason is that Christian ethics falls within the sphere of religion, ethics within that of science. The result of all this has been to rend the seamless garment of truth, and to apportion the fragments to science, philosophy, art, religion. All have lost in the process, not least religion. In isolation it has tended to become narrow in vision and reactionary in movement, clinging to dogmas which fellowship with the rest of knowledge would have purged of inconsistencies. Religious knowledge, developing apart, obtains expressions incompatible with a reasonable world-view. Yet no world-view is in the truest sense reasonable that cannot express the truth of religion, and the world-views of science and philosophy have been framed incompletely by virtue of their general neglect of it. Hence the dualisms of the God of metaphysics and the God of religion, of value denied existence in the name of fact and fact in the name of value, to which Dewey has referred as 'The greatest dualism that now weighs humanity down.'[1]

It is this lack of a synoptic view which gives point to

[1] *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 173.

what Viscount Haldane has said, that 'Most of the confusion which has characterized the history of reflection has been due to the assumption that a particular set of universals would prove sufficient for the description of objects differently characterized in facts disclosed in Nature.'[1] The suggestion of Lotze may indicate a possible line of advance. Experience is a realm of ends as well as of facts. In it what should be is as integral as what is. We have already seen the difficulty of proceeding from is to ought. The embarrassments of what is sometimes called evolutionist ethics indicate this. Clearly, too, if a purely intellectual comprehension of existence gave any evident account of its values, they would not have been so persistently overlooked therein. But unless philosophy is content to revolve in lonely spheres of logical abstraction, whilst life passes by it unnoticed, some attempt must be made to state the relation between value and existence and attain a comprehensive view of reality. Whatever Lotze's words may be understood to imply, whatever, indeed, he may have meant by them, they must indicate at least that what should be bears on the interpretation of what is for all philosophy that rejects the standpoints of Naturalism, Agnosticism, and Pessimism. This is to admit that the problem of reality is not soluble on purely rational grounds alone. But reasonable is not a synonym for logical; it indicates more than formal consistency. The problem must be reasonably expressed, but not abstractly. This involves more complexity, and increases our already sufficient difficulties. But it is essential,

[1] *The Philosophy of Humanism*, p. 300.

and in the end it may repay us. Apart from regarding the issue in this light, we never comprehend it as a whole. That is why reason which, in theory, must be accepted, in practice so often cannot compel assent. Our reasoning is never purely reason.

Our particular concern is the relation of value to reality as the religious postulate conceives it. In general, philosophy, when it seeks to afford expression to the judgements of the religious consciousness, has chosen one or other of two methods in doing so. One way is by laying stress on the importance of moral and religious factors in the interpretation of philosophical judgements. What is rationally conceived must be morally interpreted. This is the more usual course. Its chief problem is perhaps that of identifying God in the sense of the rationally necessary World-Principle with God as postulated by moral and religious needs. This is generally met by contending that the world-ground demanded by philosophy explains most, if understood to be conscious, purposive Will. The ethical and religious consequences are then deduced, working from the idea of God to that of value, reaching God as a necessity of thought, and values as based on the conception of His nature.

The other method works from value to God. It begins with value. Holding that our appreciation of value is as fundamental as our judgements of sense-perception, it declines to regard the problem as primarily to be settled on rational grounds, and subsequently to be made in some way inclusive of our value-judgements. Since we must start from experience which is made

possible by its values, we must frame the conception of the nature of reality in such a manner that they are never left out of sight. It claims that the task of seeking in the ground of existence the ground of value is simplified by beginning with their common manifestation in experience, and declining, even methodologically, to separate what must finally be united. To do so aggravates the problem needlessly. Their final unity will best be realized through their actual unity.

In either of these ways it is possible to do justice to the religious postulate as a valid predication concerning the nature of reality. The one employs it in the interpretation of its philosophy, the other as part of the groundwork on which to build. It will be convenient to look at the two separately, to see what advantages they severally may possess, and in what way they are fitted to express the philosophy of religious experience. In discussing the former position, we may limit ourselves to Idealism. The New Realism might find expression as a religious philosophy, for it is not necessarily committed to such views as those of Mr. Russell. But Realism inclines to magnify things and depreciate man, whilst all Idealism must believe that reality in some way affirms itself through the human mind, and that human values have at least relevance in a discussion of its nature. Most idealistic theism at the present day owes much to Lotze. Its general line of argument is that the ultimate ground of experience, or, as others prefer, the ground of interaction, is self-conscious will, since will is the only mode of causation known to us. Moreover, it is urged, such a ground accounts better for our own self-conscious wills

than any unconscious or material principle. By thought it is impossible to show that the power to think springs from that which cannot think. Next, it is pointed out that value-judgements also exist, and lead towards the idea of a supreme value. It is contended that an ultimate dualism is gratuitous. Both existential and value-judgements are normal functions of mind, and can be set at variance only by adopting a needlessly sceptical attitude towards the coherence of experience. If ultimate reality be self-conscious will, we should take a teleological view of the universe, and regard both as interconnected by an indwelling end. Thus values serve to interpret the nature of reality.

Such, in a skeleton outline, is the main method of procedure. The extent to which ethical and religious factors colour the interpretation depends, of course, on the individual thinker. But on these grounds a strong argument can be set forth for a religious idealism. It is almost wholly upon them that any monism can take a religious interpretation that is not pantheistic. Other Idealists, breaking with monism more radically, tend towards Pluralistic types of thought. In common to all is a basis of general idealistic metaphysics. Yet upon the same basis are founded philosophies which yield non-religious and anti-religious interpretations, or decline to interpret reality in terms of will. Their reasoning is challenged by the other theories; but, purely on metaphysical grounds, there is little to choose between the two types. Equally difficult is it to account for such divergent interpretations as those of Professor Royce, Dean Rashdall, and Professor Howison, all of whom have

a certain common basis, by purely intellectual considerations. It seems that, having raised the issue on a metaphysical basis, which is equally capable of providing an anti-religious system of thought, religiously interpreted Idealism must involve ultra-rational factors to justify its view-point. These are the actually decisive factors which differentiate between the religious and non-religious Idealisms. By them, rather than by a purely ratiocinative process, the non-religious interpretation is set aside. But if this is so, it appears that the ground of argument has been stated too narrowly to carry that argument right through.

The main problem is to identify the Supreme Principle, in whatever way conceived, with God in the religious sense, a difficulty that has been acute since Kant. Not only were the old theistic proofs unable to prove ; they were unable even to identify the God they presumed with the God of the religious consciousness. A religiously interpreted Idealism has a similar difficulty to face, and if its Supreme Principle be identified with God in the religious sense, it is on other than merely intellectual grounds. The method in question, then, has a twofold basis which it does not always recognize. But the difficulty of co-ordinating its bases is acute. Starting from judgements of fact and outer experience, it resorts at last to an interpretation actually necessitated only by value-judgements and inner experience. It holds that the methods are supplementary, neither being sufficient in itself, and justifies the assumption of their unity on the ground that otherwise a dualism is introduced. But the dualism is not exorcised by such a proceeding.

The identification of the principle of reality with that of value is a problem all religious philosophy encounters. It involves, not merely some co-ordination of value and rationality, but questions of discord, error, pain, and evil. Only an act of faith can posit ultimate harmony, but such faith does not lack reasons. Yet if we approach the problem of reality as if it involved solely metaphysical issues, and omit the bearing of our value-judgements upon it, we find in the end that thought cannot reunite what it has sundered.

It may be said that philosophy can do no other. On traditional lines this may be true, but we may still seek for a wider conception of metaphysics. If philosophy be one thing, science another, religion another, nothing is left for philosophy but abstract metaphysics. If we take a wider view of the function of philosophy, that of the co-ordination of all the data of experience, we include in those data fact and value, and face their relation from the beginning rather than reserve it as a final problem. Such a method is more inclusive, and follows more closely the actual character of experience. It implies, however, a wider epistemology than that commonly understood, and if the result partake of the character of a metaphysic, it will be a metaphysic based on value rather than on fact.

We turn, therefore, to see how far the second method we have mentioned can give a philosophical expression to the religious consciousness. It has at least one advantage. Upon the historical lines of philosophic procedure, the religious interpretation of reality, being based on factors not recognized therein, cannot claim consideration. It has by no means been always overlooked, but it has

been recognized by act of grace rather than of necessity. On a basis which accepts value-judgements as part of the essential data, justification of the religious interpretation of reality may or may not be afforded, but such interpretation must be considered. On such lines, too, there should be better hope of avoiding the modern polytheism which contains, as Professor Leuba declares, 'Two separate god-ideas that are as distinct in content as they are in origin.'[1] The distinction in content is manifest, but that of origin is true only up to a certain point. It has already been suggested that metaphysics, like all other knowledge, comes from one root, and is stimulated by social and emotional, as well as by intellectual, needs. That philosophical development has tended to abstract itself from contact with life is an unfortunate accident, which began with the sharp separation in Greek life and thought between the thinker and the worker, and has been ministered to by other causes. Nothing has lost more by that than philosophy itself. God, to-day, represents sometimes an intellectual, sometimes a moral principle, but it is not evident that He cannot be both. If He cannot, then our method of explaining experience has itself created, not found, the dualism, for religion and philosophy are both products of the human mind working as the instrument of the needs of life. All our methods of estimating experience are at root one, and the most abstract of facts is related to some human value. Science affords us a mechanistic explanation of the universe in terms of energy which seems utterly indifferent to human values. Yet this mechanistic

[1] *Psychological Study of Religion*, p. 246.

conception is supplied by human intelligence for its own purpose of explanation, and is verified because the universe responds to our postulate that its working is so to be conceived. That is to say, in this respect even, a harmony appears between the nature of reality and our purposive intelligence. But we make moral and religious postulates as inevitably as intellectual postulates. If the universe satisfies truth-values, we may hope that it will satisfy these. We cannot separate them, for a conception of reality which leaves moral and religious experiences hanging upon nothing is not even fully intelligible ; it has not been explained, much less interpreted. We may take encouragement, however, realizing that the separation between these two ideas of God arises rather out of our method of seeking knowledge than as indication that a kind of Manicheism is latent at the heart of things. Both for metaphysics and religion God is the ultimate postulate. That metaphysics expresses facts impersonally, and religion is concerned with personal value-attitudes, does not imply that the two can never come into contact.

As was the case in dealing with the former method, so here we cannot attempt to do more than to outline the way in which it may be possible to avoid the difficulties we have been considering. It will be seen that all turns upon the conception of experience. All philosophy accepts experience as a basis, but its significance is very unequally appreciated. The ' plain man's ' philosophy takes experience at face value. For an epistemology, such as that of Dr. McTaggart, experience merely serves the same function as the screen upon which the

picture is projected by the limelight. Without the screen the picture is not seen, but the screen is of use only in displaying the picture. ' Experience,' according to Dr. McTaggart, ' is only necessary to the movement of the idea because it is necessary to its existence.'[1] From this point of view, therefore, ' the idea ' is primary and experience secondary.

Amid all diversity of view, two points emerge upon which there is general agreement. First, that the ' commonsense position ' is the starting-point of our more systematic thinking, for it is that into which we all grow up. Second, that we must all trust our human powers. Whatever Protagoras's celebrated dictum may mean, a human measure is the only measure possible. Let us see how far these will take us. A very little reflection shows that the commonsense standpoint is full of anomalies. The earliest Greek philosophy soon rejected it. But, at least, common sense finds an empirical unity in life, and philosophy has never found a completely rational one. The assumption of classical philosophy that common sense can contribute nothing to philosophical explanation has resulted in the failure to see that the character of human knowledge, its instrumental, purposive nature, is revealed therein. The figment of ' pure reason ' could never have been invented had philosophy learnt this from common sense. To say this is not to advocate the uncritical assumption of common sense nor to praise irrationalism. It is not even an ' anti-intellectualism.' It is simply the acknowledgement that a more humanistic standpoint than that of

[1] *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, p. 18.

traditional metaphysics, a standpoint which takes account of the biological function of reason, supplies the only hope of unifying knowledge.

We have already given some statement of this standpoint in referring to the instrumental character of reasoning. It was pointed out that, apart from the simpler sequences of experience and conclusions from accepted promises, facts are interpretations. In philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, politics, and religion alike, we speak of facts as if they were as undeniable as a mathematical demonstration is to those who understand it. Few indeed of such facts are. We deny in the name of reason what is asserted as reason, without being able to point out a definite logical flaw. Even when we understand each other's view-point we do not accept each other's facts. The most abstract of facts, statistics, proverbially proves anything, for here again the fact is in the interpretation. It is not otherwise in philosophy. The implications of most philosophical positions are declared to indicate this or that, according to the use our purpose favours. Wittingly or unwittingly, a great part of our facts and our reasons is not only interpreted, but actually constituted for us by our own ends. Reasoning is essentially instrumental. Its purity lies, not in any detachment from purpose, but in attachment to the broadest and most sincere purposes.

Further justification of this might be supplied by the failure of rationalistic philosophy. In the hands of its most brilliant expositors it replaces the actual human standpoint for that of an Absolute. But no way of return exists. Between absolute and human truth an

unbridged gap appears. Dehumanized knowledge pointed out to us as the ideal is in no way to be connected with the human knowledge which is said to imply it. The vision of absolute truth fades like a mirage which recedes the further the nearer it is approached. There is no ladder set up upon which we may ascend and descend between the Absolute and the finite. Such failure leads inevitably to the question whether the starting-point of so barren a venture, the conception of experience, was framed aright.

But positive as well as such negative considerations exist. The remark of Darwin concerning a new basis for psychology has already been quoted, but it deserves fresh remembrance. Biology has taught the psychologist that experience means behaviour ; not merely conforming to conditions, but transforming them. Whatever is of no meaning for life is in no true sense experience. There is a whole field of functions in the organism which are not connected with consciousness, except perhaps in the vague coenaesthesis. They stimulate no activity, and therefore do not need to enter into experience. But in ill-health they may be very consciously felt. They need some adjustment, and so thrust themselves into experiences. A vague spasm in the muscles comes, goes, and is forgotten. It has no consequences, and is barely to be called experience. Dreams were taken by primitive peoples as real. Consequently they played a notable part in primitive thinking. When, later, they lost their supposed consequence for life, they remained of interest only to the superstitious. The recent re-emphasis of dreams in psychology is due to new reasons for connecting

them with vital processes. I pass a shop in a certain street daily. I have no need for the goods it displays, and am unaware for a twelvemonth, unless it be in a subconscious manner, of its existence. Then I need what it supplies. Some one reminds or tells me of such a place, and at once it takes its position within my experience. The significance of all this to philosophy is that experience means activity and activity means ends, values. Knowledge is not detached reflection, but is evolved and involved in the process of life. Experience, then, is not a starting-point, to be left behind when ideal construction begins. Rather is it to be understood that, as the expression of the life-process, the character of experience must determine the character of philosophy.

It would not be difficult to show that the character of the historical philosophies has been determined according to their conception of experience. The conception of experience made necessary by modern psychology brings the human purposive factors into prominence, and indicates that truth must be sought *in re*. This is not subjectivism. That reality exists as a thing-in-itself, and not merely in our ideas of it, neither pragmatist nor rationalist doubts, if only because some datum must be granted for all explanation. The question is how we may know that our thought expresses reality. A purely logical satisfaction is not enough, but, what is more, it cannot prove that it has prior rights over other needs. The more humanistic type of philosophy holds that an idea is true which gives satisfaction by being consistent with the expression of our minds as a whole. The ' new psychology ' defines rationalization as ' The production

of a "reason" for as distinct from the true cause or motive, of an act or conation.'[1] It is hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that much which is offered in philosophy as rationality is rationalization in this sense. The difficulties presented by actual experience are 'rationalized' by being represented as overcome in an Absolute. They are mere appearance and not reality, and just because of this we are left with a conception of reality which ignores all but logical satisfaction, and fails even to supply that.

The position may be put as follows. We begin with reality and end with it. The reality we begin with is immediate experience, our only pathway to any knowledge of reality whatsoever. Ultimate reality must be found through, and able to express itself in, our experience. There must be a way 'out and home' between experience and reality. Our immediate experience is contradictory and insufficient. That does not affect its function of manifesting reality, but it shows the manifestation to be neither direct nor obvious. Hence our attempts to refine and remould experience. The process by which we do so is experimental. We endeavour to eliminate contradiction, to establish ideas which will fulfil our demands for consistency and stability. In doing so we are directed by some purpose, scientific, philosophical, moral. We are thus led to various conceptions of the real world behind experience, the material world-order of chemistry and physics, the rational world-order of philosophy, the moral world-order of ethics. The ultimate conception of reality will be that which is capable of

[1] A. G. Tansley : *The New Psychology and its Relation to Life*, p. 160.

containing and harmonizing all such partial conceptions. In one sense the religious world-order is more ultimate than any; for, embracing all the others, it postulates that there is, throughout them all, an underlying harmony with the final good of man. The other postulates we make deal with aspects of reality. The religious postulate, more than any other, deals with its intrinsic character.

The humanistic type of philosophy, and the pragmatic method, favour the view that the conditions under which experience arises and proceeds are not only indicative of its own character, but give a clue to the nature of the reality we come into contact with through it. It is certainly a reasonable supposition. When man was thought to be apart from the rest of creation, and god-like in his rationality, a purely rational criterion of reality was justifiable. It is less easy to justify to-day. Now the process of experience is determined by its values, and in so far as this process, as Pragmatism holds, makes reality, it follows that such reality is constituted by these values. Upon similar grounds, this type of philosophy holds that there is an initial probability that any factor widely significant in human experience has some significance also in indicating the nature of reality which experience ascertains. The empirical importance of religion in life suggests that in some way the religious attitude is representative of an aspect of the ultimate character of reality. The religious consciousness asserts its postulate as being a valid predication of reality. The intellectualism of certain types of philosophy debars them from entertaining such a view, and the religious consciousness is left without a philosophical expression.

It is the merit of the humanistic type of philosophy that it permits the nature of reality to be conceived in this way, and seeks for an expression of it that meets all the aspects of experience. Such a method I believe to be most fitted to express the philosophical implications of religion, most likely to overcome the dualism of 'pure' and 'practical' reason. In brief outline, the position may be put as follows. Despite the forebodings of those who prophesy a cosmic cataclysm to wipe all life from the universe, if history means anything it means that the end to which reality as a whole has most consistently tended is the survival and development of life, and the agency it employs in doing so is the individual. Through the self-preservation and parental instincts, life is conserved and handed on. But life is for human beings more than physical existence. It is a realm of ends. That such ends are all of worth for life is not evident, but it is as impossible, surely, to believe that in their broad sense human values as a whole represent what is detrimental to the survival and development of life as to believe that instinct as a whole could be directed towards the extinction of the species. Instinct does not work invariably in all its manifestations towards ends that minister to existence, but that the main stream does so is undeniable. Human wellbeing, in the sense in which we have taken it here, is not an instinctive end, but it is an end that belongs as wholly and inevitably to life as do the instincts. The analogy of the life-impulse working itself out through instinct may serve to indicate that the quest for human wellbeing is equally a fulfilment of the character of that reality to which we belong, and in which

we live and move and have our being. An ultimate dissonance between such ends, between beauty, truth, goodness, and reality, would in the long run prove as fatal as if the whole system of instinct led towards the destruction, rather than the conservation, of life. Just as instinctive reactions are not uniform in utility towards the general ends they serve, so the impulse in man that seeks the wider wellbeing often goes astray. Just as the one sometimes seems to hinder rather than help the main purpose, so the higher values conflict and cross each other's path. But the broad harmony of both may be held to exist, however particular instances seem to contradict it. At least it may be thought certain that to decline to seek the one would be as fatal as to decline, were it possible, to follow the other. But just as instinct is obeyed, so man follows the impulse which leads toward his good, however imperfectly he may conceive that good. This one must believe to be a condition of his creation and existence, and any philosophy that regards it as such, and interprets reality accordingly, is capable of being a philosophy of religious experience.

Such, then, is the method. It appears to me that its best embodiment might be in some form of Idealism which regards the monad or centre of experience as the primary Real, and is neither grossly pluralistic nor stringently monistic. Psychology leads us away from the conception of reality as ' pure thought ' to the more expressive analogy of self-conscious will. If reality be of the nature of mind, and not a static and unchangeable system, which we try somehow to apprehend, it will be conceived as mind tending to an end. Such a view is,

of course, not one that it is easy to realize fully. The average educated man thinks of the ultimate nature of the universe as constituted by atoms and electrons, a view as untenable as the naïve realism of which it is a refinement. Yet, even so, the idea of some external reality conditioning our human minds, which depend upon it, still influences even where it has been rejected. Yet the very objectivity of the external world is not existent for us apart from our will. That world itself is a postulate. As Professor Royce has put it, 'The popular assurance of an external world is the fixed determination to make one now and henceforth.'[1] That is to say, it exists as a fact because of its value for our ends.

The conditions under which our intellect developed and now works are those of practical interests, which reminds us that the external world it grasps is chosen rather than dictated. If we regard the 'real' world as the world of sense-experience, it is so because of the satisfaction of those practical interests, and not because of an objectivity of its own which compels us so to take it. In doing so we leave our moral and affective interests on one side. Yet there is no *a priori* reason why one interest should determine what we take to be the character of reality rather than another. If all our interests were equally satisfied we should, without doubt, regard them all as indicating the character of reality. The difference is not in their character as interests, but in the degree of satisfaction they receive—that is, in their verification. But if mind be the primary reality, since activity is the

[1] *Religious Aspect of Philosophy*, p. 304.

essence of mind, no analogy will help us more to realize the innermost nature of ultimate reality than the concept of value. An Idealism on such a basis, holding the idea of the good to be regulative, would attempt to give a reasonable expression of the nature of the good, and would interpret the data of experience in accordance with it. Such a change of category would be no excuse for making desire synonymous with truth. It would involve disciplined thought, and would have to present its conceptions on rational grounds. Though framed upon a broader idea of consistency, on consistency to life, it would truly be a philosophy.

XV

THE IDEAL AS THE REAL

The process of our argument has been directed towards showing that the religious experience of mankind must be interpreted as witnessing to the character of ultimate reality. A critic has said that the empirical belief in gods has no more significance for philosophy than that in ghosts. The parallel is not very well chosen, but even belief in ghosts indicates the capacity of the human mind for conceiving a spiritual and immaterial order of existence. Religious beliefs are evidence of the same power, but around them man has gradually come to gather his fundamental values and his highest ideals. To reject such convictions as illusory can serve only one purpose—that of scepticism in philosophy. It shatters the foundation of any theory that holds that man can attain truth. To ignore them is to condemn philosophy to an abstract attitude that must mean barrenness, and to admit that it is too narrowly conceived to embrace the fullness of life's meaning. The argument we have put forth is based upon the belief that all definite and persistent human attitudes are as significant in pointing towards what is ultimately true as the Cartesians held 'clear and distinct' ideas to be. For them there must be, to adopt a phrase from Helmholtz, 'a reason in

reality.' None are without importance in our estimate of its character.

We started from actual religious experience, and saw that, as it refined and developed, it came more and more nearly towards that supreme implication which, it was contended, conveyed its philosophical significance. We have seen that if the motive-power of all intellectual and spiritual development be said to be the great forces of instinct and impulse, the direction has been, not blind, but determined by the belief in what might be; not by what is actual simply, but by what is ideal; by the effort to make the actual ideal. It is on this account that the ideal's right to be regarded as true and valid has been asserted by man with more conviction than anything else has ever drawn from him. For it he has lived and for it he has been ready to die. It is on this account that the last great meaning of religious experience is to be expressed in the words, the Ideal is the Real; not imagination or appearance, but ultimate reality. The forms in which our ideals are embodied may change, but beneath the form, that which gives life to the ideal is immortal, and is the greatest of all realities. Religious experience implies, therefore, some conception of reality which embraces within itself harmoniously the ground of the actual and the ideal order, which here and now so often seem to conflict.

The remaining question, therefore, is the character of the ground of values to which the values of the religious consciousness are attached. For the purposes of our argument we treated our postulate as referring to 'reality,'

a course which was justifiable, since God is always the supremest of realities for all religion. But the religious conception of God or gods varies so greatly that it was better to omit it for the time being, and fix on what was common to all, the idea of a reality. It is hardly necessary formally to identify God as both value-ground and world-ground. The developed forms of religious experience do so unanimously, and the whole argument of the preceding chapters is an insistence that the nature of reality embraces both. It is more needful to ask what conception of a reality which is both the ground of existence and of value, is best fitted to express what the religious postulate asserts. With the religious consciousness itself, we may call this inclusive principle God, but not every idea of God is equally consistent with the ultimate significance of religion, as we have here understood it.

Of the various ways in which the developed religious consciousness can conceive God and reality we may put aside one or two at the outset. Polytheism, despite William James, is impossible from any modern philosophical or religious standpoint. Absolutism we have already discussed and found unsuitable for our purpose. Deism, with its external creator, at best was a philosophical theory, not a practical religious creed, and is now of historic interest only. It is conceivable, however, for the religious consciousness to regard God pantheistically as synonymous with reality, or theistically as an immanent principle, the ground of reality, but not wholly identical with it.

In the West, Pantheism has been chiefly philosophical. In the East it has sprung from religion. Yet even there

it is speculative in origin, and therefore an accretion to, rather than a natural and primary expression of, religious experience: but its theory reflects upon practice. It would seem that a consistently applied Pantheism, which regarded all that is as equally divine, would result in such anomalies of morality as to make social integration impossible. Yet the combination of Pantheism and a lofty morality amongst the Stoics, for example, shows that theory bends to life's needs, and therefore it is not impossible to imagine that the religious consciousness might embrace a Pantheistic conception of reality without being necessarily indifferent to moral distinctions, as indeed modern Indian religion proves.

There have been pessimistic and optimistic types of Pantheism, but if Pantheism can serve as a philosophical expression of the religious consciousness it must needs hold that whatever is is good. At the same time it must also deny the distinctions of quality present in our value-judgements. They are illusions of the finite consciousness. To the All all is alike. Yet this renders the statement that all is good meaningless. It would be equally true and equally meaningless to assert whatever is is wrong. The conception of good can retain its meaning only by reason of the distinctions in quality which Pantheism must deny. To be consistent, a religious Pantheism must refuse to speak of good and bad except as finite illusions. In so doing it leads to utter scepticism, for good and bad is a distinction as fundamental to human consciousness as light and darkness. But still more, to do so nullifies the possibility of a Pantheistic interpretation of the religious postulate. All religion, as we have seen, presumes an

object which responds to human approach. To that extent it is ' good.' To deny this is to make any religious attitude unintelligible. On the other hand, to concede this must lead—as, indeed, in the higher religions it always does—to the conception of moral goodness in God. To admit the conception of the good in any sense is to admit that of moral good, and to admit moral good makes it necessary to relate it to the world-order. For the religious consciousness this implies basing moral goodness in God.

As a matter of fact, Pantheism does not serve to express the implications of the religious consciousness even in Pantheistic religions. In the words of my old teacher and friend, Dr. A. S. Geden, speaking of Indian Pantheism, ' The majority of the people, however, accept the theory on philosophic grounds, but make no attempt to bring it into any sort of harmony with their moral behaviour, or allow it to control their ethical habit or belief. The ruling thought and inclination of a people by nature intensely religious is to seek intercourse with a personal God, to enlist his interest and goodwill on their behalf, and to satisfy what they conceive to be his moral demand. The abstract Pantheism which they profess is, for the most part, entirely without effect on daily conduct and life.' [1] That is to say, in the country where Pantheism finds its most welcome home, it cannot be expressive of the religious consciousness of the people. The popular faiths are theistic. With philosophic Pantheism we are not directly concerned. It is sufficient to have seen the impracticability of giving a Pantheistic

[1] *E.R.E.*, vol. ix. p. 619.

representation of reality as representative of the religious consciousness.

Historically, when the polytheistic stage of thought has been passed the religious consciousness almost always has expressed itself through some form of theism. This suggests its inherent suitability, and not merely that Israel developed monotheism, and through Christianity, and indirectly also through Muhammad, spread the doctrine through the world. For no alternative effectively presents any challenge to theism as far as expressing religious belief is concerned. Our basis, however, in this study has been religious experience as a whole. That limits us to what is universal, the idea of an object and a relation to it, and we cannot here do more, therefore, than indicate what may be held to be implied by the existence of such a relation, and the result will be less than is needed for a consistent conception of theism. It may be possible within this ground, however, to show that sufficient is implied for the religious spirit to live upon, and more than that is not essential.

Since the existence of God is itself postulated, the characteristics of that existence are similarly of the nature of a postulate. But they are postulated to account for the fact of the divine-human relationship. What is fundamental is that such relationship implies intercourse, communion with a Being who responds. This raises the question, so often treated as if it were solely one of philosophical appropriateness, of speaking of God as personal. Yet the actual and most urgent reason for doing so is the sense of communion which the religious consciousness experiences in the divine-human relation. One feels that

the philosophical arguments for divine personality are largely the attempt to vindicate the sense of this communion in life. The divine-human relationship conveys to those who seek it, the conviction that God responds to human approach directly and immediately, and that fellowship exists with Him.

Fellowship, so far as we know it, exists only between personalities, or at least creatures of a nature sufficiently similar to be mutually responsive. One can have a sense of fellowship with a horse or dog, but hardly with a mollusc. Nor can it exist with the inanimate. There is a sense in which we anthropomorphically regard an object of art or a favourite book, a car or engine that has carried us on many journeys; but we are, I think, always subconsciously aware, even when we do so, of projecting our own attitude into the object. The religious consciousness never has that sense in speaking of communion with God, despite those who insist that the case is not different. Personality, then, is postulated on these grounds, just as inevitably as we attribute our own nature to that of other human beings. It seems, therefore, a natural corollary to the religious postulate to regard the reality which assists in the attainment of human good as interpretable after the analogy of ourselves. The spectre of anthropomorphism, which has had a long life since Xenophanes, is surely getting somewhat needless. The crasser forms have vanished. Reality we believe to be sufficiently close to man to be comprehended by our intelligence, and since that which offers no analogy is unintelligible to us, we are surely justified in preferring the analogy of mind to that of matter, and of personal to

impersonal existence. If the character of Nature can be reflected in human mirrors, so may be the character of God. A humanistic philosophy which acknowledges what all philosophy must illustrate, the anthropic character of knowledge, finds little to criticize in the postulate of divine personality.

The verification of this postulate, like that of all others, is in its ability to explain facts. Here religious experience has a contribution to offer to our knowledge of reality, for it provides an empirical verification of an intelligible conception of its nature, and a reason for preferring it to a material or indeterminate conception. The place of religion in human experience is far too large for any one to assume that it must wait for such conclusions as a purely scientific or a logical view of reality can afford and try to fit itself in with them in some manner. Conceptions by which men live are at least as good evidence as regards the nature of reality as conceptions by which men argue. Religious experience has a task and share in the ascertaining of truth. It has no exclusive or superior rights, as once were claimed, but it is a false psychology, which invariably means a false philosophy, that assigns to religion a department of symbols and imaginings which is distinct from our verifiable apprehension of reality as a whole. A philosophy which accepts such an idea debars itself from a complete conception of the nature of reality.

We may appeal confidently to the collective religious experience of mankind to demonstrate how wellnigh universal it is that the sense of communion or relation is taken to imply relation with a person. Mr. Bradley has declared that since religion flourishes in the absence of

belief in a personal God, the belief is not essential.[1] An appeal to the facts of religious experience is always wholesome, and one recognizes the ground that apparently underlies what is asserted here. But the argument gets a poor justification from the facts. Of Pantheism we have just spoken. No form of religious belief that is not purely philosophic, and therefore secondary, maintains itself without some form of personal relation to a god. Gautama has the values of a God even when he has not the name, and pure Buddhism is non-existent.[2] Siva and Vishnu in Hinduism supply what pantheistic Brahmanism cannot give. The facts certainly do not support Mr. Bradley's contention, but go to show that in all forms religious experience treats its object as personal, and this practical verification of the hypothesis of divine personality is testimony that it serves to meet the conditions that lead to its being set forth. The true nature of another human being is known only to those who have inner fellowship with him, and it is not otherwise with God.

As far as the religious consciousness is concerned, the personality of God is a wellnigh unanimous conviction. As such it must testify to a true apprehension of the nature of reality, but not necessarily be regarded as a consistent conception. None of the normal beliefs of mankind are baseless, but few are accurate. The common commonsense, real world of things is a true apprehension of the nature of reality, but it is a very confused conception

[1] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 452.

[2] It is illustrative of the anomalies of Buddhism that the *E.R.E.* finds it impracticable to give any general article upon it, and treats only of its various forms.

of it. Similarly, the sense of communion is, I believe, to be taken as indicating something of the nature of reality, but that does not justify our assumption of the explanation which calls God personal.

I do not intend to attempt any full discussion of the philosophical issues involved, but merely to state what seems to me the most significant of the many points which a full discussion would raise. We have said that our purposive intelligence postulates a causal order in the physical universe. Such an order is not written on the face of Nature, nor is it revealed until man for his own purposes seeks it. But the universe responds to the postulate, and satisfies our practical and intellectual needs in this respect. Similarly, we postulate a morally ordered and spiritual universe. Such an order is even less manifest, but the persistence of religious and moral consciousness, we argued, indicated that to such consciousness there came sufficient evidence to show that the universe also responded in this case. A universe that thus meets the personal, purposive intelligence of the self-conscious beings who proceed from its womb may reasonably be regarded as the expression of a reality that also possesses consciousness, which may be understood on the analogy of our own.

Very similar considerations, indeed, must be appealed to if we are philosophically to demonstrate the existence of other selves. If a solipsist, that useful spectre who serves to keep Idealism in touch with common sense, were to base his argument on the good scientific ground of parcimony of causes, he might state that he observed only in those called other selves outward behaviour which

was explicable by chemical and physical laws. He never observed any mind in them, hence no other mind but his own need be assumed to account for their existence. We should reply that our whole experience compelled us to postulate in others a nature similar to that of which we are conscious in ourselves. In such case the necessity for doing so is obvious, but what appear to us to be signs of conscious intelligence in the system of reality suggest less evidently, but not differently, a nature in the ground of reality which must be understood by the analogy of our own. We know of no impersonal power. The only cause we know is our own volition. The better we know ourselves the better we understand the universe. The better we know the universe the better we understand ourselves. Such interaction makes a dehumanized conception of reality somewhat gratuitous.

At the same time I do not see that a philosophy based on religious experience can insist on the actual word personal being applied to God, except in the sense of indicating that the nature of reality is such that we can have communion such as exists between persons with it. This does not carry with it all that the word personal conveys. A spiritual principle seems necessary, but, as Mr. C. C. J. Webb has shown, even the Christian religion applied the term personal to God comparatively late.[1] The mathematically coloured idea of unity, and the negative idea of the infinite, are not serious objections, nor is the limitation such as is implied in us by the existence of not-self necessarily insurmountable. But personality is not a static condition, nor does the term permit of definite

[1] *God and Personality*, Lecture iii.

boundaries. Every monad, or centre of perception, has being-for-self, and therefore the germ of personality. Is a word which is capable of covering so much really helpful when applied to God? Must we not, with Lotze, speak of perfect personality as existing only in God, and regard the question as being whether we are entitled to be called persons? Yet to do so is to rob the analogy of value and leave us characterizing God by an idea which has little intelligibleness for us. On purely philosophical grounds there seems to be as much against as for ascribing personality to the principle of reality. Recollecting, however, that the sense of communion is found in all religious experience, and that communion implies similarity of nature, we may speak of a personal God in the sense of a responsive God, but we can hardly ask for more on the basis of religious experience.

We have spoken of this sense of communion as the possession of religious experience. But religious experience is wider than any possible definition of it, or at least has its analogue in spheres not generally called religion. Few thinkers or artists who love and seek for truth or beauty can feel that they are part of a neutral and irresponsive universe. They may not express this feeling of a sympathetic reality in religious terms, but the charm of seeking truth and beauty, the zest with which the path is followed and the goal striven for, prove without doubt that, in some form, our search for human good endorses the religious postulate, and so tends toward an interpretation of the nature of the ground of reality after the analogy of a nature that responds to ours.

The goodness of God is an implication of the religious postulate which is even more direct than that of personality. The universal presumption underlying the religious attitude in all its forms has been said to be that its object is approachable, and responds. To that extent, therefore, it is good. In the lower forms of religion this does not involve the conception of moral goodness, and the gods are not represented from the moral standpoint. Theoretically, also, it is possible that a responsive Being might not be a moral Being, but might embrace or transcend both good and evil, as, according to some philosophers, the Absolute does. An even more definite denial is afforded by Pantheism. But, none the less, the necessity of deepening the original implication of 'good because responsive' into 'morally good' becomes evident as the ethical significance of the religious consciousness increases. With clearer insight, the view that goodness consists in responding to any and every human claim becomes untenable, and in its place arises the conception that the ultimate good of the individual is bound up with that of the race and expressed in moral terms. Goodness thus gains an almost entirely moral significance, until it is even possible to say:

> Good when He gives, supremely good,
> Nor less when He denies.

Since, however, some primitive, and all pantheistic, expressions of religion lack a conception of God as morally good, this notion cannot be said to be so characteristic of actual experience as that of a personal being. But it is an even more genuine corollary of the fundamental

religious postulate. The inescapable sense of a distinction between right and wrong, and the unquestionable imperative which bids us follow the right, are as universal as our instincts, and far more significant as regards the nature of reality. Though the uttermost difference exists between what is regarded as right or wrong, the distinction and obligation are known by all human beings. An unmoral source of reality leaves the moral order without basis, unexplained and inexplicable. The objections to regarding God as a moral being are, as in the former case, largely based on too close insistence on applying the human moral order to God. That it does not concern or profit us to ask how morality can be applied to God should be obvious. What we are driven to assume is that our moral nature, equally with, perhaps even more than, our personality, reflects the nature of reality. If it does not, we have no arguments to convince us that any part of our nature can do so.

The basis of religious experience upon which we have worked is not sufficient to give an answer to the question, What is the exact relation between God and reality? Broadly, no doubt, God is regarded as the ground of reality, and as the greatest of all realities, but whether that is to mean the sole and ultimate reality the religious consciousness has never decided. That God is real it knows. What else is real it leaves philosophy to find out. We leave, therefore, to philosophical discussion between those who regard God as the Absolute and those who do not, the question of the exact relation of God and reality. It is wholly on this account that reference has been made

throughout to the general term reality, without stating how widely it is to be distributed. Since the religious consciousness is unanimous that God is reality, whether He be part or whole of it, it would seem that if we believe that our religious experience indicates the nature of reality, the philosophical form of expression matters less. Even to call God the embodiment of desire may be a religious creed if it be held that our volitional as well as our intellectual powers can reflect the nature of what is objectively real.

In the concepts of personality and goodness, however, I believe we have highly justifiable corollaries of the postulate of religious experience. For that postulate is based upon the existence of the religious relation, and just as communion between human beings implies a personal and moral relationship, so it seems that by this analogy we may best explain the implications of that relation between man and God to which all religious experience witnesses. Beyond these we can scarcely go on that basis. The 'attributes' of God, such as infinity, omniscience, omnipresence, omnipotence, cannot be deduced from the religious relation, since they are not implied directly by religious experience nor involved in its postulate. Indirectly, they may be said to be based on impressions gained through that relation, omnipotence on the sense of power, omniscience on the sense of being comprehended, and so forth. But in no sense are they directly implied, or necessary to the existence of the relation, nor can one claim as a fact of experience that he knows God to be infinite. They are rather to be regarded as theological and metaphysical matters. A complete

philosophy of religion cannot omit to consider them, but a philosophy of religious experience is limited by the basis it has chosen, and in that basis these attributes have no place. If, however, we are justified in interpreting the common postulate of religion as needing some conception of personality and goodness for its complete expression, we afford all that is essential to the religious consciousness.

An argument which occupies a volume must involve secondary and incidental discussions, which make it more difficult to pick out the thread that runs through the whole. I will attempt, therefore, in closing, to summarize the main position set forth.

Our starting-point was psychological, and our first steps were directed to bringing out the place and importance of religion in human life. Behind this lay the belief that, broadly speaking, what is most widely characteristic of human life is the most important material for philosophy.

Accordingly we first sought for a psychological and historical characterization of religion, and defining religion by reference to the belief in an other-than-human order, or God, held to be in existence and in relation to man.

Next we considered the meaning of the term experience, and of religious experience, and, after characterizing individual and collective experience, selected the latter as the basis of our argument.

This involved an examination of what could be said to hold good of religious experience as a whole. It was

pointed out that if any definition of religion were possible, certain common factors must be held to exist.

From the definition accepted there followed as characteristic of religion generally, the idea of God or gods, and of a relation between the divine and the human. We dealt with those ideas in their connexion with human development. Passing to the fuller forms of religion, we sought a general characterization of the religious consciousness and of the religious life.

Our next concern was with the reference of religious experience, whether its knowledge of its object, God, was to be said to come by intuition or by inference. Whilst the possibility, and indeed the actuality, of immediate knowledge of God were admitted, it was held that, for the purposes of argument, such knowledge must be capable of being set forth as a valid inference upon the data provided by the religious consciousness. Accordingly we considered the view that the reference of religious experience was purely subjective, which we rejected. We also declined the suggestion that it referred to the action of society upon the individual, and the consequence some attach to this—that humanity is God. Finally we discussed the view that we must understand religion as expressing to us the inner nature of man rather than that of God. With this it was possible to sympathize more nearly. That in one sense man makes God in his image and likeness is plainly shown by the history of religion. That God appears as a projection of the desire of man's heart is also evident from the psychology of religion. But the vital issue began rather than ended there. It involved the relation of man's moral and

volitional nature to reality, the possibility of taking the one to be in some way indicative of the other. Thus psychology left unsolved questions which opened the way to philosophy.

The second and philosophical part began by summing up the results gathered in the former part, and suggesting that, philosophically considered, religious experience as a whole must be understood as implying a predication concerning the nature of reality; that there was in reality a principle sympathetic to human good in its completest sense. This we called the religious postulate. The question, therefore, arose whether this postulate could be regarded as holding good, and was capable of entering into the synthesis of our knowledge, as a valid assertion concerning reality.

The first question was of its verification. This involved a discussion concerning the character of religious knowledge in relation to knowledge generally, and whether it was possible to regard this postulate as being verified in the same way as other postulates which we accept. An acknowledgement of the difficulties did not show that in its own sphere, and by such means as were open, the postulate need lack verification.

The formidable difficulties of evil were our next concern. Here we saw that it was a case of *solvitur ambulando*. There was a practical solution, however difficult the intellectual solution appeared.

We then asked in what manner the postulate could be confirmed. Taking it as a hypothesis to explain the facts, we saw that it received an extensive empirical confirmation, and upon such lines only are any hypotheses

regarded as confirmed. It was possible also to claim that no rival hypothesis could offer a better solution, or had less obstacles to surmount.

We were thus led to the question of relating the postulate to a synoptic view of reality. This implied a discussion of the concept of value in connexion with the nature of reality. The root of the matter was seen to be in what was taken as the criterion of reality. We admitted that the principle of non-contradiction was, in the abstract sense, necessarily to be accepted, but pointed out the difficulties of deciding in actual argument how much it implied. Further, it appeared that the principle in its logical sense must be taken as part of a wider principle, since no ultimate contradiction of any of our interests, aesthetic and moral as well as intellectual, would allow us to rest satisfied. We saw that, partly through new psychological and biological conceptions, a tendency was manifest to widen the traditional procedure of philosophy. That philosophy should attempt a systematization of all experience rather than content itself with a strictly metaphysical function, was held to be the principal need at the present time.

This led us to ask how philosophy could unite the testimony of religious experience as a whole in a synoptic view of reality. We acknowledged the services of Idealism in certain forms in providing an ethical theism. But it appeared that, whilst it is wholly legitimate to interpret a philosophy, intellectually conceived and stated, by reference to moral and religious values, such a proceeding seems always to be beset with the intrinsic difficulty of restoring at the end the values omitted at the beginning.

We preferred, therefore, to make human values part of the data for philosophy, and to conceive the character of reality accordingly, proceeding from value to existence.

This led to the implications of the religious postulate concerning reality. We saw that the sense of communion upon which it flourishes allows certain ground for believing in a personal and moral principle in reality, and although the former conception especially was inadequate, enough was afforded for the religious consciousness to live upon. The realization of the primacy of action over thought makes us content that our knowledge of God should bear this practical character rather than be intellectually complete.

At this point, then, we lay down our task. We have attempted to give some philosophical expression and justification to religious experience, but that experience is independent of any such efforts. If philosophy reject it, human nature will always hold it, and its existence will continue to witness that philosophy is so much the less than the fullness of experience. That a completely satisfactory philosophy of religious experience is a possible achievement for our finite consciousness can scarcely be hoped. The present volume has aimed at the much less ambitious task of suggesting that the essential groundwork for a philosophy of religion is provided by the general facts of religious experience.

But the central idea which we have here attempted to vindicate, that within reality there is a principle working towards the realization of human good, is a challenge to humanity. Just as the response of reality to our attempt intellectually to comprehend it is the inspiration of the

ideals of science and philosophy, so a reality that we believe responds to our moral and religious postulates binds us to seek strenuously to participate in securing good. A neutral universe can call from us nothing, but a sympathy in reality with human values lays us under obligation to co-operate with all our powers. This alone can call for the maximum of moral energy. The final character of the good we do not know, but its fulfilment we must not doubt. When the real we have idealized is realized, in place of the broken lights of the spectrum of truth, we hope to see all as one.

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